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ABSTRACT
Performance measurement systems have received substantial attention in recent years from both 
practitioners and academics. Many firms have redesigned their measurement systems to make 
certain that they reflect their current environment and strategies. The oil industry is becoming 
increasingly competitive with the rising nationalisation of resources making it ever more difficult 
for International Oil Companies (IOC) to secure access to new oil and gas reserves. This makes the 
performance of IOC’s an interesting area to study at the moment as reserves disclosures are one of 
the most important pieces of information that the financial sector, shareholders and managers 
require in order to analyse, compare and contrast the past and prospective operational performance 
of oil and gas companies. Recent oil spills and stakeholder issues resulting from IOC exploration 
and production activities also bring to light the crucial nature of having effective measurement 
systems in place to avoid potential disasters.
This doctoral thesis contributes to the research area of performance measurement systems and 
strategic management by establishing the fact that the development process is formed by the 
influence of factors in the organisational context. The initial strategic analysis in the thesis will 
access both the emergent and prescriptive strategy of Royal Dutch Shell. The thesis furthers already 
available knowledge in this area by integrating what the researcher terms projection strategies 
through scenarios. The thesis also contributes to knowledge and practice by incorporating a diverse 
range of performance measures, including traditional financial measures (Return on Average 
Capital Employed, Economic Value Added, Reserves Replacement Ratio ‘industry specific’) and 
subjective non-financial measures (Balanced Scorecard, Corporate Social Responsibility, Health, 
Safety and Environment ‘Industry Specific’). The introduction of industry specific measures leads 
to the effective analysis of a complex and unique industry like the oil sector.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Over the last 20 years, the oil industry has changed from a time of stability and certainty to an era of 
unpredictability and continuous change. A wide array of new developments has contributed to a 
more unforeseeable business environment (Osmundsen et al; 2005). There is a compelling need for 
oil industry executives to look at how oil companies can respond to those changes and why 
delivering consistently high levels of performance becomes more and more challenging the larger a 
company gets (Antill and Amott; 2002). How to align the organisation behind the right, rather than 
any strategy, and follow through to deliver on performance promises to shareholders is seen by 
managers as a universal challenge irrespective of size, location, value chain and indeed business 
model (Simmons; 2002).
Shareholders, investors and financial markets are vigilant to corporate statements that may be 
technically precise, but fail to reflect the true picture of an organisations condition and prospects 
(Berry et al; 2004). The necessity for reporting metrics that fully depict the potential of an oil 
companies strategy and operations is currently more than ever before (Bindeman; 1999). The 
traditional, predominantly financial, indicators used to measure corporate performance no longer 
meet the needs of the global capital markets (Litman et al; 1999, p. 15). They do not tell a 
company’s full story and are not adequate to deliver true insight into its capacity to grow, adapt and 
change (Antill and Amott; 2002). This thesis of International Oil Companies demonstrates the case 
for more comprehensive reporting as the reporting practices of petroleum companies fall short of 
what investors and analysts say they need for investment purposes.
The DBA thesis will focus on the Shell Group which is the world’s second largest multinational oil 
company after Exxon, and as such one of the world’s largest industrial enterprises. The company 
has a strong resource base and operates in more than 130 countries, investing more than ever to find 
and produce additional oil and natural gas fwww.shell.comT In addition to its ambitious plans to 
discover new oil and gas cheaply during the 1990s, Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) was redefining how it 
counted existing reserves which are defined as oil and gas in the ground that a company expects to 
pump and sell (Cummings and Latour; 2004). In Febmary 2004 RDS announced that it had re­
categorised some 20 per cent of its total proven reserves base. Whilst it was not unusual for oil and
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gas companies to review their reserves, the sheer magnitude of this re-categorisation took the 
industry by surprise (Watchman; 2004).
Also during this period, the controversies of the Nigerian Niger Delta and Shells plans to dispose of 
a rusted and obsolete oil-storage platform, known as Brent Spar, by sinking it in the ocean brought 
into question shells underlying management philosophy. RDS was forced to review their key 
performance indicators and ensure that management systems were in line with overall corporate 
strategy which reflects both internal and external forces (Boele et al; 2001). Considering these 
factors, the researcher felt it was fitting to select Royal Dutch Shell as a case company in the 
attempt of gaining a better understanding of strategic performance measurement in the oil and gas 
industry. Proponents of strategic performance measurement advocate two general approaches for 
developing Performance Measurement Systems (PMS). The first approach calls for firms to 
measure and use a diverse set of financial and non-financial measures (Chenhall and Morris; 1986, 
Mia; 1993) while the second is based on strategic alignment (Abemethy and Bouwens; 2000, 
Gordon and Narayanan; 1984).
1.2 Performance Measurement Diversity
Supporters of this “ measurement diversity” approach claim that a broad set of measures keeps 
managers from sub optimizing by not acknowledging relevant performance dimensions or 
improving one measure at the expense of others (Simons; 1987, 1990, Chenhall and Morris; 1986, 
Hoque and James; 2000). As a result, these researchers believe that companies achieve superior 
performance when they utilise a varying set of financial and non-financial performance measures 
(Chenhall and Morris; 1986, Langfield-Smith; 1997). Hoque and James (2000) also find a positive 
relation between perceived organizational performance and the use of a diverse set of performance 
measures.
A key aspect of the project will therefore be to investigate the nature of effective and efficient 
performance measurement in International Oil Companies. This provides an opportunity to 
examine the extent to which the range of indicators proposed enables the tracking of performance in 
relation to defined goals. Criticisms that are levelled at the use of output data in the oil industry 
relate to their use as the sole indicators of performance (Lynch; 1995, Bindemann; 1999).
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An oil and gas performance measurement system with an improvement focus will need to 
incorporate measures of oil and gas outcomes, but these must be balanced with other measures of 
performance (financial & non-financial). No one performance measure in the oil and gas industry 
can tell all there is to know about how an organisation is functioning, but a collection of well 
selected performance indicators considered together can present enough information to see what is 
going on (McCormack and Vytheeswaran; 1998).
The needs for performance information and the appropriate type of performance indicators vary 
across levels within oil and gas companies and at the industry level (Antill; 2002). The indicators 
which are appropriate and valid for an IOC may be quite different from those at the level of a 
National Oil Company (NOC) which may again differ from those which may be appropriate for a 
service company or the industry as a whole. Strategy and performance measurements need to be 
intertwined, and as such are likely to be unique for each company. Companies should measure how 
parts of their value chain actually fit together for an overarching advantage instead of relying on 
process-by-process metrics (Porter; 2002).
1.3 Strategic Alignment
The measurement diversity argument leads into the second approach that will be examined in this 
thesis which is based on contingency theory. Researchers who advocate this view note that 
strategic performance measures must be aligned with the firm’s strategy and/or value drivers 
(Fisher; 1992, Langfield-Smith; 1997). The literature on management control systems design offers 
a broad range of contingency research (Bums; 1992, Daniel and Reitsperger; 1991, Langfield- 
Smith; 1998b, Chenhall and Morris; 1986). Basically this approach asserts that there is no 
universally appropriate PMS that can be applied to every situation since the effectiveness and 
usefulness of PMS are contingent on certain external factors (e.g. market and environment) and 
internal factors (e.g. technology and strategy) (Chenhall; 2003, Chenhall and Morris; 1986).
Based on this understanding, researchers have set out to investigate how different variables, such as 
the nature of the external environment, organisation stmcture, size, technology, and strategy impact 
upon the design of PMS (Waterhouse and Tiessen; 1978, Chenhall and Morris; 1986). The findings 
have been wide-ranging, but they by and large support the existence of a relationship between 
contextual variables and PMS design (Chenhall; 2003). This study hopes to find a significant 
relationship between the organization’s strategy and performance measurement system. In
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consideration of the importance of strategy to performance measurement, both the literature review 
and the analysis will be split into an initial strategy section and then the performance measurement 
section to allow for a more effective analysis.
1.4 Introduction to Strategic Focus
Brown (1996, p .ll)  stipulates that a dynamic performance measurement system should have: an 
external monitoring system, which continuously monitors developments and changes in the external 
environment as well as an internal monitoring system, which continuously monitors developments 
and changes in the internal environment and raises warning and action signals when certain 
performance limits and thresholds are reached. As a result of this, the preferred economic model 
for this thesis is the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model, which proposes that a 
deterministic relationship exists between market structure and profitability (Porter; 1980).
According to this school of thought, the structural characteristics determine the behaviour and 
strategies of firms within an industry, which in turn determines the industry specific differences in 
financial performance between firms (Porter; 1980). Porter’s SCP model and the ‘five forces’ 
framework was the reason it was thus essential to conduct a value chain analysis of the petroleum 
industry (Porte; 1980). Value chain analysis helps this doctoral thesis focus on both the 
competitive environment of RDS within which they compete, and on the specific business activities 
the company is engaged in.
Despite the logic and obviousness of the paradigm, the main problem with the industrial 
organization view is that it fails to explain the intra-industry differences in performance between 
firms (Wemerfelt; 1984). In an effort to address this issue, the thesis will focus on the Resource 
Based View which is the first real breakthrough in explaining inter - industry differences in 
performance (Wemerfelt; 1984). It proposes that the differences between organisations results from 
the heterogeneity of accumulation and efficiency in the use of firm specific unique resources that 
are the source of competitive advantage (Wemerfelt; 1984, Bamey; 1991).
By applying both models to Royal Dutch Shell (RDS), this DBA thesis is in line with Bititci
(2000)’s proposition for performance measurement systems to be dynamic and prioritise objectives 
in line with changes in the intemal and extemal environment. The fact that it is sometimes hard to 
detect ambiguous trends, gives impetus to this DBA thesis adding a scenario planning dimension to
13
the positioning and RBV approaches proposed. Scenario analysis advocates the creation of 
alternative images of the future development of the extemal environment (Estrada et al; 1997). In 
doing so, scenarios underscore vital uncertainties which influence the strategic decisions managers 
have to make (Elkington; 2001).
The scenarios themselves are not the desired end; rather they are a management tool to improve the 
quality of strategic decisions (Goodwin et al; 2001). For a conventional exploration and production 
company, a strategic decision might involve a long term strategic direction such as whether to focus 
exploration efforts on oil or natural gas. For a major independent or integrated energy company, the 
strategic decision might be whether to integrate or focus on a specific part of the value chain (Cibin 
and Grant; 1996). Newly developed functions have therefore increased the importance of multiple- 
scenario analysis to the DBA thesis. For instance, scenario analysis now claims to support the entire 
strategic management process (Schoemaker; 1993, p. 197).
1.5 Research Overview and Aim
Finally, some scholars have anticipated that world oil supply has decreased to less than half of the 
original supply of oil; this theory is referred to as “Peak Oil” and speculates that world oil supply 
cannot reach the demand and therefore prices will continuously increase (Campbell; 2003, 
Bakhtiari; 2004). The uncertainty regarding the future of oil and the recent upswing in shares of 
stock in oil companies makes the oil industry very interesting at the moment (Figure 1.1).
-r  100
90 -  90
70 - -  70
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- - 6 0
- - 4 0
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- - 20
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Figure 1.1: W orld Oil Discovery Volumes 1930 to 2050 
Source: Smith; 2003
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What makes the depleting reserves interesting when it comes to this doctoral thesis is the fact that 
the oil reserves controlled by Royal Dutch Shell constitute the vast majority of the company’s 
assets. Hence, one may conclude that the value of Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) will be dominated by 
the present value of current and future oil reserves. However, these future cash flows are quite hard 
for a layman to predict and valuate. Thus, the valuation of and performance measurement of oil 
companies may appear quite complicated (Edwards; 1997). It therefore becomes of interest to 
examine what metrics and measures are used by managers in the oil industry.
Although intemal Performance Measurement Systems (PMS) systems play a critical role in 
implementing and executing strategy (Bindemann; 1999), there has been relatively little hard 
research done on what characteristics constitute an effective performance measurement system in 
the petroleum industry (Antill and Amott; 2002, Chua and Woodward; 1994). The overarching 
research question is thus; “What is the most effective design for a performance measurement system 
to meet the four purposes below and allow an Intemational Oil Company achieve its strategic 
objectives?”
In essence, performance measurement systems in operation have to perform four basic functions to 
be effective: They need to:
1. Document historical performance.
2. Indicate current position with respect to strategy.
3. Predict future performance.
4. Motivate and control action.
The author of this doctoral thesis will compile a framework of how to go about measuring the 
performance of IOC’s, by investigating the relevant literature on the subject, and by interviewing 
industry insiders. For the reader to fully understand and profit from reading the thesis the author has 
incorporated general information about oil and the oil industry. This will provide the reader with 
useful background information and facilitate in the understanding of the complexity of this industry. 
The findings of the research will be twofold; firstly adding theoretical value to the corpus of 
knowledge in strategic management, and secondly helping oil and gas industry practitioners gain a 
better understanding of the complex and unique nature of strategic performance measurement in 
this distinctive industry, which is the immediate discipline of the research problem.
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1.6 Outline of Thesis Structure
The thesis structure will be subdivided into eight main chapters as illustrated in the table below.
THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter 1 .Introduction
Chapter 2.Literature Review
Chapter 3.Introduction to The Oil Industry
Chapter 4.Research Design, Methods and Philosophy
Chapter 5. Strategic Management Analysis of Royal Dutch Shell
Chapter 6.Performance Measurement Analysis of Royal Dutch Shell
Chapter 8.Thesis Conclusion
Table 1.1: Thesis Structure 
Source: Own Development
The first three chapters of this thesis establish the background to the research and provide the 
research design. Chapter 1 introduces the broad research area of interest and describes the 
researcher’s motivation and intent. The chapter also identity’s why the research is potentially 
important to both theory and practice and concludes by outlining the aims and objectives of the 
research. In chapter 2, the literature review is presented in two main sections, firstly a section on 
strategic management and secondly a diverse set of performance measures are examined. While the 
research question is strongly embedded in the field of performance measurement in the petroleum 
industry, the literature review and analysis sections are intentionally structured so that strategic 
management is presented first. It is anticipated that this will provide the reader with a fresh 
perspective of the strategic process and strategic management theory and analysis respectively as a 
base, before going into the research on strategic performance measurement.
While chapter 3 gives an introduction and overview of the oil industry and factors relevant to the 
study, chapter 4 explains the methodology used to examine the thesis as well as the expected 
outcomes of the research questions. The chapter starts off with an explanation of the attraction to
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Background
According to Ittner and Larcker (1997), the third generation performance measurement models 
must be able to inform the operation of the organisation and deliver insights about the real levers of 
value creation. If performance measurement and management is to be of any real value to 
organisations, it must help management translate their strategic intent into appropriate actions and 
deliver feedback information showing whether these actions are working or not (Begemann et al; 
2000, Ecoles; 1991). As indicated in chapter one, the literature will thus commence with a strategy 
section covering Porters positioning strategy with its focus on the extemal environment and the 
resource based view which helps us cover the intemal strategy of RDS (Mintzberg; 1998, Porter; 
1980; p.85, Wenerfelt; 1984).
Recent trends in the petroleum business environment show it is becoming increasingly complex and 
managers are continuously faced with rapid changes. Because of this, a capacity for peripheral 
vision is cmcial not only for success, but for survival as well (Osmundseen; 2006). The key for oil 
companies is to quickly spot relevant current and future signals, know how to explore them, filter 
out the noise, and pursue opportunities ahead of the competition (Gately; 2002, Osmundseen; 
2006). This therefore justifies a review off scenario planning literature in addition to positioning 
and RBV as the author believes this will give a more robust overview of an oil company’s strategic 
orientation for this DBA thesis.
While one line of performance measurement focuses on the use of non-financial performance 
measures; examples include the Balanced Scorecard Concept, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Health Safety and Environment (HSE) which tends to be industry specific, another line of 
performance measurement innovations have focused on improving the financial measures (new 
financial measures’ or ‘economic value measures) (Lipe et al; 2000). Proponents of economic value 
measures which will be looked into extensively in the literature below argue, that performance 
measurement systems should be aligned with the firm’s ultimate organizational objective and 
improved economic performance (Ittner et al; 1997). Finally in order to address financial industry 
specific performance measures, the literature will look into Reserves Replacement Ratio (RRR). 
This metric will give us a better overview of an oil company’s current economic position and 
strategic disposition (Chua and Woodward; 1994).
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2.2 Strategy Theory
2.2.1 Positioning Strategy
Before the emergence of RBV in strategic management literature strategy had long been defined as 
a strategic fit between the extemal environment and intemal resources (Ansoff; 1965, Andrews; 
1971, Itami; 1987). Based on these arguments and tracing originally back to the stmcture-conduct- 
performance (so-called ‘S-C-P paradigm’) tradition in Harvard industrial economics (Bain; 1959, 
Mason; 1949), Porter (1980, 1981) argued that competitive advantage could be achieved from 
product-market position. This competitive force approach, now well known as ‘Positioning School’ 
(Mintzber et al; 1998), became the dominant approach in this field through the mid 1980s. Porter 
(1980) reinterpreted the microeconomics of industrial organization in a managerial context. The 
economic analysis of market failures is used by porter to suggest how organisations might seek 
above-normal profits in less than competitive market segments.
Porter (1985) resonates more with the 'resource based view' of the firm, which attempts to explain 
how a firm might actively build market barriers and sustain monopolistic structures. Porter placed 
the relationship between enterprise strategy and industry structure at the heart of his model of 
‘competitive strategy’. He presented the possibility of ‘selecting’ a strategy based on a well-defined 
‘position’ in the economic market-place backed-up by ‘analysis’ rather than ‘prescription’ (Ansoff; 
1965, Rumelt; 1974). Porter says that he was looking for a theoretical context to add to the analysis 
as he focused on both content and process. He popularised the ‘Industrial Organization’ economics 
model of ‘Structure—Conduct (strategy)—Performance' which claims that forces within the industry 
determine the conduct of firms, which in turn determines firm performance (Thorelli; 1977, Masson 
and Quail; 1976).
At the level of market structure, industrial organisation examines the number of competitors who 
operate in the relevant market and the distribution of market shares; the conditions of entry and exit; 
product standardization and its proximity to substitutable goods; the interdependence between 
upstream and downstream activities; the quality of information controlled by partners and the 
degree of risk involved. Some scholars firmly established within the strategy field have critiqued 
the prescriptive, technocratic approach to strategy, represented by the work of Porter (1980; 1985), 
for its reliance on a rational, logical and linear model of analysis and planning (Foss; 1996, p. 9).
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Sun Tzu (1983), though often expressed as a series of maxims, advocates an approach that is non­
linear, unpredictable and paradoxical, commending the title The Art of War' rather than ‘The 
Science’ has been particularly prominent in arguing that the actuality of strategy is better 
characterized as an emergent rather than planned organizational phenomenon (Luttwak, 1987, 
Quinn and Cameron; 1988). Mintzberg et al (1998) emphasizes the recursive processes of learning, 
negotiation and adaptation by which strategy is actually enacted, and suggests that the planning- 
implementation distinction is unsustainable (Mintzberg; 1990). Mintzberg argues that such 
processes are both inevitable and functional.
2.2.2 Resource Based View Strategy
The Resource Based View (RBV) suggests that the resources possessed by a firm are the primary 
determinants of its performance, and these may contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage of 
the firm (Hoffer and Schendel; 1978, Wenerfelt; 1984). According to Bamey (1991), the concept of 
resources includes all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, 
knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies 
that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Bamey; 1991, 2001). Like the Chicago School 
tradition, the RBV is an efficiency-based explanation of performance differences (Peteraf and 
Bamey; 2003). Performance differentials are viewed as derived from rent differentials, attributable 
to resources having intrinsically different levels of efficiency in the sense that they enable the firms 
to deliver greater benefits to their customers for a given cost (or can deliver the same benefit levels 
for a lower cost)” (Peteraf and Bamey; 2003, p. 311).
Viewing a firm as a bundle of resources was pioneered by Penrose (1959). Penrose argued that it is 
the heterogeneity, not the homogeneity, of the productive services available from its resources that 
give each firm its unique character. The notion of firm’s resource heterogeneity is the basis of the 
RBV. The significance of the resource perspective as a new direction in the field of strategic 
management was broadly recognized with the path-breaking article by Wemerfelt (1984). 
Wemerfelt (1984) suggested that evaluating firms in terms of their resources could lead to insights 
that differ from traditional perspectives. The assumed heterogeneity and immobility are not, 
however, sufficient conditions for sustained competitive advantage.
According to Bamey (1991), a firm resource must, in addition, be valuable, rare, and imperfectly 
imitable and substitutable in order to be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Peteraf (1993)
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identifies four conditions underlying sustained competitive advantage; superior resources 
(heterogeneity within an industry), ex post limit to competition, imperfect resource mobility and ex 
ante limits to competition. Foss (2003) on the other hand notes that the resource-based perspective 
does not escape the general problem of finding the appropriate unit of analyses. Most contributions 
within the RBV take the individual resource as the relevant unit of analysis to study competitive 
advantage.
However, Foss (2003) points out that this choice may only be legitimated if the relevant resources 
are sufficiently well defined and free-standing. If in contrast there are strong relations of co 
specialization among resources, it is the way resources are clustered and how they interplay and fit 
into the system that is important to the understanding of competitive advantage. Priem and Butler
(2001) conclude that the resource-based view has contributed very little to the explanation or 
prediction of competitive advantage and recommend that scholars should address core connections 
between resources and the environment. While resources represent what can be done, the 
competitive environment represents what must be done to compete effectively in satisfying 
customer needs.
While Peteraf and Bamey (2002) assume heterogeneity and do not inquire into its origin, some 
authors argue for the development of an endogenous theory of heterogeneity (Russo and Fonts; 
1997, Bridoux; 2004, Harries; 2003). Mahoney and Pandian (1992; p.374) propose either to 
integrate the RBV with the organizational economics and dynamic capabilities approach or to 
utilize the equilibrium models of industrial organization in order to explain the origins of 
heterogeneity. Foss and Knudsen (2003) stipulate that uncertainty and immobility (i.e., sunk cost 
commitments) should be the only conditions to enter the study of sustained competitive advantage 
as exogenous elements whereas a host of additional conditions are candidates for inclusion as 
endogenous elements. They include input heterogeneity in this unbounded list of additional 
conditions that give shape to competitive advantage.
It could be said that the more firms possess a market base, operational know-how and material 
resources, the more likely they are to develop, manufacture and commercialize a new product 
independently rather than in cooperation. If firms have substantial resource endowments which are 
applicable to the new project, they are likely to use them to achieve greater efficiency and do it 
internally to avoid competitive leakage as well as contractual and competitive hazards especially in 
the context of horizontal scale alliances (Rumelt; 1984, Kogut; 1989). However, cooperation know­
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how on the other hand reduces the expected transaction costs and misappropriation risks of 
collaboration, making it a more likely choice (Peteraf; 1994).
While it might seem somewhat apparent that organisations are different because they are comprised 
of different resources, this perspective is a significant departure from the long dominant market 
based view (see Five Forces Analysis) (Porter; 1980, 1985). In the market-based view, firms are 
largely seen as being homogeneous, and competition is seen as occurring via positioning in markets 
(Mahoney and Pandian; 1992). With the market based view, the strategic challenge is seen as 
identifying attractive markets to compete in - attractive markets being ones with characteristics 
identified by analysis of Porter’s five forces (Bamey et al; 2003). Bridoux (2004) proposed a 
framework which integrates both resources and the competitive environment as sources of 
performance and drivers of strategy and, in particular, competitive behaviours. This framework can 
be summarized as follows: The resources and the competitive environment condition company 
strategy. Strategy and performance in turn affect the competitive environment and resources, and all 
these changes generate new information which in turn creates new learning opportunities and may 
lead to the creation and development of new resources (Bridoux; 2004).
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Figure 2.1 Strategy Framework 
Source: Bridoux; 2004
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The argument of uncertainties cited in the industrial organisation and resource based view leads this 
thesis into scenario planning strategy. Scenarios map out the boundaries of managers uncertainties 
and provide a context of expectations for generating and evaluating strategic options (Davis; 1998). 
This process reveals strategic risks and opens thinking on new means of managing or mitigating 
risk in executing major strategies. While hard decisions are not removed and risks are not 
eradicated, decisions are based on a broader appreciation of the risks and rewards (Harries; 2003, 
Chermack and Van der Merwe; 2003). For example, the focal question of a scenario planning 
exercise for management in an oil company who are focused on energy investment choices over the 
next 10-15 years might be ‘ what part of the energy value chain should we invest in (Van Der 
Heijden;1996)
2.2.3 Scenario Planning Strategy
Scenario planning is about making choices today with an understanding of how they might turn out 
(Van der Heijden; 1996). In this context the accurate definition of "scenario" is: a tool for ordering 
one’s perceptions about alternative future environments in which one’s decision might be played 
out (Chermack and Van der Merwe; 2003). They form a method for articulating the different 
pathways that might exist for managers in the future and finding appropriate movements down each 
of those possible paths (Ringland; 1998). The above definition clearly contrasts the concept of 
standard "prediction", as it is impossible to predict the future with certainty.
Furthermore, it is radically different from the idea of traditional business forecasting, in as much as 
scenarios present alternative images of the future, rather than merely projecting the trends of the 
present (Neilson and Wagner; 2000). There are many different types of scenarios and ways of 
classifying them (Martelli; 2001, Van Der Heijden; 1996, Bossel; 1998, Ringland; 1998). 
(Dammers; 2000) develops different types of scenarios according to five variables (Table 2.1).
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Breath of the scenario topic Sectoral vs. multi- sectoral scenarios
Level of aggregation Micro, meso and macro scenarios
Direction of time ( from past to future or the other Projective vs prospective scenarios
way round
Amount of exploration Dominant, limited explorative, and highly
explorative scenario
Focus of action Environmental vs policy scenarios
Table 2.1: Different Types of Scenario Thinking According To Variables 
Source: Dammers; 2000
The main theme from the literature on scenario planning cited above is that scenarios are effective 
in dealing with uncertainties (Leemhuis; 1985 p.30). Various researchers however, argue that 
managers are confronted nowadays with totally new and entirely unanticipated situations that are 
indicative of blind spots inherent in this method (Mason et al; 2003, Neilson et al; 2000, Phelps et 
al; 1998). Figure below depicts the view of scenario planning being equipped to deal with the 
predetermined and uncertainties but failing to acknowledge unknowables (Martelli, 2001).
U/P
Uncertainties
HopeForec. Scenarios
Predetermineds
Time
Figure 2.2: Scenario Outcomes 
Source: Martelli; 2001
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This is especially the case with conventional and trend-based scenarios that are based on simple 
causalities and on mere extrapolations of the past, the present and future. They cannot deal very 
well with these complex trends which used to be an exception but now become the rule (De Jong; 
1998). Methods and techniques of forecasting, in general, aim at the predetermined; that is 
predictable elements which can easily be forecasted (Sparrow; 2000). While scenario planning is 
more suitable to deal with (not too many) uncertainties in the not too distant future, events like the 
September 11 incidence and the subsequent war on terrorism by the United States of America were 
not conceivable in the year 2000 (Postma and Liebl;2003, p.5). Exploring and discussing the 
implications of such unknowables may become very relevant for decision/policy makers (Van der 
Heijden; 2002, p.214).
2.2.4 Summary
The earlier review of some of the most central literature on strategy has shown that the variance in 
the theories associated with the notion of strategy vary extensively. Hoskinson et al (1999) 
describes the development of the different views of strategy as “swings of a pendulum”. In the 
1960s and the 1970s the dominating view was to describe strategy from within the company. As 
porter and others started to be more influential in the 1980s, “the pendulum” then swung so that the 
outside view was emphasized. During the recent years strategy approaches close to the RBV have 
caused a second swing so that the strategy is back on the inside - view (Harris; 2000).
As also acknowledged by Hoskinson et al (1999), the different eras in strategic management 
studies have all made valuable contributions to the area. Finally, the importance of projection 
strategies through scenarios was examined. Scenarios are stories concerning the manner in which 
the world might turn out in the future, that is stories which can help managers recognize and adapt 
to changing aspects of the present environment. In summary, giving the relative importance of 
scenario planning in the strategic literature, this research will aim to gain a better understanding of 
IOC strategies from the positioning and resource based view as well as the IOCS ability to predict 
unforeseen events and react in the most appropriate strategic manner (Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Thesis Strategic Approach 
Source: Own Development
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2.3 Performance Measurement
2.3.1 Background
Performance measurement systems (PMS) have been on top of the list of the research and business 
agenda over the last decade (Frigo and Krum’wiede; 1999, Bourne et al; 1999). Businesses have 
realised the importance of multidimensional and balanced performance measurement systems as a 
tool that would enable them drive the company forward (Waggoner et al; 1999). Although 
traditional financial accounting systems indicate the performance that results fiom the activities of 
an organisation (Ghalayini and Noble; 1996), they fail to provide little indication of how that 
performance is achieved or how it can be improved (Meyer and Gupta; 1994, Keegan; 1989).
2.3.2 Description of Performance Measurement
Considerable research indicates that, since enterprises are forced to immediate reactions, managers 
are frequently unsatisfied with the traditional tools of evaluation (Zairi; 1996, p.31). They 
frequently feel overloaded by information but not by relevant performance data; as is so often the 
case for many concepts, performance measurement has no generally accepted definition (Meyer and 
Gupta; 1992, Lynch and Cross; 1991). Various researchers have suggested that performance 
measures are the lifeblood of organizations, since without them no decision can be made (Kennerly 
and Neely; 2001, Mia et al; 1994). According to Kloot (1997) measurement is the first step to 
control and improvement. Resources in any organization are limited and scarce. Performance 
measurement provides management with the opportunity to make the right allocation of resources 
and to set the right priorities for improvement (Macintosh et al; 1994, Wisner and Fawcett; 1991).
According to the marketing perspective, organizations achieve their goals, i.e. they perform by 
satisfying their customers with greater efficiency and effectiveness than their competitors (Lynch 
and Cross; 1991, Bums; 1992). Efficiency is a measure of how economically the supplier’s 
resources are used when delivering a given product or service; effectiveness refers to the extent to 
which customers’ expectations are met (Bititci et al; 2000). This is crucial due to the fact that it 
reveals the multi-dimensional nature of performance in addressing both internal and external factors 
which in turn influences managerial decisions. The level of performance an organization attains is a 
function of the efficiency and effectiveness of such actions (Bourne et al; 2002). Most descriptions 
of Performance measurement are similar to the one presented by Slack et al. (2001), which
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distinguishes between five types of performance objectives: cost, flexibility, speed, dependability 
and quality.
2.3.3 Why Measure Performance
Before approaching the task of designing any system or any specific measures, it is important to 
separate ‘Why measure?’ from ‘What to measure?’ because the reasons for the evaluation of 
performance underpin any measurement that is needed (Clinton et al; 1998). Any consideration of 
measures suitable for evaluation needs to take the aim for which evaluation takes place into 
consideration as this prevents the issue of meeting one need at the expense of others (Hayes and 
Abernathy; 1980). As Crowther (2002) remarks, performance measurement is undertaken for one 
of three main reasons:
• Measurement for control
• Measurement for accountability
• Measurement for strategy formulation
Each of these reasons exists in isolation from the others, and so should be considered separately. 
There is no reason to presume that measures created for control purposes will be suitable for 
accountability or for strategy formulation; measures used must thus be appropriate for the purpose 
to which they are put (Townley and Cooper; 1998). Researchers note that measurement is a relative 
rather than an absolute process, and it is comparison that provides the meaning for measurement 
(Crowther; 2002, Clinton et al; 1998, Hayes and Abernathy; 1980). An organization first describes 
performance (through objective measurement), and then evaluates performance (through subjective 
value judgements).
Schiemann and Tingle (1999, p. 2) confirmed their strong belief on the need for strategic 
performance measures to drive firm success. Kaplan and Norton (2001, p.22) suggest performance 
measurement as a basis for defining strategic objectives for continuous improvement as well as a 
vehicle for cultural change. Measuring performance offers an effective method of determining 
whether or not an organization is meeting its goals and achieving its mission (Brown; 1996, p. 180).
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2.3.4 Traditional Financial Performance Measures
To use a PMS that solely consists of financial performance measures can cause problems for a 
company as illustrated below:
• Financial measures are not directly related to strategy; disproportionate use of return on 
investment (ROI) also affects strategy development and may clash with strategic objectives 
(Atkinson; 1997, Ghalayini and Noble; 1996).
• Traditional criteria such as cost efficiency and utilisation may pressure managers for short­
term results and for that reason discourage improvements (Chenhall; 1997, Nanni et al; 
1992).
• Financial measures do not report precisely on the cost of processes, products, and 
customers: they also focus on controlling processes in isolation rather than as a whole 
system (Bums; 1992, Atkinson; 1997).
• Financial measures are not applicable to new management techniques that give shop-floor 
operators responsibility and autonomy (Tingle et al; 1996, Nanni et al; 1992).
• Financial measures do not penalise overproduction and do not adequately identify the cost 
of quality (Bourne et al; 2002, Chenhall; 1997).
2.3.5 Issues with Traditional Measures of Performance
The shortcomings of traditional measurement systems have triggered a revolution in the field of 
performance management (Eccles et al; 1992, Neely et al; 1999). The extent to which discussed 
models, which were developed in the 1970s and 1980s, maintain their relevance to contemporary 
settings is partly questionable (Grady; 1991, Johnson et al; 1998). Today, strategies are being 
complicated by the need for most companies to be both low cost producers and to provide 
customers with high quality, timely and reliable delivery. Authors suggest that traditional financial 
performance measures are historical in nature (Titman et al; 1999, p. 15), provide little indication of 
future performance; encourage short-termism, are internally rather than externally focused, with
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little regard for competitors or customers, lack strategic focus and often inhibit innovation 
(Richardson and Gordon; 1980, Kaplan and Norton; 1992, Neely et al; 1995, Reid; 2000).
Firms have traditionally relied almost exclusively on financial measures such as budgets, profits or 
accounting returns to measure performance (Waggoner et al; 1999, Reid; 2000, Otley; 1999, Ittner 
et al; 1997, Bushman et al; 1996). These perceived inadequacies have motivated several academics 
and practitioners to suggest a variety of performance measurement innovations (Townley and 
Cooper; 1998, Grady; 1991, Johnson et al; 1998), ranging from ‘improved’ financial metrics such 
as economic value measures (Chen and Dodd; 1996, Zimmerman; 1997, Stem et al; 1995), to 
balanced scorecards that integrate financial and non-financial measures (Kaplan and Norton; 2000) 
and personal or subjective measures (Gibbs et al; 2004, Ittner et al; 2008). The main characteristics 
of both the ‘traditional’ and ‘contemporary’ performance measures will be discussed shortly in the 
following sections.
2.3.6 Background to Strategic Alignment and Measure
The right performance measures align actions and strategy by reducing managers’ financial myopia 
and effectively communicating strategy (Zairi, 1996, Kaplan and Norton; 2000). Systemic 
management understands and exploits knowledge of dynamic interrelations among resources and 
capabilities (Vitale; 1995, Bierbusse and Siesfeld; 1997). The elements of a PMS are intended to 
reflect the strategic use of resources and deployment of efficient processes (Give, et al 2001; 13). 
Strategy depicts how effective the corporation has been in leveraging its business context. Its 
impact on performance cannot be seen in isolation from the firm’s business context (Bitictici et al;
1997). The double-headed arrow linking business context and strategy in Figure 2.4 conveys this 
relationship (Burgelman; 1983).
Gibbs et al (2004), notes that one of the main goals of a PMS is to help direct the allocation of 
resources, to assess and communicate progress toward strategy, or to evaluate managerial 
performance. However, a major challenge for companies is determining which of the hundreds, if 
not thousands, of measures to track (Ittner et al 2003:90). Kaplan and Norton (1996; 75) explicitly 
recognized the value of using a balanced set of performance measures to link a company’s long­
term strategy with its short-term action. They thus incorporate a circular model linking performance 
measures and strategy.
30
Finally, Burgelman (1983) introduced the notion of a ‘strategic context’ -  the process through 
which the current corporate strategy is extended to accommodate the new business activities 
resulting from bottom up initiatives that fall outside the scope of the current strategy. The strategic 
and structural contexts of the firm together must allow for both the exploitation of existing business 
domains as well as the exploration of new ones (Figure 2.4). Senior executives in a firm are not 
only decision-makers and actors in the strategy process, they are also the architects and managers of 
the organizational context that shapes these decisions and actions (Burgelman; 1983).
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Figure 2.4: Managing The Strategy Process 
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2.3.7 Measurement Diversity
Numerous researchers have examined the effects of strategic priorities on the choice for financial or 
non-financial performance measures within the PMS (Dixon; 1990, Eccles; 1991, Meyer and Gupta; 
1992). Collins et al (1997) found that innovative and proactive firms use budgets primarily 
representing financial objectives to a much greater extent than other firms. Also Simons (1987) 
found that high-performing prospectors attach great importance to setting tight budget goals and 
monitoring outputs carefully. The majority of studies, however, report opposite results. 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) establish that companies following a build strategy (increasing 
sales and market share) are more likely to place greater importance on non-financial measures (such
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as new product development, market share, R&D, customer satisfaction) than companies employin 
a harvest strategy (maximizing short-term earnings). Likewise, Simons (1987) discovered that 
defender firms tended to rely more on financial measures such as short-term budgets to compensate 
their managers.
Ittner et al (1997) found that the significance put on non-financial measures was higher in 
companies following an innovation-oriented ‘prospector’ strategy than in companies following a 
‘defender’ strategy. Proponents of this view stipulate that if management wishes to stress 
effectiveness in innovation, enhancing customer satisfaction and a reasonable rate of return, their 
management accounting and control systems should be designed to support these arrangements 
(Armstrong and Baron; 2003, Bititci et al; 1999). Various researchers have found that perceived 
environmental uncertainty is positively associated with higher importance of external and non- 
financial information (Govindarajan and Fisher; 1990, Langfield-Smith; 1997).
Govindarajan (1984), for example, pointed out that financial data alone would not be sufficient to 
evaluate managerial performance in a situation with high environmental uncertainty. Along the 
same lines. Chapman (1997) argued that performance evaluation under conditions of uncertainty is 
inappropriate when accounting information is incomplete because the process of quantification of 
accounting information will likely be harder in the more rapidly changing situation. Meanwhile 
Gordon and Miller (1976) indicated that reliance on accounting performance measures is low under 
high environment uncertainty but high under low environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, 
Langfield-Smith (1997) argued that organizations facing higher competition are likely to use 
multiple performance measures. In view of the above reported findings, thus, it can be concluded 
that in high perceived environmental uncertainty, information needed for planning, controlling, 
decision making and performance evaluation and measures should go beyond the accounting and 
financial information (Merchant; 1998, Daniel and Reitsperger ; 1991).
2.3.8 Strategic Alignment
More recently researchers have considered the influence on PMS design of the way in which firm’s 
position themselves within their environments by way of competitive strategy (Eccles; 1991). This 
has involved the identification of a firm’s strategic orientation and how this affects the way in 
which PMS are developed and used. The philosophy of strategic orientation is obtained from the 
propositions of Mintzberg (1973) who classified strategy as either entrepreneurial, adaptive or
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planning mode; Miles and Snow (1978) who identified defender, prospector, analyser and reactor 
strategic archetypes; and Porter (1980) who categorised strategy into overall cost leadership, 
differentiation and focused market or niche strategy. At a fimdamental level the PMS is designed to 
address decision-makers informational needs, which are known to be influenced by the nature of the 
external environment (Flamholtz; 1983, Eccles; 1991, Flamholtz et al; 1985). PMS are an 
instrument used by organizations to reduce uncertainty and insulate against changes in the 
environment (Schiemann and Lingle, 1999, p. 185).
This study expects to find a positive relationship between PEU and new PMS techniques in the oil 
and gas industry. As organisations face increasingly uncertain environments they will tend to 
increase their use of new PMS techniques, since these techmques have been developed in recent 
years and are therefore more likely be able to address contemporaneous organisational needs 
(Flamholtz et al; 1985). Market Value Added, balanced scorecard. Economic Value Added, and 
benchmarking are examples of PMS techniques that have been proposed as means of responding to 
the new challenges posed by the changing environment faced by contemporary organizations 
(Chenhall and Chapman; 2006, Langfield-Smith; 1997, Macintosh; 1994).
Critics note that the vast majority of contingency theory studies attempted to establish a relationship 
between contextual variables and PMS, but failed to consider how this relationship impacted on 
organizational effectiveness (Otley; 1980, 1999, Dess et al; 1997). However, the need to consider a 
measure of organizational effectiveness is a crucial one as the fundamental reasons for the existence 
of PMS is to contribute to that end; it should not be simply assumed to exist (Dixon; 1990, McNair 
et al; 1990). This issue is illustrated by studies that adopt what Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) call 
the selection method approach to fit.
Another significant issue with these studies is that the analyses performed tend to be univariate or to 
consider a rather limited number of variables at one time (Drazin and Van de Ven; 1985). The 
omission of important variables, which in many circumstances appear to be the product of 
convenience, is likely to be one of the factors that explain the frequency of conflicting findings and 
the fragmentary nature of research in the field (Fisher; 1998). This would not be an issue if not for 
the fact that researchers have shown that contingency variables are inter-related and therefore the 
findings might be in part driven by unobserved but correlated variables (Chenhall; 2003, McNair et 
al; 1990).
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A simple but clear example of how this problem can arise is shown by Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984) work, where the correlation between organizational structure and PMS becomes non­
significant when they control for the effect of the perceived environmental uncertainty. Also, other 
researchers have concluded that an exclusive reliance on the interaction between pairs of variables 
is potentially misleading (Govindarajan; 1984, Anthony and Govindaajan; 1995). Second, a 
common problem to these studies is the lack of an outcome variable to evaluate the robustness of 
contingency “match” examined (Otley; 1999). Researchers typically attempt to establish a 
relationship between contextual variables and certain features of the PMS, but not whether this 
match results in improved organisational performance (Chakravarthy; 1986). This study takes a 
view through the lens of the oil industry to attempt to overcome these issues.
2.3.9 PMS and Managerial Compensation
The use of performance measures in a compensation system or performance appraisals process is 
not a new topic in the measurement systems research as more companies are now using Strategic 
Performance Measurement (SPM) frameworks to calculate their rewards (Atkinson; 1998, 
Hertenstein and Platt; 2000). Various researchers find the balanced scorecard approach as an 
effective method to determine pay (Dabhilakar and Bengtsson; 2002, Letza; 1996). Over the last 
two decades, researchers have focused on the use of non-financial measures in annual incentive 
schemes (McKenzie and Shilling 1998, Ittner et al. 1997) or on the performance and behavioural 
effects of incorporating non-financial measures in incentive contracts. However, none of these 
researchers explicitly state that the type of financial and non-financial performance measures they 
investigate are the ones included in the companies’ SPM system (Martins and Salerno; 1999, 
Schneier et al; 1991).
The performance measurement system provides essential information to improve the understanding 
of managers’ decisions on firm value, and thereby serves a key governance role in developing 
strategies, evaluating the achievement of organizational objectives, and compensating managers 
(Meyer and Gupta; 1992). Current studies also suggest that the link between performance 
measurement and executive reward is a key element of management control systems because it 
creates incentives for managers to take the long-term perspective, reduces information asymmetry, 
and aligns managers' decisions with the interests of shareholders (McKenzie and Shilling; 1998, 
Hertenstein and Platt; 2000).
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2.3.10 Joint Venture Performance
Due to the new found competence of National Oil Companies (NOG), International Oil Companies 
(IOC) are increasingly finding themselves in a position whereby they have to partner with NOC’s to 
gain access to projects and reserves in oil producing nations (Ernst; 1999). Local content laws 
embarked on by third world nations also means that lOCs are forced to do business with small 
independents to operate in these countries (Luciani et al; 1998).
Joint Venture  C harac te r i s t i c s
P a r t n e r s h i p  b e t w e e n  N O G  ( N a t i o n a l  O i l  C o m p a n y )  a n d  I O C  
( I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O i l  C o m p a n y )
R i s k s  a n d  c o s t s  a r e  s h a r e d  b e t w e e n  N O C  a n d  I O C  
E x a m p l e s :  N i g e r i a ,  N o r t h  W e s t  S h e l f  ( A u s t r a l i a ) ,  R u s s i a
O
NOC IOC
R i s k  s h a r i n g
Figure 2.5: Types of Oil and Gas J.Vs 
Source: Tsalik and Schiffrin; 2005
The case company for this thesis (Royal Dutch Shell) is a joint venture which is 100 percent owned 
by two holding companies: Royal Dutch, which is based in the Netherlands owns 60 percent and 
Shell Transport which is one of the 10 largest in the U.K owns 40%. The majority of the business 
activities of RDS are also carried out as joint venture partnerships. Joint venture partnerships open 
up new market opportunities and access to local market knowledge for Royal Dutch Shell (Shell 
Annual reports). Benefits for partners include gaining access to world-leading technologies and 
proven experience in delivering large-scale projects. For customers, joint ventures bring into play 
new sources of products with the advantage that they are likely to be manufactured using proven 
technologies and delivered against familiar specifications (www.shell.com). Complementary 
strengths, shared long-term visions, consistent business principles and an equal commitment to 
sustainable development are the potential keys to successful alliances (Shell Annual Report; 2009).
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2.3.10.1 Measurement and Strategic Issues of Joint Ventures
Evaluating the performance of JV’s could be complicated for various reasons. Firstly, JV’s are 
owned and governed by two or more organisations, and therefore should not be appraised like 
wholly-owned divisions, all the more so as the interests of the JV and its parents are often in 
conflict (Anderson; 1990). Secondly, JV’s are not always established in order to meet conventional 
business purposes such as profit and market-share, but also in order to meet more qualitative 
objectives, e.g. organisational learning, co-opting or blocking competition (Hennart; 1988, Kogut; 
1988). Despite a long interest in understanding and measuring IJV performance, the research on 
IJV performance is still complex and challenging (Anderson 1990; Gulati; 1995, Luo; 2002).
The multifaceted nature of performance measures e.g., what measures should be evaluated 
(Beamish and Makino; 1994), the various constituents of performance evaluation e.g., whose views 
should be measured: the parent firm or IJV managers, and the situations in which IJV’s operate 
make the correct evaluation of IJV performance difficult, leading to non-consensus on the correct 
measures of IJV performance (Geringer and Herbert; 1991, Gulati; 1995, Venkatraman and 
Ramanjuam; 1986). As noted above, the dataset used in the paper will be derived from a case study 
and survey of Royal Dutch Shell which is a joint venture between Royal Dutch and Shell Transport. 
By extending the survey to include both partners involved in an IJV, the data helps to work within a 
stronger framework.
2.3.10.2 Financial vs. Non-Financial Measures in International Joint Ventures (IJV)
Many IJV researchers have extensively used financial measures because the measures can explicitly 
reveal the economic health of an IJV (Chakravarthy; 1986, Venkatraman and Ramanjuam; 1986, 
Beamish and Makino; 1994). However, the use of these measures potentially causes problems due 
to the lack of standardization in international accounting conventions, difficulty in obtaining 
objective financial data, and the diverse partner objectives in IJVs (Chakravarthy; 1986, Dess and 
Robinson; 1984, Woodcock et al; 1994).
Different accounting practices between countries may not allow for the correct comparisons of 
financial performance measures between IJV’s, which makes it difficult to evaluate their financial 
performance. IJV parent firms often fail to disclose accurate and reliable financial data in respect of
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their subsidiaries (Anderson; 1990, Chakravarthy; 1986). Without the appropriate data from the 
parent firms, researchers also may have difficulty in accurately evaluating the IJV financial 
performance (Dess and Robinson; 1984, Geringer and Herbert; 1991). Financial measures can thus 
only be deemed appropriate when researchers can get the objective financial data that support 
specific financial objectives of an IJV (Chakravarthy; 1986, Venkatraman and Ramanjuam; 1986).
However, IJV objectives are not limited to the attainment of financial goals. IJV objectives can 
include non-financial ones such as technology acquisition, pre-emption of foreign markets, product 
line diversification, and acquisition of partner marketing skills and services, or improvement of 
product design or quality (Bleeke and Ernst; 1991, Geringer and Herbert; 1991). Due to the fact that 
both partner companies may have different goals that they want to achieve, the different goals of 
each partner make the financial performance of IJV’s a deficient measure of the true economic 
health of the IJVs (Madhok; 1995, p. 117). In summary, despite the extensive use of financial 
measures, the lack of availability of accurate financial data, different accounting systems across 
countries, and the possible differing objectives of the partners do not allow the financial measures 
of IJV performance to fully reflect overall performance dimensions of IJVs, but represent only one 
dimension of IJV performance (Anderson; 1990, Geringer and Herbert; 1991).
IJV researchers often use non-financial measures to evaluate IJV effectiveness such as liquidation, 
major reorganization (e.g., equity renegotiation), exit rate, termination, high quality products, 
longevity (e.g., survival or duration), and competitiveness (Gulati; 1998, Inkpen; 1998). These non- 
financial measures can reflect various partner objectives and stability of an IJV not related to 
financial objectives (Hennart and Zeng; 2002, p.699). Though these non-financial measures allow 
researchers to measure different IJV objectives and stability, it is questionable whether the 
longevity-related measures (i.e., survival, duration, exit, termination, etc) can be valid measures of 
IJV performance (Inkpen; 1998).
For example, IJVs can be terminated earlier than expected by the partner’s mutual agreement after 
they achieved their objectives, high exit or termination costs may deter a withdrawal from IJV 
operation, or an IJV itself can be a transitory organization for its parent firm due to the nature of the 
firm’s objectives in the IJV (Inkpen; 1994, Gulati; 1998). Therefore, though the longevity-related 
measures can objectively reflect the temporal stability/instability of an IJV, they do not truly reflect 
adequate measures of IJV performance (Bleeke and Ernst; 1991). The combination of both financial 
and non-financial measures can capture a wide variety of IJV performance dimensions that IJV
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partners try to achieve in IJV relationships (Glaister; 1995, p.77). The wide use of diverse measures 
would provide researchers with an improved lens to understand and evaluate the diverse objectives 
of IJV’s from various performance aspects.
2.3.10.3 Factors Influencing International Joint Venture Performance
IJV researchers have utilised a wide variety of factors that can affect IJV performance. The 
numerous factors are so wide in scope that it is difficult to limit as to what factors influence and 
how the factors exactly affect IJV performance (Barkema et al; 1997; p. 426). However, commonly 
cited factors contributing to IJV performance are cultural similarity or distance, control (i.e., which 
partner firm controls the operation), ownership (i.e., equity share), prior experience of IJV 
participant firms (international experience, IJV experience, or host country experience), the number 
of participant organisations, the resources that each partner contributes to the IJV (e.g, resource 
complementarity), organizational culture (e.g., senior management support), and trust or 
commitment (Hermart and Zeng; 2002). The external environment changes, such as industry 
characteristics (e.g., new competitors) and government pressures (e.g., policy changes), are also 
addressed as factors influencing IJV performance (Hennart and Zeng; 2002).
Since the impact of these factors on IJV performance varies depending on IJV conditions, such as, 
locations, countries or industries in which IJVs operate or on IJV types (e.g., vertical vs. horizontal 
alliances), it is often difficult to generalize the extent to what extent these factors affect IJV 
performance and how these factors work together to influence the performance (Dussauge and 
Garrette; 1995). The research aims to curb this gap. Finally, (Cameiro et al; 2005) proposed a 
generic analytical framework (Table 2.3) for the categorization of the business performance 
construct. This framework effectively represents the rather intricate domain of the phenomenon and 
could serve as a starting point for a guiding yardstick to elicit appropriate measures.
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_  debt holders processes average expectations _  whole firm _  subjective indicators
_  suppliers _  innovation -benchmark _  dynamic _  division / (primary -single
_  channels and -other -change in SBU (strategic sources) -multiple
_  business learning SBU’s in recent business -selfevaluation _  composite
partners _  strategic the firm past unit) -evaluation scales
_  local _  social -pre-set -expected _  product market by competitors -reflective
community 
_  governments
_  environmental 
_  behavioral / 
situational 
_  overall
goals change 
for the 
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Table 2.3: Generic Analytical Framework for the Characterization of the Business Performance Construct 
Source: Carneiro et al; 2005
2.4 Types of Performance Measures
2.4.1 Financial Performance Measures
2.4.1.1 Return on Average Capital Employed
According to Catasus et al (2001) it is common among many companies to use return on average 
capital employed (ROACE) as a measure of success. Capital employed is more meaningful than 
absolute measures as pure profit (Osmundseen et al; 2005, Smith and McCardle; 1998). ROACE, or 
return on average capital employed, is usually defined as net income adjusted for minority interests 
and net financial items as a percentage ratio of average capital employed, where capital employed is 
total capital minus net interest-bearing debt (Jennings et al; 2000). According to Nilsson et al (2002) 
ROACE is calculated as:
Operating Profit 
Average Capital Employed
39
Where capital employed is defined as shareholder funds, plus minority interests, plus interest- 
bearing debt, both non-current and current (Barker; 2001). The massive restructuring of the oil 
industry and improvement programmes that materialised in the late 1990s were indeed the result of 
financial market pressures (Berry and Wright; 2001). There was a change in focus from the 
development of reserves and production in the longer term to operational efficiency and capital 
discipline in the short to medium term (Cormier and Magnan; 2002, Chua and Woodward; 1994). 
Companies were benchmarked and rated in accordance to a specific set of financial and operational 
performance indicators (Jennings et al; 2000).
The most important of these indicators was Return on Average Capital Employed (ROACE). This 
simple accounting measure of capital return became a vital input to valuation analyses among stock 
market analysts and investors (Antill and Amott; 2002, Osmundsen et al; 2007). With its direct link 
to net income, ROACE is significantly influenced by the oil price. Oil companies are increasingly 
ranked, and probably priced, by investment analysts and investors on a basis that puts 
disproportionate emphasis on ROACE (Osmundsen et al; 2007).
Considering the lengthy nature of lead times for exploration projects, management focus on short 
term capital may have lead to a shift in attention to cost cutting and value maximisation of existing 
reserves (attempts to develop oil recovery).The short term adverse effects on corporate income 
statements is significantly strong for exploration expenses due to the fact that only successful wells 
are capitalized, whereas costs related to dry wells are immediately expensed (Antill and Amot; 
2002, Osmundsen et al; 2006, Antill; 1999). In essence, the focus on ROACE by investors and 
analysts as clearly placed a cap on the investment budgets of companies in the oil industry. This 
could have been avoided if a practical trade off was made between short-term profitability and long 
run production growth (development of new reserves) (Koester; 1990). Over the last couple of 
years, the tide has turned.
In addition, the return on capital that investors appear, anecdotally, to demand is significantly 
higher than the cost of capital to oil companies. This may have the effect of inhibiting investments 
that should be made under pure economic theory." Antill and Amot (2002), Osmusdeen et al 
(2007) goes further to state that when the ROACE is high, oil companies tend to spend a large share 
of their profit on buy-back of their own shares rather than investment in generation of new reserves. 
Both investors and companies seem to have realised that reserve growth is required to sustain long­
term production and activity growth (Quirin et al; 2001). Finally, Antill and Amott (2002) claim
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that a main problem with ROACE is that capital employed will always reflect a mixture of legacy 
and new assets. The repercussion is that ROACE fails to sufficiently reflect incremental 
profitability. Thus, it falls short of being a good measure for current performance (Quirin et al; 
2001). Oil companies need to accept investment projects with lower internal rate of return (IRR), as 
the growth potential would add value to the companies (Antill and Amott; 2002).
2.4.1.2 Economic Value Added
Economic Value Added (EVA) is a value based financial performance measure, an investment 
decision tool and it is also a performance measure reflecting the absolute amount of shareholder 
value created. It is computed as the product of the “excess retum” made on an investment and the 
capital invested in that investment (Geyser and Liebenberg; 2002 p.4) The EVA technique has been 
adopted by important firms such as Coca Cola, DuPont, Eli Lilly, Polaroid, Pharmacia (former 
Monsanto), and Whirlpool. The difference between EVA and traditional financial measures like 
ROACE and Retum on Investment (ROI) is that the traditional performance measurement 
benchmarks do not consider the cost of invested capital (equity and debt) in order to generate the 
profits made by a company (Grant et al; 2006). Thus, under the traditional approach two companies 
that have the same ROE would be considered as equally successful , whereas under the EVA 
approach the same conclusion could not be reached if  these two firms had a different cost of capital, 
in other words if their economic profit or residual income was different (Grant et al; 2004, 
Rappaport; 1998 Zimmerman; 1997).
The Economic Value Added of a firm can be defined as the change in the NOPAT (Net Operating 
Profit after Taxes) minus the change in the Cost of the Capital used to generate this NOPAT 
(Rappaport; 1988, 1999). Thus, EVA depends basically on the firm’s operating profit, taxes, debt 
level, and the cost of capital (Garrison, Noreen and Seal; 2003, p.616). The three basic inputs 
needed for its computation are —  the retum on capital eamed on investments, the cost of capital for 
those investments and the capital invested in them (Lehn and Makhija; 1996). The formula for 
determining EVA is:
r
EVA = NOPAT - Cost of Capital 
Capital Invested
X Capital Invested
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(Stem Stewart; 1998) reports that when they calculate EVA for their clients, they make up to 164 
non- U.S. GAAP adjustments. They intend these adjustments to convert accounting profit into an 
estimate of economic profit (Stewart; 1998). Some examples include removing R&D and 
advertising expenses from NOPAT and capitalizing them, and adding goodwill back to the balance 
sheet. At the minimum, three adjustments need to be made to capital invested when computing 
EVA — converting operating leases into debt, capitalizing R&D expenses and eliminating the 
effect of one-time or cosmetic charges (Geyser and Liebenberg; 2002, p.4).
EVA presents itself as a strategic evaluation tool, but it does little to help devising the strategies 
themselves (Kramer and Pushner; 1997 p.41). In effect, the strategies proposed by EVA refer to 
black boxes where its replacement of input-oriented corporate strategising by wholly output- 
oriented performance measures is in place (Stem; 1993). Therefore EVA takes on more 
responsibility than is typically accorded to performance measurement systems). It omits attention to 
the possible time lags that may exist between strategic manoeuvres and their result (Stewart; 1994). 
The connections between strategic vulnerabilities and financial vulnerabilities over time are most 
likely complex and unique, and ‘good results’ may be rooted in strategic moves made in earlier 
periods (Hubbell; 1996, Ordelheide; 1992).
In certain industries EVA alone is an inappropriate measure of financial performance (Stewart; 
1994). Geyser and Liebenberg (2002) note that year-on-year changes in EVA which may be 
negative at times are unlikely to explain changes in a firm’s value given that the value is dependent 
on future expected cash flows This is especially relevant in new high growth companies, such as 
those in the new technology-intensive industries. The authors also advocate the adjusted EVA 
which corrects for inflationary distortions due to the fact that EVA is often distorted by inflation, 
with the result that it cannot be used during inflationary times to estimate actual profitability. EVA 
is both a measure of value and also a measure of performance. The value of a business depends on 
investor’s expectations about the future profits of the enterprise. Stock prices track Economic Value 
Added much more closely than they track earnings per share or retum on equity (Kramer et al;
1997). A continuous increase in EVA will result in an increase in the market value of the 
organisation. As a performance measure. Economic Value Added forces the organization to make 
the creation of shareholder value the number one priority (Jackson; 1996).
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2.4.1.3 Reserves Disclosure (Financial Industry Specific)
Prior studies have shown oilfield disclosures to be value relevant in interpreting assets and earnings 
of companies in the oil and gas (O&G) industry (Rajgopal; 1999, Odell; 1998, Chua and 
Woodward; 1994). Reserve disclosures for companies in the energy sector provide important 
information needed to interpret the current and prospective performance of oil and gas exploration 
and production (Quirin et al; 2001, Clinch and Magliolo; 1992). Reserves reports should present a 
superior reflection of the underlying value of the organisation than its balance sheet (Deakin and 
Deitrick; 1982, Magnan and Cormier; 2002). The balance sheet records the historical costs linked 
with drilling for, development of or acquisition of oil, and not the value of the oil and gas interests 
(Boone; 2002, Quirin et al; 2001). The reserves disclosure, while not perfect, helps investors to fill 
this information gap (Berry et al; 2004, Spear; 1994). Thus by examining movements in the 
reserves report in terms of both volume and value, the researcher in this Doctoral thesis should have 
a clearer understanding of both the current value and the historical performance of management in 
adding value (Boone; 2002, Bryant; 2003 ,Cormier and Magnan; 2002).
The U.S Security and Exchange Commision (S.E.C) identify three primary classes which can be 
included in the FI report (Shaw and Weir; 1993). These are proved, probable and possible reserves. 
Proved and probable reserves must be reported, and reporting of possible reserves is optional. 
Researchers note that to be called proved, commercial productivity must be confirmed by actual 
production or by a formation test (Chua and Woodward; 1994, LeVine; 2006). If this has not 
occurred, a reserve booking (probable or possible) could still be considered depending on the 
probability of recovering the oil/gas quantities and offsetting the analog data (Boone; 2002, Deakin 
and Deitrick; 1982). The reserve classes are also defined on the basis of the probability of 
recovery. Unless probabilistic methods are used to estimate reserves, these percentages represent 
the professional judgment of the evaluator (Bryant; 2003) The NI 51-101 regulations target the 
following probabilities for the three primary reserve classes at the reported level (country).
• Proved >P90
• Proved + Probable > P50
• Proved + Probable + Possible >P10
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Figure 2.6: Reserve Classes:
Source: Schlumberger Information Solutions; 2003
Figure 2.6 is a graphical representation of resources classification system from Schlumberger 
Information Solutions (S.I.S). The system defines the major recoverable resources classes: 
Production, Reserves, Contingent Resources, and Prospective Resources, as well as Unrecoverable 
Petroleum (S.I.S; 2003). The “Range of Uncertainty” reflects a range of estimated quantities 
potentially recoverable from an accumulation by a project, while the vertical axis represents the 
“Chance of Commerciality, that is, the chance that the project that will be developed and reach 
commercial producing status (S.I.S; 2003).
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Figure 2.7: Resource Classification Systems 
Source: SPEAVPC/AAPG/SPEE; 2007
The significance of oil price factors on reserve replacement and reporting is mostly pertinent in the 
energy sector where dependence upon financial retum metrics that disregard the economic value of 
capital invested in oil and gas (O&G) reserves have been shown to be potentially misleading (Antill 
and Amott; 2002, Osmundsen et al; 2006, Deakin and Dietrich; 1982). Despite findings by Clinch 
and Magliolio (1992), when it is considered that reserves up to three years in the future are 
associated with ruling oil price sensitivities, it is not possible from current SEC O&G financial
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reporting to assess the potential effect of oil price variability on future SEC proven reserves and 
production entitlement (Osmundsen et al; 2006, Clinch and Magliolo; 1992, Quirin et al; 2001).
In other words the quantity of underlying PSC oil and gas assets for corporations are themselves a 
function of oil price levels and current disclosures provide no way of measuring this effect (Harris 
and Ohlson; 1987, Magliolo; 1986). Various researchers are pushing for further examination of 
these price effects on disclosures, and the extent to which oil sector reserve ownership is affected by 
previously unstudied effects of high oil prices driving down corporate reserve entitlement (Antill 
and Amott; 2002, Osmundsen et al; 2006).
Oil company reserves reporting have become a key area of study for researchers in recent years 
largely because of RDS ‘proven reserves re-categorization’ although RDS is not unique 
(Osmundsen et al; 2006, Quirin et al; 2001, LeVine; 2006). Exploration and production (E&P) 
firms regularly adjust their estimates of proven reserves; other examples include El Paso, Nexen 
and Forest Oil (LeVine; 2006, Watchman; 2004). In addition, there has been the widely publicized 
debate around the reserves booking for the Ormen Lange gas development in Norway, and a critical 
debate as to how Norsk Hydro and BP have been able to reflect the same reserves numbers in their 
annual US financial filing (20F) as in their Annual Reports (Antill and Amott; 2002).
A debate has also commenced as to why Exxon did not downgrade its reserves when the oil price 
collapsed in 1998 (Bryant; 2003, Cormier and Magnan; 2002). The classification of petroleum 
resources as defined by the Security Exchange Commission, Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), 
the World Petroleum Congress (WPC), the American Association of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG) 
and the Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (SPEE) (Figure 2.7), last updated in 2007 
highlights the fact that when it comes to reserves reporting for the major oil and gas companies only 
the ‘proven’ reserves are usually disclosed (Odell; 1998, Chua and Woodward; 1994), and these can 
comprise a very small part of the total resource base that the company might own at any one time 
(Antill and Amott; 2002). In the context of this classification, it can be argued that a reserves report 
focusing solely on the ‘proven’ reserves does not fully and fairly reflect the full value of the 
company (Chua and Woodward; 1994, Levine; 2006).
Greene and Hopson (2002) note that the first mle of the resource accounting is that proved reserves 
are a stock from which current production is drawn and to which additions are made from unproved 
resources (Figure 2.8). If a scenario’s production requirement for a region can be met from the
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proved reserves of that region, the full amount of the requirement is withdrawn from proved 
reserves. The test of whether reserves are adequate is whether the ratio of reserves to the production 
requirement exceeds a specified minimum reserves-to-production (R7P) ratio (Greene and Hopson; 
2002, p.9).
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Figure 2.8 S tructure  of Resource Accounting M odel 
Source: G rene and Hopson; 2002
If the scenario calls for a region to produce more oil than its conventional oil resources can support, 
it is initially assumed that the deficit will be satisfied by the world’s reserves of unconventional oil 
(Berry et al; 2004, Boone; 2002). Just as for conventional oil, proved reserves of unconventional oil 
are the stock from which all unconventional oil is produced (Cormier and Magnan; 2002). Finally a 
simple adjustment to the existing SEC disclosure would eliminate much of the debate on which a 
company is conservative or aggressive in its reserves booking (Bryant; 2003).
This adjustment could require companies to show in greater detail, at a field level, the level of 
reserves booked (Odell; 1998, Deakin and Deitrick; 1982). In addition, given that many Western 
governments and NGOs are pressing for greater disclosure by the industry of their financial and tax 
payments to developing countries, it might be useful for companies to disclose movements in 
reserves on a country-by-country basis (Chua and Woodward; 1994). Ultimately, it is important that 
reserves information presented in support of financial filings should adhere to three key 
considerations: consistency, transparency and utility (Levine; 2006).
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2.4.2 Subjective Measures of Performance
2.4.2.1 Balanced Scorecard
Kaplan and Norton developed the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) in 1992 as part of a KPMG funded 
research program entitled ‘Measuring Performance in the Organisation of the Future’ (Norreklint; 
2000, Give et al; 1999). The BSC is a comprehensive framework in which the mission and strategic 
directions of an organisation can be interpreted via an array of performance measures (Kaplan and 
Norton; 1996). It was intended that the framework would give managers an all-inclusive view of the 
business yet allow them to focus on critical areas for improvement for strategic development 
purposes (Ceelman; 1998, Bergendahl and Dagas; 1997). As a result, it has been used mainly by 
large businesses as a means of performance measurement and as a performance driver. A 
commonly accepted strength of the BSC is the linkage of performance measures with organisational 
strategy (Maisel; 1992, Johnsen; 2001, McCunn; 1998).
Various authors inform us that the BSC is very successful as a tool for driving change within an 
organisation in a way that is aligned with strategy (Johnson; 1998, Norreklint; 2000, Give et al; 
1999). In essence it is a strategy implementation tool. Similarly, Me Adam and Bailie (2002) value 
the BSC for the way it can be applied by a management team to clarify and translate high level 
strategy into business objectives. McCunn (1998) also supports the view that the strategy focus is a 
major strength of the BSC, however, he stresses that its focus is on the implementation of strategy 
and not in determining strategy.
In observing and working with many companies, Kaplan and Norton (1992: p. 71- 79) have found 
that senior executives do not rely on one set of measures to the exclusion of the other. They 
recognize that no single measure can offer a clear performance target or focus attention on the 
critical areas of the business. Resent years have witnessed rising interest towards integrated 
performance measurement systems to provide managers and employees with adequate information 
about the firm’s operation (Hoque and James; 2000). Researchers believe that the balanced system 
is based on the concept that financial variables alone may not be a sufficient measure of corporate 
performance (Give; 1999). To address this problem, the BSC provides an integrated framework to 
help managers implement strategies, measure performance, and compensate employees by 
developing goals and measures along different perspectives and linking them together with the 
vision, mission, and strategy of the firm (Landry and Steve; 2003, p.4). Although many other
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approaches to strategy implementation exist, the specific appeal of the BSC is its reliance on the 
mix of operations and financial measures, which are simply linked to the organisation’s strategy 
(Sim and Koh; 2001).
The scorecard (Figure 2.9) identifies and integrates four perspectives of looking at performance. 
These perspectives are financial, customer, internal business processes, and learning and grovs4h 
(Downing; 2001). These perspectives are not limited to the four, and also don’t exclude the addition 
of other perspectives (Kaplan and Norton; 1996: p. 34). In fact they have found that these four 
perspectives are commonly found in business plans, processes and business logic (Lingle and 
Schiemann; 1996). Kaplan and Norton identified the need to ensure that financial performance, the 
drivers of financial performance (customer and internal business processes), and the drivers of 
ongoing improvement (learning and growth perspective) are given equal weighting (Neely; 2002, p. 
148).
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The BSC clarifies organisational goals (Simdin; 1998), that is, what the organisation as a whole is 
expected to accomplish (Marr; 2003), and measures the degree of success in attaining these goals 
(Slim and Koh; 2001). Long-term planning and control is a desirable element for most companies, 
and it is provided for in the Balanced Scorecard, since the scorecard enables long-term planning by 
establishing several future oriented, progressive key measures (Slim and Koh; 2001, Downing; 
2001, Sundin; 1998). Another advantage of the Scorecard approach is that it has a breadth that 
enables every single worker to identify with one of its components. Moreover, each worker is 
provided with feedback on the contribution he or she makes to the organisation, which clarifies how 
the individual helps the overall business reach the defined corporate objectives (Westin and Wetter,
1998). Finally Bjorklund et al (1998) inform us that by adding a customer and a learning and 
growth perspective, the company shows increased awareness of external influences and is better 
suited to react to its environment.
With BSC, top management can connect today’s activity with tomorrow’s goals (Olve et al; 1997). 
A central starting point is that the managers agree about the vision and strategies that drives future 
success (Bergendahl and Dagas; 1997, Olve et al; 1997). In the second step, the central visions and 
strategies are broken down in the organization through communication. These are decentralised to 
business units’ daily operations (Johnson; 1998). The third step is to plan business and goals, 
resource allocation and to set milestones. In the forth step, BSC is used for feedback and learning 
(Downing; 2001). The learning arises fiom the ability to follow the development and, if necessary, 
change the visions. This is what Kaplan and Norton call double loop learning, with a reference to 
Agyris (1991). Agyris (1991) distinguish between learning that challenge status quo (double loop 
learning) and learning that is routine (single loop learning). Double loop learning is necessary to 
continuously adjust the strategy to permanent changes in environments. This is done by practicing 
an open dialogue with managers and examining the underlying structure of thinking and decision 
making (Downing; 2001).
Irrespective of its numerous advantages, the BSC also suffers from some shortfall’s like the fact that 
the BSC literature has neglected the insights of institutional theory, which explicitly recognises the 
importance of relative bargaining power in shaping whose interests will dominate in a company and 
the resulting effects on what facets of performance are measured, reported and acted upon (Libby et 
al; 2002, Silk; 1998). This has implications for balance and integration in PMSs, and hence for the 
possibility of successfully implementing the BSC (Marr; 2003). Another criticism of the BSC and 
strategy maps, however, is that they neglect several other important stakeholders whose need for
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performance-related information is worthy of recognition. Researchers argue that there are three 
theoretical contexts for social and environmental accounting research (Libby et al; 2002, Silk;
1998). The first relates to the “decision usefulness” of such information to decision makers, 
typically taken to be investors. Researchers suggest that, while the results of such studies are 
inconclusive, there is evidence to suggest that it “pays to be good, but not too good (Hoque and 
James; 2000).
Also, the BSC and in particular its associated strategy maps essentially follow a one-way linear 
approach to strategic performance management, starting with the learning and growth perspective 
and culminating in financial results (or outcomes) for shareholders: effective innovation, learning 
and growth by employees, efficient internal business processes, satisfied and loyal customers, good 
financial results for shareholder’s (Norreklit; 2000, p. 75). Thus the BSCs “causal chain” contains 
financial outcome measures and their performance drivers, linked together in assumed cause and 
effect relationships. However, as Norreklit (2000) believes there is no causal relationship between 
measures from the four perspectives. Instead, the arguments indicate that the perspectives are 
interdependent. While the BSC has been hailed as one of the most significant developments in 
contemporary management accounting, applications of this model have been primarily within large 
corporations and selected public sector institutions, including hospitals and government 
departments; the BSC has not made any appreciable inroads into the small business domain (Hoque 
and James; 2000).
Overall, the BSC has both strengths and weaknesses. Its key strength is its focus on the 
implementation of strategy. Additionally, individual firms can address the goals and needs of their 
own specific stakeholders when developing their scorecard (Lipe and Salterio; 2000). However, on 
the other-hand the approach is complex and still has a long way to go before generalist perfection 
can be accepted (Epstein and Mazonni; 1997).
2.4.2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Responsibility means different things to different people (Kapelus; 2002, p. 275). 
One end of the spectrum it is compliance with laws and being philanthropic another way of looking 
at it is through the beneficiaries which range from employees to suppliers to customers and the 
community (Frynas; 2005). Complying with the law is the basic minimum to legitimately stay in 
business (Fombrun’s and Rindova; 2000). Traditionally, environmental management has been seen
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as imposing a cost on a company and a “green penalty” on investors, with no corresponding benefit 
being conferred (Kotler; 2005). The opposing view holds that environmental performance is 
compatible with, and perhaps central to, competitiveness and superior financial performance. There 
is strong evidence that improved environmental behaviour has a significant impact on shareholder 
value (Lantos; 2001).
The re-ignition of the notion that firms have social responsibility that goes beyond profit making to 
include helping to solve social and environmental problems—corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)—has provided fertile ground for the debate that has shaped the present direction now 
assumed by business-society relationships (Windsor; 2006 Simms; 2002, Clarkson; 1995). Critics 
have argued that CSR is a distraction for business in meeting its primary goal of profit making, and 
an inefficient means of allocating scarce resources, aswell as the fact that that certain businesses 
lack the legitimacy and competency to take on any such responsibility outside its primary area of 
expertise (Idemudia; 2006, p .9). Advocates of CSR on the other hand have responded that the 
monumental increase in business power, issues of ethics and the increasing failure of governments 
to meet their basic responsibility to society, as well as ensure effective regulation for business 
activities, have meant that the acceptance of social responsibility by organisations has been both 
unavoidable and necessary (Lockett et al; 2006, Windsor; 2006, Wood; 1991).
CSR describes the principle that companies can and should make a positive contribution to society 
(Clarkson; 1995: p.92). Moreover, “company executives are seeing their sustainability initiatives 
translate into higher shareholder value and more robust long-term economic health for their 
companies (Lantos; 2001, p. 597). Globalisation strategies provide companies with record access to 
markets and ever-lower production costs (Day and Montgomery; 1999). Business practices, even 
those conducted a very long way from their home markets, can be subject to intense scrutiny and 
comment by customers, employees, suppliers, shareholders and governments, as well as other 
groups upon whose support the business relies (Lantos ; 2001, p. 595). However (Jensen; 2001) 
has argued that, in a world where firms must serve multiple stakeholders, each with their own 
claims as to what the legitimate goals of the firms should be, firms are left without a focus, and 
without a benchmark against which their managers can be held accountable.
Researchers note that the public responsibility of organisations is divided into areas of social 
involvement directly related to their business operations and competencies, with secondary areas of 
involvement relating to its primary activities For example, car manufacturers could be expected to
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deal with vehicle safety and the environment but cannot be mandated to address low-income 
housing or adult illiteracy (Warhurst and Mitchell; 2000). Because the advocates of stakeholder 
theory refuse to specify how to make the required tradeoffs between these competing interests, they 
leave companies with a theory that makes it difficult for them to make purposeful decisions; with no 
way to keep score, stakeholder theory makes managers unaccountable for their actions (Jensen; 
2001). Adding CSR to other more conventional business concerns, in other words, introduces, for 
Jensen, a critical governance problem (Wood; 1991). On the one hand CSR seems to be 
increasingly demanded by interest groups and public opinion (Warhurst and Mitchell; 2000).
2.4.2.3 Health Safety and Environment (Subjective Industry Specific)
Safety is a concept which refers to the activities whose objective is hazard reduction (hazard is 
defined as the possibility to have a non-desirable event) and the decrease of the consequences that 
are caused by the non-desirable events (Pidgeon; 1991, Griffin et al; 2000). The measurement and 
evaluation of an organization’s performance on Health Safety and Environment conditions at work 
(HSE) mainly aims at the provision of information about the current situation and the progress of 
the strategies, processes and activities that are adopted by an organization with the view to keep 
HSE hazards under control. The health and safety culture of an organisation is an important factor 
in ensuring the effectiveness of risk control (Bellamy; 2009).
Wiegmann et al (2007) argued that safety culture is defined as a set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, 
roles, and social as well as technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of 
employees, managers, and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious. 
In recent years, emphasis is placed on using more than one safety assessment method and the 
combination of their results for a more comprehensive display of the safety level of an organization. 
One such proposal (Petersen, 2001) concerns the use of safety performance indicators, based on 
data before and after the incident, including the evaluation of the safety climate, safety programs, 
physical conditions, safe behaviours and events. These indicators are combined with economic 
indicators in order to integrate safety in the general business objectives of an organization.
Willey (2003) proposes using multiple indices to evaluate the effectiveness of a safety management 
system through the method of the balanced scorecard. Organisations need to recognise that there is 
no single reliable measure of health and safety performance. What is required is a ‘basket’ of 
measures or a ‘balanced scorecard’, providing information on a range of health and safety activities.
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Measuring health and safety performance is an ongoing activity, so in one sense the measurement 
process is continuous. But like any other activity measurement should be both efficient and 
effective, so the frequency with which it takes place needs to be planned appropriately (Pidgeon; 
1991). Although the primary focus for performance measurement is to meet the internal needs of 
the organisation, there is an increasing need to demonstrate to external stakeholders that 
arrangements to control health and safety risks are in place, operating correctly and effective. The 
challenge for organisations is to communicate their performance in ways which are meaningful to 
their various stakeholders as pressure for accountability is reaching other sectors through routes 
such as corporate social responsibility (Behm et al; 2004).
While it is important for businesses to recognise how useful economic assessment of health and 
safety interventions can be, some research have shown that there are difficulties inherent in the 
process; for instance, in measuring accurately the benefits of an intervention (Griffin et al;. 2000, 
Grote; 2008, Bellamy; 2009). A common feature of measures like Return on Investment would be 
that they are generally positive in nature - reflecting achievement - rather than negative, reflecting 
failure. While the business performance of companies are subject to a variety of positive measures, 
for health and safety it frequently comes down to the negative measure of injury and ill health 
statistics - measures of failures. But a low injury or ill-health rate is no assurance that risks are 
being controlled and will not lead to injuries or ill health in the future.
An organisation can have a low injury rate because of luck or fewer people exposed, rather than 
good health and safety management system. This is particularly true in oil companies where there 
is a low probability of accidents but where major hazards are present. Here the historical record 
could be a misleading indicator of safety performance (Meam et al; 2003). Under-reporting - an 
emphasis on injury and ill-health rates as a measure, particularly when related to reward systems, 
can lead to such events not being reported so as to ‘maintain’ performance. The random approach, 
based purely on what is easiest to measure, is of limited value. The resultant data provides no 
information on how the figure was arrived at, whether it is ‘acceptable’ (ie good/bad) or the quality 
and effectiveness of the activity (Griffin et al;. 2000). A more disciplined method which develops as 
the health and safety management system develops is needed. This ensures that activity fitted within 
the overall health and safety management framework is important not only for ensuring the 
effectiveness of measurement but also to ensure efficient use of the resources used for performance 
measurement (Bellamy; 2009).
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Because of the drawbacks associated with the use of injury and ill-health data alone as a means of 
measuring performance, some organisations have recognised they need more proactive measures of 
performance which can be easily counted, such as numbers of training courses or numbers of 
inspections. Once performance measurement is understood, organisations can apply this to 
understanding the cost of ill-health and injury by using a cost-benefit ratio as a basic tool of 
economic assessment (Grote; 2008, Bellamy; 2009), and to help build a value-for-money case for 
improving safety (Behm et al; 2004). One way to obtain this type of ratio is by using a cost benefit 
analysis (CBA), a method which managers can utilise to assess any improvement in monetary terms 
and the financial advantage can be seen immediately (Weigman et al; 2000).
2.5 Literature Review Summary
Strategy in the literature above modifies current strategic management terminology in consonance 
with the advances achieved by the resource-based view (RBV) and industrial organisation literature 
(Porter; 1980, Wenerfelt; 1984). This was followed by scenario planning being identified in the 
literature as a strategic tool which can be utilised by managers to effectively deal with the fact that 
the external environment is full of unexpected change (Wack; 1985). This is done by advocating the 
creation of alternative images of the future development of the external environment (Weick; 2004, 
Schoemaker; 1993).
Recent strategic management literature has evolved the concept of an organisations product strategy 
beyond Porter’s (1985) delineation of managing the value chain to achieve competitive advantage 
(e.g., through product cost leadership or differentiation). Porter’s work on the significance of 
strategic positioning has greatly influenced later work that seeks to explain how companies might 
use their resources to attain strategic positioning. Research that followed Porter explains how 
organisations reach and maintain the positions of strategic advantage that he described. Barney 
(1991) argues that successful organisations achieve competitive advantage by acquiring and using 
unique resources to build inimitable capabilities that create strategic advantages. It is clear from the 
literature that these various views of strategy are complementary. A combination of positioning, 
RBV and scenario strategy are thus seen as being important to gain a clearer understanding of an 
organisations strategic disposition and strategic performance measurement systems.
Traditional financial performance measures such as ROACE were seen as being historical in nature, 
providing little indication of future performance; encouraging short-termism (Hayes and Abernathy;
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1980, Kaplan; 1986); being internally rather than externally focused with little regard for 
competitors or customers, lacking strategic focus and often inhibiting innovation (Kaplan and 
Norton; 1992, Neely et al; 1995). It is widely believed that the information provided by such cost 
based systems is inadequate for the efficient management of businesses in continuously changing 
and highly competitive markets (Ittner et al; 1997). The literature also delved into the advantages 
and flaws of EVA which was identified as the technique which provides a way to compute the 
economic value created by the firm over a period of time, the key variable which should guide 
managerial decision making.
The financial measures were rounded up with a look at reserves replacement which provide 
important information needed to interpret the current and prospective performance of oil and gas 
exploration and production (Quirin et al; 2001, Magnan and Cormier; 2002). This industry specific 
financial measure is said to provide a better reflection of the underlying value of oil companies than 
their balance sheets (Antill and Amott; 2002). The literature also examined subjective measures 
(BSC, CSR and HSE ‘industry specific’) which were seen by researchers as becoming more 
relevant to investors due to the inability of solely financial indicators to relay the accurate picture of 
corporations.
While certain authors (Hayes and Abernathy; 1980, Kaplan and Norton; 1992, Neely et al; 1995) 
felt that subjective performance measures are able to take ‘difficult to measure’ strategic aspects 
(such as employee skills and attitudes, intangible capital) into account, previous research suggest 
that subjective performance measures can have negative effects (favouritism in bonus awards, high 
influence costs) if the evaluation is unfair or biased (Gibbs et al; 2004, Ittner et al; 2008). CSR and 
HSE for example has been unsettling for most organisations as it implies that the organisation’s 
responsibilities are much wider than simply those related to the economic aspects of producing 
products and services (Frynas; 2005, Tinker et al; 1991).
2.6 IOC Strategic Performance Measurement Matrix
The two main issues considered when creating the conceptual model for this study were i) 
connection between performance measurement functions and measures ii) link between 
hierarchical levels and structure. Firstly, this thesis recognises that performance measurement 
systems in operation have to document historical performance, indicate current position with 
respect to strategy, predict future performance and finally motivate and control action to be
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effective. As eaeh measure can be linked individually to one or more of these issues, the subsequent 
analysis and conclusions section aims to identify the direct relationships between the 6 measures 
identified and the four factors deemed to be essential for performance measurement effectiveness. 
There is no guarantee that measures developed for control purposes will be appropriate for 
predicting future performance or for indicating a company’s current position in respect to strategy; 
measures used must be appropriate for the purpose to which they are put.
Finally, the decision to distinguish among the overarching goal(s) of the organizations corporate 
level to functional level performance is also seen as important to this thesis since the literature 
(Ittner & Larcker, 2001) suggests that ignoring higher-level strategic choices made by the firm may 
result in a misspecification of the relation between lower-level strategies and the design of the 
accounting system units (due to information asymmetry). Consistent with this notion is that 
previous experimental research (Banker et al, 2004; Lipe & Salterio, 2000) suggests that ‘unique’ 
performance measures may be ignored (i.e., used to a little extent) when evaluating performance.
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2.6.1 Link between Performance Measurement Functions and Measures:
Discontent over the traditional performance measurement system has forced many companies to 
look for means to improving their performance measurement system or find new strategic 
performance measurement systems (SPMS). A distinct feature of these SPMS is that they are 
designed to present managers with financial and non-financial measures covering different 
perspectives which, in combination, provide a way of translating strategy into a coherent set of 
performance measures (Chenhall, 2005). According to Chenhall (2005), it is the integrative nature 
of SPMS that provide them with the potential to enhance an organization’s strategic 
competitiveness. It is vital that performance is not solely seen from a financial point of view. As 
noted in the literature, financial measures are too aggregate and short-term in nature, and are not 
focused enough to capture elements of strategy that are critical to the firm’s success.
However, a major advantage of financial statements like ROACE and EVA is that they can provide 
relatively precise approximations of financial viability in the historical sense. On the other hand, is 
argued that linking performance to profit with short term measures like ROACE would most likely 
trigger problems in the medium to long-term for the business. EVA is claimed to be the best 
surrogate for or the predictor of future share price performance; an increase in EVA should 
therefore result in an increase in future cash flows (Stewart, 2002; Stem et al, 1995). However, 
Otley (1999) argues that it needs to be recognized that EVA remains an historic income measure 
and does not anticipate the future earnings, despite the existence of predictions based on stock 
market valuations. As short term return on capital is unsustainable, the subsequent sections of the 
thesis aims to establish the fact that effective performance measurement in the oil industry is 
achieved with a more balanced trade-off between short-term indicators such as return on capital and 
long-term indicators as reserve replacement. The future performance of an oil company and its 
ability to generate future projects is measured by the rate at which the programme adds to the 
company’s ‘proven’ reserves.
Also, pressure from domestic and global competitors, demands for quality and reliable products 
from customers, high expectation from the stakeholders and usage of new and advanced 
manufacturing technology contribute major impetus for devising and implementing subjective 
performance measures. There is the view that CSR and BSC are better predictors of company’s 
long-term performance, and that they sustain managers in monitoring company’s progress towards 
strategic objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Banker et al., 2000). Ittner and Larcker (1998)
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argued that the improvements in different subjective non-financial areas such as customer 
satisfaction and stakeholder management would affect future financial performance.
Measurement is necessary in order to assess performance against organisational plans, and to have a 
means of assessing any changes in control necessary to correct any deviations from that plan. 
Kaplan and Norton (2001) claims that BSC helps to overcome strategy implementation by 
providing a framework to build strategy-focused organizations The balanced scorecard is designed 
to be at the centre of an organization’s control mechanisms to effectively deploy strategy and to link 
operational practices with strategic intent. Finally, measurement and evaluation of an organization’s 
performance on Health Safety and Environment conditions at work (HSE) mainly aims at the 
provision of information about the current situation and the progress of the strategies, processes and 
activities that are adopted by an organization with the view to keep HSE hazards under control. In 
essence it is a strategy implementation tool as well as a means of motivating and controlling action.
2.6.2 Link between Hierarchical Levels and Measures
To understand the performance measurement systems, it is necessary to be aware that financial and 
non-financial performance measures are applied at different hierarchical levels within the 
organization. In essence, control systems can be applied at every level in an organization and they 
may differ among the organizational levels and situations (Atkinson, et al., 1997; Fisher, 1995; 
1998). Hence, there are controls at management level, corporate level as well as operational level. 
Control at the corporate levels tends to rely more on financial measures (ROACE) and is more 
infrequent compared to control at the operational level (Atkinson, et al., 1997). The efficiency and 
effectiveness of the performance measurement system of an organization depends on the 
operationalization of its vision, goal and strategy from corporate level to the functional level and 
having a successful PM system.
The highest level could be classified as the strategic business unit level typically consisting of 
divisions. Alternatively, for non divisionalized companies this would represent the company as a 
whole. In this level, most of the key results areas are defined in financial terms (Merchant, 1998). It 
should be noted that non-financial performance measures have been used for decades at the 
operational level but they have not been widely adopted at the strategic business unit level. It is
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thus crucial for senior managers to track not only financial measures, but also non-financial 
performance measures.
The Balanced Scorecard is also a potentially powerful tool by which senior managers can be 
encouraged to address the fundamental issue of effectively deploying an organization’s strategic 
intent (Kaplan and Norton; 1992). It focuses on establishing links between strategic objectives and 
performance measures; it also pays some attention to measuring the achievement of the components 
of the strategic plan the organization has espoused i.e. the means that it is believed will lead to the 
desired ends. According to Ghalayini et al. (1997), the main weakness of this approach is that it is 
primarily designed to provide senior managers with an overall view of performance. Thus, it is not 
intended for the factory operations level. Measures of corporate social performance help top 
managers, boards of directors, and other stakeholders understand if operational managers are 
building valuable long-term relationships and assets.
Reserves replacement ratio is also used by senior level managers to measure current levels of 
reserves to production and make decisions on whether or not to make investments in future reserves 
which will affect the company’s strategic performance. This is often linked to the contentious issue 
of determining senior managers’ rewards and bonuses according to their performance against 
performance indicators like RRR. EVA makes the drivers of wealth creation much more transparent 
to managers at all levels of the firm as well as linking senior manager’s bonuses to performance.
At some middle organizational level, managers often utilise financial measures like ROACE and 
EVA as well as translating financial goals into operational goals. These managers’ goals are 
primarily defined in financial terms, so their communications with their superiors are primarily in 
monetary units (Merchant, 1998). Administrative control provides information about the 
performance of managers and operational units (EVA). Measures like EVA have the advantage of 
being conceptually simple and easy to explain to non-financial managers, since it starts with 
familiar operating profits and simply deducts a charge for the capital invested either in the company 
as a whole, or in a business unit, or even in a single plant, office, or assembly line (Stewart, 2002). 
In addition, EVA is closely analogous to the concept of residual income (RI) which is both widely 
practised and well established in literature as a measure of divisional performance (Stem et al, 
1995). The thesis will also show how the reserve adjusted EVA in the oil industry provides 
information on wealth creation at the operational level which can be missed at the consolidated 
level.
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At the lowest level (operational level) daily reports might be provided that are likely to rely mainly 
on non-financial measures (e.g. number of defects, output quantities, etc.). Operational control 
provides feedback about the efficiency and quality of tasks performed. In the operational PM 
system, the stakeholders’ requirements like; safety, quality, customer satisfaction, cost, and return 
on investment, amongst others need to be considered. The most important reason for implementing 
an operational integration is to measure the value created by operation. As a manager, one must 
know that what is being done is what is needed by the business process, and if the operational 
output is not contributing/creating any value for the business, it needs to be restructured. This brings 
the issue of doing the right things keeping in view the business goal of the company. For example, 
this gives a clearer picture of the contribution of operation towards HSE and CSR issues. A bad 
operation performance can lead to accidents (safety issue) and pollutions (health hazards and 
environmental issues), besides encouraging an unhealthy work culture and environment.
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3 OVERVIEW OF THE OIL INDUSTRY 
3.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter will give an overview of the petroleum industry as the main aim of this DBA thesis is 
to get a better understanding of PMS systems in oil and gas companies and their relation to strategy. 
The chapter will initially focus on the generic business strategies in the oil industry, after which the 
three main issues in the sector which the researcher considers to be important to this study will be 
briefly described. These issues can be grouped into, environmental, pricing and reserves depletion.
3.2 Background
The 1990s witnessed highly volatile oil prices and with them, a wave of consolidations in the 
international energy world that has brought about a structural shift in the industry still being played 
out today. Of the so-called “Seven Sisters” that dominated the world oil scene in the aftermath of 
World War 11, only four remain, now commonly referred to as the lOCs (international oil 
companies) (Jaffe and Soligo; 2007 p.l 1). These consolidations are a resultant factor of the rising 
power and market position of National Oil Companies (NOCs) (Meyer; 2008, Johnston; 2007, Jaffe 
and Soligo; 2007). The oil sector is made up of six industries: oil & gas production, integrated oil, 
oil refining/marketing, coal, contract drilling, oilfield services/equipment, and oil & gas pipelines 
(Table 4.1).
Exploration & Production 210 28 13.8%
Integrated Oil & Gas 32 7 67.2%
Marketing/ Refining &
Transportation 55 6 1.7%
Contract Drilling 28 13 5.8%
Equipment & Servicing 73 21 11.5%
Table 3.1 Types of Oil and Gas Companies 
Source: Eikeland ; 2004
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3.3 Typology of generic business strategics
When investing in energy activities, an oil and gas company can choose either to remain 
specialised, by acquiring only new upstream business activities (pure horizontal integration) 
(Luciani and Salustri; 1998) or to diversify through vertical integration in the gas and oil chain 
(Thackery; 2002), or through investments in energy supply chains beyond oil and gas (Meyer; 2008, 
Johnston; 2007, Victor; 2007). In such alternative energy supply chains, the company can choose 
involvement only in production activities or full-scale vertical integration (Leblond; 2007 Hartley et 
al; 2007). Hence, a typology of four generic strategies can be discerned (Eikeland; 2004).
N o vertical integration 
along the oil and gas 
supply chain.
Pure exploration  and production 
com pany (specialised  com pany 
w ith no diversification).
Production- based  energy 
com pany (som e diversification).
V ertical integration 
along the oil and gas 
supply chain.
V ertically  integrated oil and gas 
com pany (som e diversification).
V ertically  in tegrated energy 
com pany (h igh level o f  
d iversification).
Table 3.2 Exploration and production-based oil and gas companies’ generic business strategies 
Source: Eikeland ; 2004
The boxes in the table indicate connections between extent and form of diversification. In the upper 
left-hand box, the company is not diversified at all (specialisation). In the lower right-hand box, the 
company is highly diversified, being vertically integrated in diversified energy supply chains 
(Eikeland; 2004). The upper right and lower left-hand boxes represent companies with some degree 
of diversification. In the upper right-hand box, the company invests in the production of other 
energy sources. In the lower left-hand box, the company invests only in downstream (marketing and 
distribution) oil and gas activities. The typology represents idealised business strategies (Eikeland; 
2004). In the real world, companies would only approximate these ideals (Bleakely; 2000).
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3.4 Environmental Issues
Oil affects the environment in two main ways. It contributes to carbon dioxide (C02) emissions; the 
increase in human-generated C02 emissions is generally regarded as a principal cause of global 
warming (Victor; 2007). Oil also contributes to general pollution, including acid rain, urban smog, 
marine pollution, reduced biodiversity, and the degeneration of various ecosystems (Leblond; 2007, 
Hartley et al; 2007, Meyer; 2008). The development of petroleum resources also affects the 
landscape, agricultural patterns and tourism.
3.4.1 C02 Emissions
Either global warming should be accepted as a reality or, on the precautionary principle, action 
should be taken to reduce C02 emissions (McNulty; 2008). The conclusion that mankind was 
contributing to global warming by means of C02 emissions fuelling a greenhouse effect was the 
driving force behind the ‘Kyoto Protocol’ of 1997 (Leblond; 2007 Hartley et al; 2007, Woiceshyn 
and Daellenbach; 2005). This pact is intended, by 2010, to provide the world with a workable 
program for fulfilling the goal set by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, namely, cutting global C02 emissions by 7 percent from their 1990 levels (Crooks; 2007, 
Victor; 2007). Implementation of the ‘Kyoto Protocol’ remains the focus of the world’s efforts to 
combat global warming. The largest widespread oil use is in the transport sector that needs to 
consider alternative fuels and ways of energy usage (Fiorello et al; 2008).
Unfortunately since today a little is done on that field, majority of vehicles still runs on gasoline 
and there is not any visible solution to be changed in the short term period (Stevens; 2008). With 
high oil price levels, stronger EU regulation in the field of environment, bio diesel introduction, 
Kyoto protocol we could slowly but surely see some changes. But question still holds: is it good 
and fast enough (Alida; 2005, p. 14)? Bio fuels became great publicity in the last decades due to 
small modifications of cars and existing filling station network. But it seems that pace of 
substitution that was made by EU directives firstly of setting the 20% of bio fuels need to be 
revisited to only 10% by the year 2020 (Finer et al; 2008).
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3.4.2 Oil Spills
The extraction and transportation of oil often results in spills. Spills occur from storage tanks, 
pipelines, tankers, barges and other vessels. With the exception of pipelines, spills most commonly 
occur during transport, including while loading on tankers, moving from tanker to rail, or from rail 
car to storage facility (Svetlana and Schiffrin; 2005, p. 111). The recent BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico and the numerous spills by RDS in the Niger Delta are examples of the harmful effects of 
oil and gas activities. An explosion and fire on a BP drilling rig left 11 workers missing and 
presumed dead in April 2010. A rig worker claimed a leak was found weeks before the disaster & 
both BP the operator of the rig, and Transocean, the owner, were informed. Instead of shutting 
down the entire rig to carry out the necessary repairs, BP simply closed the faulty unit, it was 
alleged.
This same issue is evident in the Niger Delta where there is evidence that Shells infrastructure 
needed work and that corrosion was responsible for 50 per cent of oil spills. The company reported 
an average of 221 spills per year resulting from poor maintenance of infrastructure, ineffective HSE 
management systems, leak’s during processing at refineries, human error and as a consequence of 
deliberate vandalism or theft of oil (Amnesty International: 2010). Amnesty international visiting 
the Niger Delta in 2006 put the figure for oil spilt, onshore and offshore, at 9 to 13 million barrels of 
oil over the past 50 years. To put this into perspective, people living in the Niger Delta have 
experienced oil spills on par with the Exxon Valdez every year over the last 50 years.
Moreover, the solutions oil companies have in place to deal with oil spills offshore causes further 
pollution problems. Dispersants do not clean the water; the oil is simply broken up and falls to the 
bottom where it can kill marine wildlife (Piorelli; 2008, Hartley et al; 2007). While marine life has 
been devastated with incalculable long term impacts, failure to swiftly contain, clean up and 
remediate oil spills can also increase the danger of fires breaking out and causing damage to life and 
property (Crooks; 2007, Hartley et al; 2007, Meyer; 2008). Oil companies are now focusing on 
environmental monitoring which involves the ongoing checking, inspection or examination of 
equipment, management systems, operational activities and their effect on the environment on a 
regular and frequent basis (Victor; 2007, Leblond; 2007). For example; monitoring the 
implementation of an Environment Management Systems to see, for example, if the project is 
implemented in accordance with any mitigation measures required; and monitoring the EMS, that 
is, monitoring the management processes.
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3.5 Pricing Issue
The crude oil price cycle may extend over several years responding to changes in demand as well as 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC supply 
(Skrebowski; 2005). The way in which the oil prices are determined, varies within the studies, 
nevertheless the oil prices are modelled in every study using the following inputs: 1. ultimate 
resource recovered; 2. commodities demand growth (depending on GDP and population); 3. oil 
production (McNulthy; 2008, Wheatley and Crooksl; 2008 ).
Therefore, energy prices are modelled in most studies primarily as a consequence of oil supply and 
demand (Stevens; 2007). Nevertheless, it is generally thought that another factor such as limited 
production capacity can dictate prices (Wolf and Pollitt; 2008). The current high oil price is a 
consequence of systematic underinvestment that has eroded the spare capacity on the supply side 
(Crooks; 2008). The lEO considers three scenarios according to different assumptions about world 
oil supply (Figure 3.1); in the low world oil price, reference, and high world oil price cases, average 
world oil prices in 2030 are $29, $52, and $93 per barrel, respectively (Piorelli; 2008, p. 57).
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Figure 3.1 Estimated World Oil Prices 
Source: Casamassima et al; 2008
Practically every aspect of society is reliant upon an unlimited supply of inexpensive energy and in 
respect of this oil plays the key role (Piorelli; 2008, Hartley et al; 2007). However, during the late 
1990s, a mere 3000 million barrels were being discovered each year -  in other words, new oil 
production was just one ninth of consumption (Wolf and Pollitt; 2008). The unexploited oil finds in
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Siberia are not sufficient on their own to cover worldwide requirements. New refineries are being 
built nowadays and lots of oil firms are merging with each other to gain access to those fields that 
are still top producing (Mcnulty; 2008, Meyer; 2008, Finer et al; 2008).
This volatility in the oil prices are affected by the political instability in oil producing regions. 
(Crooks;2008, Jaffe and Soligo; 2007), the extent to which companies are affected depends on how 
far upstream they operate, and in which geographic regions they operate (McNulthy; 2008, Stevens; 
2008). In the short term, oil prices have increased over fears of a war in Iraq (Wheateley and 
Crooks; 2008). Uncertainty about the resolution and timing of the conflict has also increased 
volatility in oil prices (Dees et al; 2007). In the long term, most untapped deep sea oil reserves are 
located off the coast of South America and Nigeria (Zittel and Schindler; 2004). Political instability 
in these countries will significantly impact upstream oil activities in the contract drilling industry 
(Crooks; 2007).
3.6 Reserves Issue
The fact that the oil industry is spending much money and using all available high technologies to 
explore for oil in unfavourable areas; like polar, Caspian, Deep Sea might be interpreted as the 
industry’s admission of the fact that ever less oil is found at other (easier to access) places. 
Otherwise industry would look for that oil first (Zittel and Schindler; 2002, p. 13). As one can see 
in detail from the diagrams below, ever more oil producing countries are reaching their peak of 
production in spite of very favourable economic conditions i.e. high prices of crude oil 
(Karadeloglou et al; 2007). The mainstream view is thus summarised by figure 4.2, which shows oil 
discovery history (left-hand scale), a hypothetical mid-point peaking curve and the world’s actual 
production (right-hand scale). The high prices of the two oil shocks in the 1970s curbed demand 
and delayed the anticipated date of peak.
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Of the world’s 42 leading oil producing countries, oil extraction is experiencing a decline in 15 of 
them (Finer et al; 2008). Production figures in 14 more countries will start to fall within 3 years 
(Zittel and Schindler; 2004), while the sources in only 6 countries will still not have reached their 
peak until 2010 (Iraq, Brazil, Saudi-Arabia, Colombia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) 
(Wheatley and Crooks; 2008). This inevitable peak in production at an oil field is known today as 
‘Hubbert’s peak’ (Fattouh; 2007). This critical point, at which the demand for oil continues to 
increase, perhaps even accelerates, whilst the supply of oil starts to decline, is known in technical 
language as ‘The Big Rollover’ (Graham and Glaister; 2002). Figure 4.3 illustrates this curve as 
well as the fact that we will probably soon be faced with a severe shortage of oil (Campbell and 
Laherre; 1998).
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In 2002 the OPEC share of world oil production through National Oil Companies in each OPEC 
country was about 33 % and thus had reached roughly the same size as at the beginning of the 
1970s when the power of OPEC over the markets (or at least the public awareness of it) enabled it 
to trigger an oil price shock (Leblond; 2007, Hartley et al; 2007, Crooks; 2007). But in contrast to 
the situation in the 1970s, the OPEC share will not decrease again in future but will only increase 
further, given OPEC members National Oil Companies more say in the oil industry because of 
limited reserves outside OPEC (Wolf and Pollitt. 2008). Researchers feel that most of the large oil 
fields on land (conventional oil sources) have been discovered (Leblond; 2007, Hartley et al; 2007). 
The oil industry must now focus on offshore and unconventional sources, which are more difficult 
to access, farther from markets and require greater capital investment (Finer et al; 2008). This is 
reflected in Figure 4.4; since 2000 the bulk of new discoveries have been in water deeper than 200 
metres, while the oil reserves found on land and on the continental shelves have been declining:
Unless demand is cut, the world will depend on additional supplies from the Former Soviet Union 
(including the Caspian), the Middle East OPEC countries and on additional non conventional 
sources in Alberta (as outlined above) or Venezuela (Finer et al; 2008, Fiorello; 2008). Canada 
might provide about 1.5 Mb/d of additional oil until 2010 (Zittel and Schindler; 2002, p. 17). 
Another million could come from other unconventional oil projects in Venezuela under optimistic 
assumptions. According to predictions by the US-DoE (Energy Information Administration) the 
Caspian region could eventually supply 1.5 Mb/d additionally in 2010.
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3.7 Section Summary
The main aim of this section has been to give an overview of the international oil industry and 
identify some of the key factors currently facing the industry. The chapter identifies the three main 
issues that are currently relevant to the oil industry as pricing, environmental and reserves 
replacement. It was established that significant oil price rises in the 1990s, the contribution of oil to 
pollution and C02 emissions combined with consolidations in the international energy world has 
brought about a structural shift in the energy world still being played out today. All these factors 
will be analysed further with specific reference to Royal Dutch Shell in the next chapter.
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4 RESEARCH METHOD
4.1 Introduction and Overview of Research Methods and Limitations
As stated above, the main aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of the complex nature 
of performance measures in a large multinational oil firms with activities spanning the globe. Due 
to the multifaceted nature of performance measures, this study intends to find out what the most 
appropriate performance metrics are in the international oil and gas industry and through this 
process gain a better understanding of the current business environment and how the oil companies 
are responding strategically. Within science theory, the two main approaches that divide the society 
of research are positivism and hermeneutics (Eriksson and Wiedersheim-Paul; 1999). While 
researchers note that they are two extreme perspectives, they also acknowledge there is a continuum 
of perspectives between them (Duffy; 1987, Crano et al; 2002, Rosenberg; 1988). This study is 
more concerned with the hermeneutic approach which sees science as a scientific method where 
researchers study, interpret and try to understand elementary reasons for human existence (Dilthey; 
1996, Dootson; 1995).
4.2 Research Question
The literature review in the previous chapter identifies and describes a number of specific 
limitations from previous research in strategic management and performance measurement systems. 
The initial research aim has to do with IOC strategy and how, together with its business context, 
strategy determines IOC performance. This thesis aims to show that the financial performance of 
an IOC is influenced not only by its strategy, but also by its external and internal environments 
(Porter; 1980, Barney; 1991). While Mintzberg et al (1999) offer intuition as the driver of 
entrepreneurial decisions and action, Hurst et al (1989) notes that intuitive insights or vision are by 
their very nature difficult to incorporate into a boundedly-rational process. The researcher aims to 
prove that projection through scenarios, not just rationality, are essential drivers of an IOC’s 
business strategy as they are stories that can help managers recognize and adapt to changing aspects 
of their present and future business environment. They help IOC managers form a method for 
articulating the different pathways that might exist in the oil industry tomorrow, and thus facilitate 
appropriate movements down each of those possible paths’.
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Based on theoretical insights and the results from the case study on RDS, the researcher focused on 
the way business strategies follow the business context. Moreover, looking at turbulent changes 
within the context of the petroleum industry, the aim was to find out how these changes have an 
impact on the performance measurement systems of lOCs. Building on the characteristic 
dimensions of PMS derived from the literature, this thesis will focus on financial measures and non 
financial measures. The aim is to establish if using a diverse set of measures as opposed to strictly 
traditional financial measures leads to more effective strategic performance measurement of IOCS. 
It is believed that the incorporation of industry specific measures is crucial due to the unique nature 
of the oil industry. In light of this, the financial measures include an industry specific measure in the 
form of Reserves Replacement Ratio (RRR) while the industry specific subjective measure in this 
thesis is Health Safety Environment (HSE).
4.3 The Attraction of Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics represent a qualitative understanding and interpreting system that is open, subjective 
and engaged in the studied object (Becker; 1996, Guba and Lincoln; 1994). Through the spoken and 
written language you can interpret what humans really want to say. Moreover actions are also 
interpreted in this context. The hermeneutic scientist makes an approach towards the research unit 
with a subjective mind (Olson; 1995, Crano et al; 2002). Hermeneutics are strains of interpretive 
epistemology, specializing in the examination of one’s social reality and subjective familiarity with 
a particular topic. From the interpretive epistemological perspective, knowledge is complex in 
nature, leading to research methods which reveal expressions of the social reality of participants 
(Smith; 1988).
The framework for this thesis supports the principle of multiple realities that are ultimately 
constructed and modified by each individual (Brinberg; 1985, Singleton et al; 1993). To achieve 
the aim of this thesis, the researcher was required to identify different views of people regarding the 
importance, success factors and suitable performance measures related to lOCs. The research 
approach is inductive and concerned with discovering and interpreting social patterns (Smith; 1988, 
Klein et al; 1999). Klein et al (1999) established a set of principles for conducting and evaluating 
interpretive case research which are based on the philosophical view of hermeneutics.
72
l .T h e  fundam ent princip le  o f  herm eneutic circle 4 .T he principle o f  abstraction  and  
generalization
2.T he principle o f  conceptualisation 5.The princip le  o f  d ialogical reasoning
3. The Princip le o f  interaction betw een 6.T he princip le  o f  m ultip le in terpretations
researchers and  subjects 7 .T he princip le o f  suspicion
Table 4.1: Principles for Evaluating Interpretive Case Research 
Source: Klein et al; 1999
A challenge associated with the hermeneutic perspective may arise from the level of bias that is 
incorporated into the overall research process (Guba and Lincoln; 1994, Olson; 1995, Crano et al; 
2002). Cole and Avison (2007) argue that it is prejudicial in nature to interject critical components 
of understanding a particular phenomenon into a study that is based on the judgment of a researcher 
including their personal experiences and expectations. Furthermore, the challenge associated to this 
philosophy centres on the premise that interpretation ultimately arises from pre-understanding and 
contextual comprehension (Laverty; 2003). The wide variety of case studies in strategy and 
organisational context like those by Bower (1970) and Burgelman (1983,1996), provide convincing 
descriptions of the strategy process and useful insights on how it may be managed. However, these 
studies are hard to replicate and the frameworks offered difficult to validate.
4.4 Discounting Positivism
Positivism has been defined by numerous individuals over the years. Kolakowski (1972) note’s that 
positivism embraces a four point doctrine: (1) the rule of phenomenalism which emphasizes that 
there is only experience; all abstractions be they “matter” or “spirit” have to be rejected (2) the rule 
of nominalism -  which emphasizes that words, generalizations, abstractions, etc. are linguistic 
phenomena and do not offer new insight into the world (3) the separation of facts from values and 
(4) the unity of the scientific method. It can also be defined as an epistemology which aims to 
explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal 
relationships between its constituent elements (Burrell and Morgan; 1979).
Burrell and Morgan (1979) further note that positivism is a position which holds that the goal of 
knowledge is simply to describe the phenomena that we experience. In other words, the purpose of 
science is simply to stick to what we can observe and measure. Knowledge of anything outside that,
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a positivist would hold, is impossible (Trochim; 2000). As such, positivists separate themselves 
from the world they study. The researcher acknowledges that gaining a much better understanding 
of a complex phenomenon as ‘the strategic performance measurement of IOC’s’ necessitates 
participation in real life to some extent. This helps to better understand and express the 
emergent properties and features of IOC’s (Healy and Perry; 2000).
Chakravarthy; (1987) states that the more rigorous statistical studies on Performance Measurement 
Systems tend to be very narrow in scope and are often inconclusive. Survey strategy was also seen 
as inappropriate to this thesis as it involved having access to a reasonably large population of 
people. At the initial phase of the research this was a problem. It also required adequate prior 
knowledge about the subject area under investigation (Crano et al; 2002, Singleton et al; 1993, 
Becker; 1996). At the start of the thesis there was little previous research in the use of performance 
measures in IOC’s. As the research inquiry was of an exploratory nature, case study research 
strategy was considered.
4.5 Case Study
Case studies provide an excellent opportunity to explore new areas such as measuring the 
performance of RDS and provide preliminary input into a variety of issues. Much of our 
understanding to date regarding Performance Measurement Systems has been gleaned from case 
studies (qualitative research) that have been reported in the literature (Silverman; 2001, Smith; 
1988, Becker; 1996). Unfortunately, the conclusions are frequently disputed in the academic 
environment due to the lack of generalizability to other organizations (Miles and Huberman; 1994).
Yin’s (2003) definition of a case study is; an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident. It also copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points. Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) list at least 
six sources of evidence; physical artefacts, archival records, interviews, documentation, direct 
observation, and participant-observation. Creswell; (1994) list interviews, observation and 
document collection, and open-ended surveys as sources of evidence. This single case study of 
Royal Dutch Shell utilised two of these sources, interviews and documentation.
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4.5.1 Design and Preparation for Case Study
Preparing for case study data collection includes examining the skills of the researcher, preparation 
and training for the case study as well as development of the case study protocol (Brinberg; 1985, 
Singleton et al; 1993). Yin (1994) maintains that success with these issues contributes to quality and 
efficiency in conducting case studies. The researcher in this thesis had some prior experience with 
an oil and gas service company which thus made it easy to focus on the most critical issues to the 
industry. While this experience was an advantage it still wasn’t enough as the focus on this research 
was not the oil industry participants in general but IOC’s in particular. In order to improve the 
interview questions and find relevant theories, a pilot interview was conducted with volunteers at 
two IOC’s and one oil service company prior to commencing the research analysis.
• Two days at RDS branch in the U.K and Two days at RDS branch in Nigeria (IOC).
• Two days at Total Oil Company headquarters in Paris (IOC)
• Two days at Single Buoy Moorings Monaco (Oil Service Company)
The visits in different oil companies helped the researcher in the planning and preparation of the 
research design. The researcher learned about the oil industry in general with a focus on petroleum 
strategy, and received more insight into the terminology that is used in the industry. By way of 
preparation and “training” for the case study, the researcher presented several seminars to academic 
colleagues outlining and discussing the purpose of the research, the theory underpinning the 
research, proposed research method and procedures. Seminar feedback from peers and experienced 
researchers together -with a detailed literature review of research methods and techniques further 
facilitated researcher preparation.
Prior to the pilot study, an equal amount of focus was given to 7 initial selected measures. The main 
outcome of the pilot study was the understanding that corporate social responsibility and reserves 
replacement were the most crucial metrics in the company. As a result, the measures were cut down 
to 6 with extra focus given to CSR and RRR as the key themes in this thesis. While Health Safety 
and Environment performance was not identified at the onset of this thesis, the pilot study led to its
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inclusion due to manager’s insistence on the crucial nature of CSR to their strategic performance 
measurement systems. HSE is often seen by researchers as a sub set of CSR.
Finally, in regards to protocol, Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) observe that the possibility of 
getting access is less dependent on the research itself but on the researcher as a person, where 
amongst other things the question of trustworthiness plays a decisive role. In this sense, access was 
probably facilitated by the fact that the researcher had various spells as an intern in the focal 
company. Topic-wise the possibilities to do research on the Strategic Performance Measurement at 
RDS was well received as the company was going through an overhaul of their key performance 
indicators in light of recent events like the reserves replacement scandal, the Niger Delta Crisis and 
the Brent Spar disaster.
4.5.2 Introduction to Case Company
Royal Dutch Shell comprises a complex network of more than 1000 companies and as many as 
2000 joint ventures at any one time, operating in over 135 countries (www.shell.comT RDS has a 
profitable downstream business with the world’s largest single branded retail network and one of 
the most powerful brands. They are building on their successful track records in Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) across the whole production chain and are a leading LNG supplier. RDS is also the 
world’s largest distributor of bio fuels and they are one of the biggest developers of wind energy 
(Shell Annual Report; 2008).
RDS sees its future in the oil, gas coal business in addition to producing oil from unconventional 
resources such as oil sands. Managing the environmental and social impact of energy use and 
production remains a priority (Alida; 2005). The company is aware that close cooperation with 
governments and other national oil companies plays a significant role in achieving strategic goals 
(www.shell.comT
4.5.3 Data Collection
There are two main stages to the data collection process
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4.5.3.1 Stage 1 (Documents and Secondary Data)
Of great importance for this study were internal planning documents and memos drawn up to 
document the experiences of RDS managers in using the performance measures under examination. 
This provided the researcher with a better understanding of the complex nature of effective and 
efficient strategic performance measurement of IOC’s. While documents are important in the data 
collection stage of case studies, care must be taken in the interpretation of documents, since they are 
often prepared for another purpose and audience than that of the case study (Yin; 1993, Cuba and 
Lincoln; 1994, Olson; 1995, Crano et al; 2002).
4.5.3.2 Stage 2 (In-depth Interviews)
The method that was used to collect primary data was in-depth one to one interviews with top 
managers in RDS. Such interviews have the advantage of gathering data on complex and sensitive 
issues and enabled the researcher to obtain feedback as well as the use of visual aids if possible 
(Miles and Huberman; 1994). This method is preferred as it can help unearth detailed information 
without deviating from the original purpose of the interviews (Yin; 1994). The interview questions 
were structured to obtain information relating to requirements of the performance measurement 
indicators utilised by RDS. The interviews involved a face-to-face meeting, with the exception of 
two that were conducted by phone because of time constraints.
In this research, a total of 18 managers and senior staff at RDS were interviewed independently. 
They were selected based on their working experiences and the level of involvement in strategic 
decision making in RDS. The goal was to speak to people of different hierarchical levels and
different functions at RDS. As people remember different things differently at times, speaking to
people from various organizational levels was seen as one possibility to deal with contradictory 
statements on their measurement systems (Silverman; 201, p. 88). The researcher therefore 
conducted interviews with staff dealing with the measurement systems on an operational level 
(administrators), functional managers, divisional managers in the divisions who deliver 
performance metrics, and finally the employees working for a central function that has an advisory 
role on strategically relevant tools and their implementation.
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The mainly non-stmctured approach enabled participants to tell their stories in the way most 
comfortable to them. Probes were utilised which followed from the course of the discussion. 
Kochrane and King (1994), note that this type of questioning enables participants control the 
conversation flow in order to describe their experiences. This approach is consistent with Gadamer 
(1975)’s concept of dialogue, where open question and answers allow for discovery of new insights 
and ideas (Gadamer; 1975). In particular with the research objective being to understand how oil 
and gas companies measure performance, interviews clearly provided an in-depth understanding 
and gave insights on people’s experiences.
On the other hand, there are limits of using interviews (Klein et al; 1999, Olson; 1995). First, it has 
the common problem of bias in the interview processes and also there is the possibility of reluctance 
of talking due to a lack of trust for the interviewer (Silverman; 2001). What was interesting was that 
due to the recent reserves reporting scandal, higher level staff where less open when it came to 
talking about reserve metrics while lower level staff who placed reputation and ethics as a key 
factor in their initial decision to join their organisation were more open in expressing their dismay at 
the various scandals of the last two decades at RDS. Irrespective of this all managers were asked 
exactly the same questions.
In order to improve data accuracy, interview data gained from interactions with the managers were 
recorded on tape (with the permission of the participants) and/or summarized in notes. The tapes 
were then listened to and a verbatim account of everything said was written. Transcription of the 
raw data included word-for-word quotation of the participant’s responses as well as the 
interviewer’s descriptions of participant’s characteristics, enthusiasm and opinions during the 
interviews. Notes from the interview were then used to identify speakers or to recall comments that 
are garbled or unclear on the tape. The key benefits of this approach are its comprehensiveness and 
the opportunity it affords for the respondents to remain attentive and focused during the interview 
(Rosenberg; 1988, Gadamer; 1975). The main disadvantages are the level of time and resources 
needed to produce complete transcriptions and the inhibiting nature of tape recording for some 
respondents (Stinchcombe; 1991, Brinberg; 1985). In light of this, the researcher ensured that 
permission was initially obtained, and the participants were then informed that their answers will be 
recorded, and confidentiality guaranteed.
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4.6 Data interpretation and analysis
Data interpretation and analysis might be conceived as the final step in a research process that 
brings the insights of the study together to a meaningful whole. However, following Miles and 
Huberman (1994) and Stake (1995) the analysis of qualitative inquiries is rather an ongoing process 
accompanying all research phases than a final steppingstone to scientific knowledge. The research 
process was based on the process-related view of analysis, starting with the first analytical activities 
during the data collection phase and moving in cycles, similar to the approach outlined by Creswell 
(1994). The general analysis strategy employed was to rely on the (evolving) theoretical 
background to the study, which is reflected in the research question of measuring the performance 
of IOC’s, the literature review and also in the data collection methods (Yin; 1994.). Underlying 
theory also guided the data reduction process, where case data was selected, focused, simplified or 
abstracted (Miles and Huberman; 1994).
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Source: Creswell: 1994
Once initial interview data was collected, the researcher began open coding of the data by looking 
for patterns and themes. Coding involves analysing the data line-by-line and sorting the data into 
concepts and categories. All field notes, transcripts and other material on performance measures 
were coded and then refined as the data collection proceeded (Strauss and Corbin; 1997). It was out 
of this coding process that additional questions specifically related to RRR and CSR evolved. It was
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also clear that additional data needed to be examined with more focus on RRR and CSR as a 
strategic issue for IOC’s who are currently grappling with the continuously declining rates of world 
reserves and stakeholder backlashes in response to various oil spills.
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the analysis of qualitative data consists of three 
activities: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. Data reduction should not be 
considered to be separate from analysis, but as a part of it. This reduction of the data is analysis that 
helps to sharpen, sort, focus, discard, and organize the data on strategy and measurement systems in 
a way that allows for “final” conclusions to be drawn and verified (Miles and Huberman; 1994). The 
second activity of data display is where the reduced data on strategy and measurement systems was 
then taken and displayed in an organized, compressed way so that conclusions can be more easily 
drawn. And finally, conclusion drawing and verification was the final analytical activity for the 
researcher of this thesis.
4.7 Credibility
The previous sections already signify that the trouble with case studies as a research design is the 
lack of universal and clear criteria on how they should be conducted to produce valid and reliable 
results (Becker; 1996, Smith; 1988). As Perakyla (1997) states, the issue of reliability and validity 
in social science research is of particular importance as it is essentially about its objectivity.
4.7.1 Validity
Validity is a general term denoting correctness of measure, i.e., that it does in fact measure what it 
purports to measure (Crano et al; 2002, Rosenberg; 1988, Singleton et al; 1993). An instrument may 
be assessed for face validity, sampling validity and construct validity (Rosenberg; 1988). Validity 
can also be considered in terms of external validity and internal validit}  ^(Yin; 1989). It is one of the 
measures that define the value of the research results. The face validity of the interview 
schedule/questionnaire was tested by running it past my supervisor in his capacity as 
knowledgeable informant to determine if it ‘looked right’. A few minor wording suggestions were 
recommended and incorporated into the document. The construct validity, the degree to which the 
measure actually measures the area of interest, was established by the adoption of a mixed methods 
approach.
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The internal validity of the study was largely reliant on the Subjectivity of the respondents and 
given that the participant managers were still active contributors to themes being examined, it is 
inferred that positive bias could be strong. Following the advices, validity of interview 
questionnaire was addressed during construction of the instrument. A list of key factors for 
performance measure systems and strategic decisions by managers was extracted from theories such 
as the resource based view and balanced scorecard. These key factors were sufficiently confirmed 
by previous researchers to have construct validity. More factors such as previous circumstances 
were developed during the discussions and suggestions from personal interviews with managers at 
RDS. This list was reviewed for completeness and developed into the final round of interview 
questionnaires. Additionally, questions for the measures, which were established to be valid, were 
adapted from previous research.
4.7.2 Reliability
Reliability is consistency to obtain the same results again (Oppenheim; 1992). Yin (1994) believes 
that reliability which demonstrates the operations of a study such as the data collection procedures 
may be repeated with the same results. The reliability of the study is increased through the process 
of triangulation, where converging lines of inquiry are developed from the multiple sources of 
evidence. Additionally, construct validity is addressed as multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon are provided through multiple means (Merriam; 1988, Yin; 1994). Reliability can be 
indirectly inferred by validity (Oppenheim; 1992). If a measure is valid, it is reliable. If it is not 
reliable, it cannot be valid (Merriam; 1988). However, no measuring instrument is perfect (Litwin; 
1995) and it must be acknowledged that developing a reliable and valid measure is a highly difficult 
process (Jarvenpaa et al. 1985). Multiple methods of data gathering were used, personal interview, 
telephone and observations to assure the reliability of the research.
4.8 Conceptual Model
Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend that in qualitative studies a conceptual model is developed 
as soon as possible. They state this is an important exercise as it forces the researcher to make 
decisions regarding what the key factors to be studied are and the relationships between them. 
Following the data collection phase, it was possible to develop a conceptual model and some initial 
concepts for the thesis. After carefully examining the literature, the TOC Strategic Performance 
Measurement Pyramid’ (Figure 4.2) was built specifically for IOC’s. While it dictates the necessity
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for the interrelation between strategic orientation and effective performance measures, it also 
addresses the issue of ensuring that the right mix of measures is used in the appropriate context. 
This can be seen by the inclusion of RRR and HSE which are financial and subjective industry 
specific measures respectively.
The first layer of the model recognises the need for prescriptive and emergent strategy in addition to 
projection through scenario learning as a precursor for mangers in the oil industry 
to effectively assess strategy. The second layer on the other hand illustrates the demarcation 
between the necessary measures for success in the industry. By including RRR and HSE, this model 
is able to capture industry specific measures as well as the usual objective / subjective divide. Each 
part of the model is reviewed further
Intel nntioiuil Oil Compniiy Strategic Performance
Emergent .Prescriptive and Pi ejected Strategy
Financial Perfoi mance(RO.A.CE E \ A.RRR 'Industry Specific*) 
SubjectivePw formance (BSC.CSRJHSE. Industry Specific)
Figure 4.2: IOC Strategic Perform ance M easurem ent Pyram id 
Source: C reated By A uthor
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4.8.1 Strategic Orientation
The basis of the first layer of the model is that external selection and internal selection, together, 
determine the fates of organizations. Companies that carry on surviving have an internal selection 
environment that is a reflection of the relevant selection pressures in the external environment. This 
produces externally viable and new strategic variations that are internally selected and retained 
(Prahalad and Doz; 1987, Bartlett and Ghoshal; 1989). The strategic layer of the model also 
acknowledges that managers of an organization make strategic decisions that are not just rational, 
but also driven by intuition and projection (Damasio; 1994).
This is an important area for oil and gas managers who constantly have to deal with uncertainty in 
the industry due to fluctuating prises and the issue of peak oil and reserves replacement. The author 
thus believes projected strategy through scenario planning is essential for the accurate strategic 
management analysis of IOC’s.
4.8.2 Performance Measurement Diversity
Recent research on performance measurement indicates that the degree of interactions in a firm’s 
planning system (Chakravarthy; 1987), and its orientation to control have an important role in 
determining managerial strategies (Gupta; 1986, Simons; 1990). The more rigorous empirical 
studies on measurement systems tend to be very narrow in scope and are often inconclusive 
(Chakravarthy; 1987, Fombrun et al; 1984, Gupta; 1986, Simons; 1990, Gupta and Govindarajan; 
1984). Moreover, both field and survey research on measurement systems typically focus on one 
measure at a time without considering the combined effects of all systems (Lawler; 1971).
Quinn’s (1980) work suggests misalignment between systems could provide the spark for a new 
strategy. On the other hand both Simons (1990) and Lorange (1980) have argued that alignment 
between the systems is essential for effectively exploiting the business context of a firm. The role of 
misalignment and alignment of a firm’s management systems and their impact on strategy will be 
reviewed extensively in this thesis. This research will focus on a combination of financial, non- 
financial and oil industry specific measures which are essential for accurately measuring the 
performance of an IOC.
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4.9 Conclusions
Positivist research attempts to obtain objective accounts of an external reality (Crano et al; 2002, 
Singleton et al; 1993, Becker; 1996), while an interpretive position focuses on internal reality, 
interpreting the subjective meaning of social action (Burrell and Morgan; 1979). An assessment of 
subjectivity is to what extent the self is included in research findings, in accounting for both 
subject-as-self and researcher-as-self (Brinberg; 1985). The research aims to gain a better 
understanding of the subject-as-self, by interpreting the meaning of other internal worlds through 
their actions and explicit accounts. The researcher also aims to gain a better understanding of the 
researcher-as-self, by acknowledging research perceptions are filtered through a layer of tacit 
knowledge, accrued from leaming-by-doing and inductive generalizations from interviews (Schon; 
1983, Sprangers; 1987).
Critics claim that the problem with purely descriptive case studies is connected to the issue of 
transferability of results. While such studies might deliver a detailed picture of a specific case, it is 
questionable whether the findings are also applicable to other cases. Weick (1979) discusses the 
problem involved in this type of situation and argues that research always has to make tradeoffs 
between being general, accurate and simple. Nevertheless, such critics are contrasting the situation 
to survey research, whereby a “sample” (if selected correctly) readily generalizes to a larger 
universe (Gabriel; 1990, Sykes; 1990). This example is incorrect because survey research relies on 
statistical generalization whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytical 
generalization (Crano et al; 2002, Rosenberg; 1988).
Finally, as noted earlier, the main task of this thesis was to discover, identify, describe and analyse 
the structures and generative mechanisms related to performance and strategy. Clearly, using a 
quantitative method like regression analysis which assumes the dependent variable is known with 
zero measurement error, is unsuitable, thus another option for the study could have been a realism 
methodology (figure 4.3) which include qualitative ones such as case studies or convergent 
interviews which are process-oriented and do not investigate cause and effect relations but are 
rather concerned with underlying ‘causal tendencies’ or powers (Bhaskar 1978, p. 20).
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5. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS OF RDS
5.1 Background
The strategic management section of this thesis starts with a five forces analysis in order to 
understand both the strengths of RDS’s current competitive position and the position they are 
looking to move into. This will be followed by an analysis of the firm’s competence strategy 
through the Resource Based Framework and then end with scenario planning activities at RDS 
which give an overview of projection strategies. The chapter depicts how RDS has worked to 
enhance its competitiveness though innovation offsets, following the hypothesis of Porter and van 
der Linde (1995), by reducing costs through eco-efficiency and enhancing and influencing product 
innovation.
5.2 Porters Five Forces
5.2.1 Bargaining Power of Suppliers
Respondents described the main suppliers to be the owners of the natural resource reserves that the 
firms seek to exploit, namely nation states with oil and gas resources or their NOCs. They also 
identify the suppliers providing the oil companies with services and equipment. Respondents in the 
strategy department were of the opinion that, increased nationalisation of petroleum resources has 
made the national resource holders very powerful. NOCs have complete control over the licensing 
and production of their natural resources as seen in the Middle East, Russia and Venezuela 
(interviewee 4). Hence, this forces RDS to cooperate with national resource holders for reserve 
access. The likelihood of forward integration by the suppliers is high, and often occurs. This 
signifies that the suppliers will be able to carry out the same task as the oil companies, with the 
exception of market access, and for this reason become a rival to RDS and other IOC’s. However, 
as the majority of the petroleum reserves are discovered in the less developed regions of the world, 
national resource holders lack the proper infrastructure and technology to operate the complex 
exploration projects on their own and thus depend on lOCs, service suppliers and the independent 
oil companies for knowledge transfer and investment in research and development.
The countries that control most of the world’s oil and gas are granting access to RDS only on their 
own terms and there is the desire of certain countries to keep their reserves for the long term
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(interviewee 2). RDS has accepted this reality with their strategy now being how to persuade 
resource rich countries to give them access. This means contribution to technology and maximizing 
local involvement (interviewee 8). Faced with maturing oil fields, rocketing costs and the growing 
readiness of these countries to demand a higher price for access to resources, respondents indicate 
that RDS has been forced to scale back production targets and revise their reserve projections 
downward (Interviewee: 1 and 2).
While rapid changes continue to occur in the industry, technology remains crucial as RDS seek 
breaks through technological innovations or risk losing out to rivals. As producers of energy in an 
eco-conscious world, RDS is looking for newer, exotic types of energy with projects such as 
planning to steer more of its future business into mining Canadian oil shale and investing in bio 
fuels (interviewee 6 and 10). The increased demand for energy from emerging countries like China 
and India combined with fewer opportunities to discover new reserves outside of the OPEC 
countries is responsible for sustained high prices and enhanced supplier bargaining power 
(McNulty; 2008b, Wheatley and Crooks; 2008).
The tendency of producing countries to prefer the entry of smaller independent oil companies that 
have no alternative source of oil provides the resource holders with the bargaining power to exploit 
better terms in their concessions (interviewee 2). These factors will in respondents opinions threaten 
the profit margins of IOC’s and intensify competition. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
bargaining power of the suppliers, namely reserve holding states, is high towards RDS due to high 
supplier concentration, low costs of switching and possibilities for forward integration.
5.2.2 Threat of Substitute
lOCs provide the world with mainly oil and gas products in addition to other means of energy 
production, such as oil sands and wind power. Substitution for lOCs could thus come in the form of 
consumers lowering their consumption in the face of high prices, such as the prevailing prices in 
2008 of over $100 per barrel by switching to more fuel-efficient cars or bicycles (Interviewee 1, 5 
and 7). However, respondents argued that the share of energy spending of consumer income has 
dropped significantly over the last 20 years; therefore consumers are less likely to curb their 
consumption in the face of price increases. Substitutes for oil in general comprise coal, nuclear 
energy, hydrogen, natural gas and renewable energy sources such as biomass, hydropower, tidal 
power, wind power and solar power (Dunham; 2004, McNulty; 2008, Stevens; 2000). Interviewee
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14 who was one of the operational managers interviewed notes RDS is currently working to create a 
world leading bio fuels business and aims to build a material capability in the capture and storage of 
C02. Most respondents believe that the development of unconventional oil and gas resources (e.g., 
oil sands, coal bed methane and shales) presents unique opportunities for RDS with technology, 
capital and expertise that cannot be deployed in countries whose oil and gas development is strictly 
controlled by NOCs (Interviewee 4 and 6).
Over time a switch will take place, as oil and gas, non-renewable resources are depleted or their 
production is rendered uneconomic. This is however unlikely to happen any time soon (interviewee 
8 and 9). Interviewee 8 states ‘it will take many years to fully develop viable substitutes considering 
the substitutes available today are superior in quality and function’. Interviewee 9 furthers this view 
by stating ‘renewable energy requires a process that is very costly and in most cases dependent on 
governmental policies or efforts’. Considering these drawbacks, it is reasonable to assume that 
fossil fuels will continue to be the primary sources of energy, as predicted by the International 
Energy Agency projections. Hence, it can be assumed that the threat of substitutes is currently 
rather low, but will become a threat in the future.
5.2.3 Threat of Entrants
The oil industry is highly attractive due to the profitability of the firms in operation. Nevertheless, 
respondents note there are significant entry barriers which make the threat of new players entering 
into the energy market low. The capital requirements for entry are significant, as most exploration 
efforts for oil do not result in worthwhile finds and as such investments often involve sunk costs 
that are difficult to retrieve if  the business fails (interviewee 10). Respondents indicate that a 
different dynamic is at work in gas production, as its storage and transportation, as well as 
production, involve high capital costs. RDS has also established networks of suppliers and 
distributors over time, developing technological capabilities which are difficult for newcomers to 
get access to (interviewee 4 and 6). It is reasonable to claim that there is little supplier loyalty to 
RDS, unless the supplier, a sovereign country, in question is the home country of the IOC. This lack 
of loyalty does constitute a threat of potential entrants.
RDS face new competition from independents which are currently increasing their market share as 
they continuously become preferred partners for the national resource holders. They normally focus 
on niche segment, have lower capital requirements to start production, and do not need to produce
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at the same level to achieve economies of scale (interviewee 3 and 9). Additionally, respondents 
note that a number of NOC’s, especially from emerging markets are currently expanding their 
operations into international territory, and hence constitute a threat to the RDS. Interviewee 4, 5 and 
10 all note that while there are certain barriers to entry set up against private potential entrants, such 
as experience, access to supply, distribution, high capital costs and economies of scale, these 
barriers do not apply to emerging NOC’s, as these firms typically are backed by their home country 
government politically and financially. These companies seek to secure access to required energy 
sources as part of their efforts to meet their domestic energy requirements (interviewee 4).
There has been a wave of Chinese NOC’s investing in Africa and crowding out IOC investment in 
the country (interviewee 6). NOC’s compete on cheap labour as they can use their large abundance 
to build up the infrastructure in the countries they operate in and hence can produce more cheaply 
than IOC’s (interviewee 8). To conclude, respondents were mainly of the opinion that the threat of 
entry from traditional integrated oil companies is rather low as they face high barriers to entry. On, 
the other hand there is increasing threat of new entrants from the independents, service suppliers, 
NOC’s and emerging market companies.
5.2.4 Buyer Power
Respondents define buyers as the purchasers of the firm’s products, in this case these would be 
either power companies, airlines or individual car owners as most of the oil producers are also 
integrated downstream through owning petrol stations. The market is highly fragmented as there are 
millions of consumers, and they only purchase a small fraction of the total available market 
(interviewee 7, 8 and 9). Respondents were of the opinion that buyers have no influence on RDS’s 
product prices and must accept the prices in the market at any time as oil and gas is a necessary 
source of energy for electricity and transport. The oil prices have in recent years reached peak levels 
and this is mainly due to the increased demand in combination with restricted supply (Powell et al; 
1998).
Buying power is dispersed among many firms with none of them holding enough buying power to 
affect the competitive situation in the market. Switching costs are however quite low for certain 
buyer segments, and high for others (interviewee 7, 8, 12 and 14). For individual consumers, there 
is usually the choice of choosing from either RDS stations or other stations like Total or Texaco 
when it comes to purchasing gasoline in an area (interviewee 7). However power plants or airlines
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tend to be more locked-in with RDS, usually due to long-term contracts or distribution channels, 
such as one fuel supplier being available at an airport (interviewee 6). Furthermore, interviewee 9 
points out that ‘there is no threat that buyers will vertically integrate backwards due to the fact that 
no individual consumer or airline would start an oil company just to have access to fuels.’ Due to 
all the above factors, it can be assumed that buyers in the industry are left with little bargaining 
power and they have limited effect on the competitive dynamics.
5.2.5 Degree of Rivalry
Finally, it is important to see how the forces affect the competitive rivalry within the industry by 
examining the intra-industry dynamics. Overall, respondents felt the competitive rivalry in the 
industry was high due to the competitive balance, high fixed costs, high exit barriers and lack of 
product differentiation. High supplier power of landlord states and threat of potential NOC entrants 
represent additional difficulties for RDS, while buyers have little bargaining power and few 
substitutes (interviewee 6, 7 and 13). The main competitors in the industry today are the other 
IOC’s (British Petroleum, TOTAL), the NOC’s (Kuwait Petroleum Company, Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company), service companies (Single Buoy Moorings) and the independents (Oando Oil 
and Gas). Respondents felt the quality gap was also closing as a result of the oil service sector 
making the technology more available. By adopting and implementing industry best practices, 
emerging companies are becoming more similar to the western majors (interviewee 1, 3 and 9).
The Chinese oil companies, for instance are becoming more competitive as they apply a more 
comprehensive approach than Western companies (interviewee 10). Some managers in the strategic 
department interviewed were of the opinion that these companies are a real concern in terms of 
rivalry and competition as they have access to a large and cheap labour force, they bring with them 
the necessary manpower to new locations for developing the infrastructure in the countries they 
conduct oil exploration. This in their view is their real competitive advantage which other oil 
companies are struggling to match.
In response to this, RDS is refining their business strategy and moving away from their 
conventional role of full equity developers of oil and gas fields, to pursuing a range of commercial 
arrangements with host countries that vary from full equity interest to partial equity sharing and fee 
for- services (interviewee 11, 12 and 15). Shrinkage of equity oil and gas owned by RDS has been 
substantial. For example in 1960s, 85% of global oil and gas reserves was reportedly fully open to
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IOC’s equity participation, 14% was held by Soviet Russia, and NOC’s controlled less than 1% 
(Myers; 2006). This situation has now reversed. As illustrated in the appendix, over 60 to nearly 80 
percent of world proved oil reserves are now in countries that have NOC’s. Lastly as oil is a 
commodity, there is low degree of product differentiation as the products are commodities and in 
combination with low customer switching costs this intensifies the degree of rivalry (Meyer; 2008, 
Bockem; 2004). As a result of these factors, most respondents were of the opinion that that there is 
currently intense rivalry in the global oil and gas industry.
5.2.6 Summary and Implication of Five Forces
After a careful examination of the industry five forces, the issue becomes addressing how the IOC’s 
extract themselves out of this bind in their business model? There are different ways of coping with 
this issue. Respondents from all departments interviewed were overwhelmingly of the opinion that 
that RDS will certainly keep pushing to replace their oil reserves, while pursuing opportunities in 
renewable energy. Interviewee 6, 8 and 10 note that RDS will have to agree to lower stakes in joint- 
ventures (JVs) with NOC’s, or act as contractors for huge oil & gas projects devoid of equity stakes.
Interviewee 14 and 17 were of the view that it is paramount RDS invest heavily in technology 
development, in oil and gas extraction technologies as well as alternative energy. This goes to the 
heart of the issue which will be laid out later on in the thesis. The next part of this section will be 
based on describing the key constituent activities of the petroleum sector based on the notion of an 
industry value chain. Overall, this chapter seeks to introduce key activities, value drivers and risk 
factors of the petroleum industry.
5.2.7 Royal Dutch Shell Value Chain
As formulated by Porter, industry analysis fi-am.es value chain analysis, both conceptually and 
procedurally. The analysis is crucial to defining the industry in terms of its boundaries within the 
larger value system. Respondents note that the RDS value chain is the constellation of activities 
that surrounds the production of hydrocarbons, including the upstream (extraction and production of 
oil and gas), downstream processing (oil refining, gas processing and the production of downstream 
petrochemicals), auxiliary industries (financial, process chemicals, etc.), transportation (pipelines) 
and associated service industries (Figure 5.1).
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Figure: 5.1 RDS Value Chain
Royal Dutch Shell 2008 (www.shell.coin/annualreportl
The most discernible activity in the oil and gas value chain is Exploration and Production (E&P) or 
the upstream phase. E&P business is the most risk prone economically and physically as it 
generates the highest returns when successful (interviewee 7 and 9). Petroleum producing wells can 
yield a range of commercial streams including oil, natural gas, condensate and natural gas liquids, 
which provide the corporation with multiple revenue streams. Timing also matters since how 
quickly or slowly the reserves are produced will affect their value. Downstream operations merely 
serve as conduits for crude supply to meet consumer demand in the shape and form which the 
consumer demands. Hence, interviewee 8 states that ‘it would not be out of place to say that if we 
stick with our current business model, we would have to find ways to expand our upstream 
operations’.
This is not happening right now as noted from the five forces framework. Respondents note that 
RDS has seen prized, giant oil fields taken away from them by national governments to be handed 
to their respective NOC’s as demonstrated in the cases of Nigeria and Russia, and there is evidence 
that fewer of these large contracts are coming their way. IOC’s can cover one or more activities 
along the value chain, implying a degree of vertical integration, (interviewee 4 and 5) and/or can 
seek to expand within a given activity, implying horizontal consolidation as illustrated below.
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5.2.8 Vertical Integration
In the 1970s, IOC’s used to be both financially vertically integrated (subsequent stages of the value 
chain are owned by one holding company, which controls their cash flows) and operationally 
vertically integrated (physical exchange between those different stages of the value chain) (Stevens;
2003). Motivations for such integration were varied ranging from securing sources of supply, 
securing off-take markets, creating entry barriers, to circumventing taxes (interviewee 3 and 6). 
The five forces established that the market was going through many changes such as new 
technologies emerging on both the supply side and demand sides in response to changes in the 
structure of the primary energy business spurred by evolving environmental demands. Following 
the continual emergence of NOC’s in the market and major price shocks, IOC’s sacrificed 
operational integration for increased use of intermediate markets. Interviewee 12 informs us that 
RDS was the first company to free its refineries from the requirement to purchase oil from within 
the group. Internal transactions were increasingly conducted at arm‘s length, giving individual 
divisions more autonomy.
If we examine the energy industry from the standpoint of the value chain, we can say that there is a 
need to move away from the conventional closed and vertically integrated corporate structure in the 
energy sector towards a value network such as the one shown in Figure 5.2, in which individual 
companies with own core competence form alliances to create a complex and horizontally 
integrated value chain (Stevens; 2007). Free markets and technological innovations bring about 
changes in the business structure. The necessity for vertical integration from the upstream through 
the downstream sectors disappears and the functions of commercial flows and distribution are 
divided.
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5.2.9 Horizontal Integration
In respect of horizontal concentration, the benefits from eeonomies of scale in most activities of the 
value chain arc broadly recognized. Oil and gas projects arc very capital intensive, have lengthy 
lead times, and arc innately risky. In E&P particularly, scale helps to access better funding, to 
diversify investment and development risk, and to serve as long-term insurance to partners such as 
host governments (interviewee 11). Interviewee 7 states that ‘the aim of horizontal integration at 
RDS is to strengthen our position relative to NOC’s and service companies as well as increase our 
market share’. This is done by increasing the product range to better meet the expectation of 
customers as in the case of RDS’s movement into renewable energies, or by combining the core 
activities of two firms and hence increase their scale of operations as in Totals merger with ELF. 
Respondents 5, 10 and 12 were of the opinion that consequently, eeonomies of scale occur, as the 
average unit costs of production decreases by spreading the fixed costs over larger quantities of 
production.
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However, if the competition in the oil industry is significantly reduced as a result of a horizontal 
integration, anti-trust issues may arise (interviewee 13). Apart from legal issues, another drawback 
is related to this dimensions of expansion is whether the anticipated economic gains will actually be 
realised (interviewee 14). As interviewee 10 indicates ‘we have a tendency to overestimate the 
horizontal scope between our products, and hence the expected synergies might not be realisable. In 
order to deal "with this problem, it is important that RDS make an explicit strategy on how to realise 
the potential synergies as it will not occur instinctively (interviewee 18). Finally, the main aim of 
applying the value chain concept to this thesis was to identify sources of competitiveness for RDS 
by analyzing how value activities are linked, where they generate costs, where they create synergy, 
and where they are differentiated. This thus leads into examining the differentiation and cost 
leadership position of Royal Dutch Shell.
5.2.10 Differentiation and Cost Leadership
Respondents generally felt it was not enough for RDS to achieve differentiation by offering to 
develop a country’s reserves more economically, arguing that they possess the appropriate 
technology. With crude prices at about $70 a barrel, national companies are in the position to 
benefit from all the best solutions offered by research and development teams (interviewee 6). 
Many host governments of these organisations began with limited skill bases but have since 
expanded their business focus to incorporate their activities through the value chain. NOC strategies 
are becoming more internationalised with the aim of being as competitive as RDS and other IOC’s 
(interviewee 4 and 7). Respondents insisted that strategic differentiation through technological 
excellence is no longer enough; RDS would have to act as a good corporate citizen, attuned to local 
needs, if they want their host countries to welcome them. Due to the events which took place in the 
mid-1990s, RDS has implemented a carefully crafted corporate social responsibility strategy to be 
better able to meet the growing public concerns (interviewee 5 and 9).
RDS achieves differentiation through improving the carbon intensity of its operations (tons of GHG 
emitted per tons of hydrocarbon produced or processed), and with the objective of reaching a level 
20% lower than that of 1990 in the near future (interviewee 4 and 8). The RDS position of 
differentiation through technical competence is similar to that of Total which reduced its total 
emissions of GHG by 10% over 2000 -  2009. This according to interviewee 10 requires innovation 
and investment in renewable energy. While a transition from a high-carbon to a low carbon world is 
possible and necessary, it will not happen overnight (interviewee 5 and 12).
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As noted in the five forces analysis, the key disadvantage of renewables is that the costs still too 
high for consumers, unless they benefit from government subsidies (interviewee 7 and 9). Finally 
in respect of cost leadership, emphasis at RDS continues to be on production and project delivery, 
cost performance and operational exeellenee. Their foeus on the reduction of costs is sustained 
through optimised management of the supply chain and simplifying and standardising processes 
globally. Interviewee 8 also states, ‘Not only do we believe strongly in strengthening our 
capabilities in project delivery, having employees in place with the necessary skills is also vital to 
the successful delivery of our strategy’.
5.3 Resource Based View at RDS
Through the course of conducting a value chain analysis, it is possible to isolate key competencies 
and thus the competitive advantages of a company. RDS uses its core competencies, based on 
capabilities and resources, to most efficiently and effectively operate value-creating activities in the 
value chain. From the external analysis of the industry environment (Porter’s five forces) we have 
identified the main drivers of the industry, and the most influential competitive forces. The market 
based view fails to ask whether the market opportunity is one that can be exploited by the 
corporation in question -  that is, does the corporation have the resources and competencies to be 
competitive in this market?(Knudsen; 2003). With this analysis we aim to identify the main 
resources and competences of RDS and how the IOC can utilize these in order to generate a 
sustainable competitive advantage internationally.
Technological specialization at RDS takes various forms and allows them to capitalize on in-house 
technical strengths or to specialize in specific areas such as onshore/offshore, shallow 
water/deepwater, oil/gas, geologic and working interest plays, and mature assets. According to 
interviewee 2 ‘our emphasis on efficient resource management and our willingness to talce on 
technology risk has increased our recovery rates substantially’. Interviewee 10 goes on to state that 
‘we have been very innovative in developing technology on increased oil recovery techniques 
(lOR), and many oil companies do not use as sophisticated drilling equipment as us and hence leave 
more oil in the ground’. RDS is also a few steps ahead of competition in developing total solutions 
of reducing CO2 emissions, and the company will most likely be able to capitalize on this know­
how later when more projects demand such a solution.
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A look at the resource base, finanees, production, and operational performance, geographical spread 
of operations and investment patterns of RDS is helpful in assessing recent performance and 
predicting future growth trends. There are numerous ways of examining the issue. How much in 
hydrocarbon reserves does RDS have? At what rate is RDS producing and bringing these to the 
market? How profitable is the operation? Can RDS managers replace the yearly reserves they 
deplete, through new exploration etc?
5.3.1 Access to the natural resource base
High oil prices are changing the industrial landscape for NOC’s and IOC’s alike. At home, NOC’s 
now command greater power vis-à-vis IOC’s (Wolf; 2008, Non; 2006, Arent and Norland; 2006). 
Higher revenues means NOC’s are increasingly able to self-finance projects and can purchase 
technological applications from service companies. Respondents generally felt that RDS has not 
been able to replace their reserve assets in recent years in contrast to service companies and NOC’s. 
While RDS wants to own rights to the reserves they are developing and share profits in line with the 
market value of oil produced (the basic terms of a Production Sharing Contract), oil services 
companies are happy to take a fixed fee for the service they provide and lay no claim to the 
resourees (interviewee 1 and 7).
Respondents felt it wasn’t a question of service eompanies growing to replace IOC’s, but of NOC’s 
growing in competence and filling their gaps with service eompanies. Interviewee 13 on the other 
hand is of the opinion that ‘service companies would appear as riskier partners than RDS to less 
competent NOC’s, which feel more confident with partners that have a track record and can manage 
the integration of services’. As noted in the literature, one important measure indicating the health 
of the resource base is the reserve replacement rate. Table 5.1 shows that RDS added 3,420 million 
barrels of oil equivalent (boe) proved oil and gas reserves in 2009.
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Revisions and reclassifications 
Improved recovery 
Extensions and discoveries 
Purchases of minerals in place
Sales of minerals in place
Total additions 
including year-end price effects
Year-end price effects
Total additions 
excluding year-end price effects
Production
BOE: Barrel of Oil Equivalent
Table 5.1 Proved Reserve Oil and Gas Changes at RDS 
Source: Shell Annual Report: 2009
Million BOE 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
2,014^ ®^  878 409 (101) 153
42 54 59 27 6
1,362 219 853 2,006 825
3 81 -  109 37
(1) (68) (1,115) (44) (19)
3,420 1,164 206 1,997 1,002
260 19 (183) (59) (60)
3,160 1,145 389 2,056 1,062
(1,187) (1,189) (1,210)(1,268)(1,287)
With 2009 production of 1,187 million boe, the reserve replacement ratio (RRR) at RDS was 288% 
(shell reports; 2009). New and additional reserves are dependent on the level of upstream capital 
investment (interviewee 6). Exploration, development and production are included in this. While 
new reserve exploration is seen by certain respondents as being financially risky, others felt it was 
the best means for sustainable production growth (interviewee 7 and 9). In 2009, RDS invested 
capital heavily in upstream. This is not surprising, since the company has added to reserves. Other 
respondents however felt they were not investing enough in new reserve exploration and 
development.
RDS set up an E&P production and technological organisation whose primary objectives are to 
select, develop and implement technologies that enable the successful discovery and production of 
greater hydrocarbon levels. This helps RDS achieve continuous improvement in cost-efficiency 
and performance, increase operational safety and reduce environmental impact (Shell Annual 
Reports 2008).
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MILLION BOE
Australia/ North America South
Europe Asia Oceania Africa USA Canada America Total
Oil, NGL Oil, NGL Oil, NGL Oil, NGL Oil, NGL Oil, NGL Synthetic Oil, NGL All
and gas and gas and gas and gas and gas and gas crude oil Bitumen and gas products
Revisions and
reclassifications 377 684 181 318 181 
Improved
3 210™ 54 6 2,014
recovery -  41 -  1 -  
Extensions and
— — — — 42
discoveries 18 78 515 175 97 
Purchases of
29 423 2 25 1,362
minerals in place -  -  3 -  -  
Sales of minerals
- - - - 3
in place (1) -  -  -  - - - - — (1)
Total additions 
including year-
end price effects 394 803 699 494 278 32 633 56 31 3,420
Year-end price 
effect 260
Production (341) (363) (80) (136) (169) (44) (31) (7) (16) (1,187)
Reserves replacement ratio excluding acquisitions and divestments 
and year-end price effects 266%
Reserves replacement ratio excluding acquisitions and divestments, 
including year-end price effects 288%
Reserves replacement ratio including acquisitions and divestments 
and year-end price effects 288%
BOE: Barrel of Oil Equivalent
Table 5.2 Total Proved Reserve Oil and Gas Changes a t RDS 
Source: Shell A nnual R eport: 2009
Researchers claim that in recent years, shareholders of IOC’s have begun to call on the companies 
to invest more in renewable, but some claim that this has not produced visible results (Moroney and 
Berg; 1999, St. Clair; 2004). Interviewee 4 argued that IOC’s do not have the skills or the will to 
invest and succeed in the renewable energy business, as they are too large, not responsive enough 
and lack the entrepreneurial flair that is necessary in this sector. But other respondents felt there was 
a need for the evolution of RDS, due to concerns about climate change and sustainable long term 
returns.
According to interviewee 6 and 8 ‘we may have to move into the power industry, but interviewee 3 
questions if this would not put them into direct competition with power companies in a field that 
they have little expertise in. In his opinion, it is a far-fetched notion that RDS will become a power- 
generating company simply because power generation is not one of their competence areas. RDS is 
most competent in bringing fuel products to the market (interviewee 6). This view is echoed by
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respondents 13 and 16 who believe that power generation through renewable energy is not the way 
to go for IOC’s, but rather offering a way to store that energy and offer it in a way that is convenient 
to the consumer.
Crude oil production growth which has a significant impact on RDS’s cash flow was also 
negligible. Longer term, a key strategic goal is the accessing and unlocking of new reserves so that 
production can grow with a strong per-barrel cash generation. Production for the year 2009 
amounted to 3,142 thousand boe/d, which was 3% lower than in 2008 (Shell reports; 2009). RDS 
actually suffered declines in rates of production resulting fi-om pipe line sabotages and militancy 
attacks in the Nigerian Niger Delta, OPEC restrictions as well as production declines resultant from 
Venezuelan nationalisation and maintenance downtime -  mainly in the UK. While managers noted 
that an annual production decline rate of 5% is clearly a strategic issue for RDS, interviewee 5 
states that the production from new field start-ups should more than offset the field declines during 
the year. RDS currently has projects under construction that will access some 11 billion boe of 
new oil and gas resources. Many of these new projects will be long-lived assets that can run for 
decades, with low decline rates. Production at RDS is expected to reach 3.5 million boe by 2012.
Segment earnings ($ million)
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Upstream International 7,209 19,298 12,453 12,773 10,819
Upstream Americas 1,145 7,208 5,641 5,079 5,008
Total Upstream earnings ($ million) ^354 2 6 j ^ 6 " 18,094 Ï W 2  ' ^ Î5 ;8 2 7
of which Integrated gas 1,785 4,093 3,144 2,642 2,295
Upstream cash flow from operations [A]
($ million) 18,445 35,448 25,870 26,430 22,289
Crude oil production [B] (thousand b/d) 
Natural gas production [B]
L581 ' 1,693 1,818 1,948 1,998
(million scl7d)
Synthetic oil production [B]
(thousand b/d)
Bitumen production [B] (thousand b/d) 
Mined Oil Sands production [B]
8,483
80
19
8,569 8,214 8,368 8,263
(thousand b/d)
Total production [B] [C]
78 81 82 95
(thousand boe/d) 3,142 3,248 3,315 3,473 3,518
Equity LNG sales volume 13.4 13.1 13.2 12.1 10.7
100
(million tonnes)
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Upstream capital investment ($ million) 23,951 32,166 21,362 20,281 13,698
Upstream capital employed ($ million) 98,826 83,997 71,711 71,414 56,984
Upstream employees (thousands) 23 22 22 22 21
BOE: Barrel o f Oil Equivalent
Table 5.3 Key Statistics at RDS 
Source: Shell Annual Report; 2009
One argument that was brought up by respondents was the faet that the drops in production levels 
and depletion of conventional oil supply will be offset by the production from non-conventional 
sources, mainly Canadian oil sands and oil shales (Figure 5.3). Oil sands are deposits of bitumen, 
amolasses-like viscous oil that requires heating or dilution with lighter hydrocarbons in order to 
flow. They are aligned to RDS’s upstream growth strategy thus forming a competitive source of 
renewal as-well as leveraging RDS’s reputation and capability in ‘frontier’ technology 
development. Respondents generally felt the great difficulty with alternative fuels is that they are 
illusive substitutes in a sense due to the fact that their production is often dependent on substantial 
investment. In certain eases the energy investment could be so huge that the net gain according to 
respondent estimates could be almost zero.
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Figure 5.3: Canadian Conventional and Non Conventional Production 
Source: Zittel and Schindler; 2002
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Interviewee 3 on the other hand believes that as long as the oil prices remain high enough to justify 
the cost of this type of production, such technologies will provide a unique competency to RDS. 
Although Oil sands are a point of competitive advantage, interviewee 5 and 8 agreed that the 
production from the Canadian oil sands entails more emissions of C02 than conventional oils 
(Figure 5.4). A portion of these incremental emissions occur in the process of extraction (Flint,
2004). The development of a viable carbon capture and storage industry could play a significant 
role in securing the future economics of the industry. Gasification offers good prospects on this 
front since the gas is produced at high pressure and high concentration of C02, which would 
facilitate capture.
(thousand tonnes/year)
8,0511
Base
business
We achieved our 
goal to have our 
emissions in 2000 no 
higher than they 
were in 1090.
11,208
CHG AOSP
Other CHG
■  C 0 2 J,500
7,966 7 ,708
AOSP goal:
-* A 50% reduction hy 2010  
7,417
r r
Our goal for our base business 
is to reduce our emissions 6% 
below our 1990 emissions.
Our current plan achieves 
that goal.
9,167
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Figure 5.4: Shell C anada Green House Gas Emission Forecast 2010 
Source: www.Shell.Com
5.3.2 Human Capital Resources
While RDS may have the reserves in the ground and the cash in the safe respondents noted that 
without the right expertise, both managerial and technical operations may not be very profitable or 
sometimes even possible at all. Respondents were thus unanimously of the opinion that human 
capital in the form of exceptional people is a unique resource for RDS. Oil price weakness, such as 
the fall in 1998 and the resultant mergers prompted many companies to reduce or abandon drilling 
and lay-off or retire early thousands of workers. Although the driving rationale behind the mega­
mergers was positioning IOC’s to compete effectively with the NOC’s, this process led to the loss 
of over a million jobs.
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Respondents generally feel the industry is now paying heavily for this short-sightedness. According 
to interviewee 2, ‘those let go are gone forever and short-term consulting or replacements are never 
quite the same.’ It takes a minimum of 3 years to develop basic industry operating competence and 
10 years plus in many professional disciplines. The seriousness of today’s situation is highlighted 
by interviewee 9 “There has never been a time when our industry so needs outstanding talent. Older 
professionals will need to be replaced in a few years’. At the same time, we have seen a drop in the 
number of students taking science-based program”.
Also, interviewee 9 felt that recent events such as the Niger Delta crisis, Brent Spar Crisis and the 
reserves re-categorization scandal amongst other issues have probably discouraged the future 
generation employee pipeline which tends to prioritize environmental-consciousness, ethics, and 
long-term viability. While some respondents felt RDS had been able to work around the growing 
talent gap with increasing automation, process efficiencies and by looking to higher institutions and 
outside service corporations for incremental operating and project delivery capacity, other 
respondents were of the view that these adjustments alone are progressively becoming more 
insufficient to compensate for the rising shortage of skills and knowledge as activity levels rise and 
senior technical employees leave the industry.
5.3.4 Reputational Resources
Drawing major revenues from countries governed by violent and corrupt regimes, and at the same 
time being particularly exposed to consumer actions in its downstream activities, requires a 
balancing act that interviewees 7, 8, 10 and 17 felt that RDS has not always managed. Due to the 
events which took place in the mid-1990s, RDS has implemented a carefully crafted strategy to be 
more equipped to meet the growing public concerns about the effects of its operations (Rowlands; 
2000). According to interviewee 17, ‘RDS has adopted a management model following Corporate 
Social Responsibility (GSR) concepts, so that the process is managed as any other business activity. 
That said, questions were further raised to the respondents on how an organization like RDS 
implements the concepts of GSR in daily operations? Interviewee 8 reply’s by stating ‘we have 
learned that a traditional, technical approach to environmental and social challenges was not always 
effective in controlling the risks stemming from public perceptions’.
Interviewee 18 who is a managing director furthers this by stating ‘among the lessons we learned 
from Brent Spar and the Niger Delta situation is that we need to take account of people’s feelings as
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science by itself is not sufficient’. Oil contributes to carbon dioxide (C02) emissions which are 
generally regarded as a principal cause of global warming (Ross; 2001, Laestadius: 1998). ‘RDS is 
attempting to cultivate an image of a company that takes climate change seriously says interviewee 
15’. But the company has not always translated its concern into action. RDS has not ceased or 
scaled back its exploration or production activities. On the contrary RDS is expanding wherever 
possible.
British Petroleum (BP) which is one of Shells main competitors in the industry heads the plans for 
the world’s first gas-red hydrogen power station in Scotland, incorporating C02 capture and 
injection for enhanced oil recovery (BP Report: 2010). There is no doubt that RDS is also 
positioning itself strategically for a more carbon-restricted future through research and development 
of CCS technology, but statements from certain respondents, indicate that RDS has limited 
ambitions of being a leader in the CCS: “Carbon capture and sequestration (CSS) is simply just one 
of the technologies available. It’s an economic niche area where we do not have the expertise, but 
which is available if  necessary’.
5.3.4 Technological Resources
Respondents were overwhelmingly of the opinion that having access to the right technology is 
extremely valuable within the oil industry in order to extract and produce more cost efficiently and 
increase the recovery rates of existing oil and gas reserves. According to interviewee 5 and 16, 
technological specialization at RDS takes various forms and allows them to capitalize on in-house 
technical strengths or to specialize in specific areas such as onshore/offshore, shallow 
water/deepwater, oil/gas, geologic and working interest plays etc. On some levels, adopting new 
technology can be viewed as an economic risk for RDS. The cost may be greater and the result not 
as certain as existing technology. However, the payoff from a new technology can be enormous. 
Respondents overwhelmingly accepted that technology has reduced the risk of exploration and cut 
the time required to drill a well.
Even if RDS is considered to have valuable technological resources, a relevant question that comes 
up is whether these are also rare, as most of the technology developed in the industry is or will 
quickly become available to all oil companies. In a typical license project with several partners, 
none of the companies, not even the operator have sole ownership of the technology developed for 
that specific project as the costs is shared by all licensees (interviewee 5 and 9). Consequently, the
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technology itself is not rare as it is theoretically available to most of the companies in the industry, 
maybe with the exception of emerging market companies.
Nevertheless, what is considered to be rarer is the know-how in utilising this technology to its full 
potential, and the ability to combine different technological capabilities and project management in 
a way that makes the total solution unique. Finally this section will round up with brief descriptions 
of what respondents felt were there most unique competences.
5.3.4.1 Deep water drilling technologies
While technology is developing to permit even wider ranges, current drilling technology enables 
access to a reservoir up to several kilometres from the drill rig (Stottem et al; 1998 Mommer; 1999). 
This according to respondent 3 further minimizes the ‘footprint’ by reducing the need for satellite 
wells thus enabling more flexibility in selecting a drill site, particularly where environmental 
concerns are raised. Respondents therefore consider deep water drilling as a unique competency 
which may lead to a competitive advantage. However interviewees 5 state’s ‘our inability to make 
deep water finds in the near future could turn this into a threshold competency’.
5.3.4.2 Operational Efficiency
In upstream operations respondents felt it was a question of exploration & produetion costs, for 
instance what are the costs associated with extracting one barrel of oil - exploring, developing and 
exploiting the reserves at the lowest possible cost. RDS is unable to significantly affect the crude oil 
price; the two main factors IOC’s can control are improving recovery efficiency and reducing costs. 
As it is possible for an inefficient organisation to survive during periods of high prices, which is 
currently the case for some NOC’s, operational efficiency becomes a unique competency 
(interviewee 2).
5.3.4.3 Seismic Survey
This technology in respondent’s opinion represents one of the more important technology 
introductions over the past decades in that it has allowed RDS to dramatically improve their oil and 
gas finding rates. By visualizing 3D seismic data, virtual reality rooms help RDS geologists make 
accurate predictions about exploration locations and develop oil and gas fields following successful
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discoveries. While past surveying and mapping activities used invasive techniques such as 
explosive seismic profiling and extensive drilling to locate potential reservoirs, modem exploration 
entails the utilisation of non-explosive reflection seismic profiling to visualize, and evaluate larger 
amounts of data more effectively and efficiently. Other respondents felt that substituting traditional 
techniques for 3D seismic analysis was more of a cost cutting measure which could have negative 
effects in the long mn. They also note that the quantity and complexity of the data, and the inherent 
subjectivity of extracting information by analysts, can result in key features being missed or mis­
interpreted.
When asked further about substituting traditional techniques due to costs, respondents noted that 
that the low price environment made going through procedures like cutting the core on appraisal 
wells uncomercial. Interviewee 2 states ‘out of necessity we had to overlook this procedure.’ 
Interviewee 5 and 7 on the other hand felt managers got comfortable vrith this position which was 
clearly wrong leading to an enormous potential overstatement of reserves as a systemic problem. 
RDS created the illusion that costs were coming down and the whole thing ended up creating a lot 
of issues. The tmth is RDS was at the forefront of seismic tech and what thus came out of this was 
the organization had far more confidence in its own estimates of what it regarded as proved reserves 
than anything else. While interviewee 6 tried to justify their reasons for ignoring coring tests, 
interviewee 8 noted that none of these issues should have permitted RDS to cut down on the 
necessary validation process that they needed to do to evaluate the reserve quantities. Other 
respondents note how seismic surveys emit sound energy into the water which has the potential to 
affect marine mammals. In response to this RDS has set up mitigation programs which requires the 
detection of marine mammals within or about to enter the designated safety radii and in such cases 
temporarily terminating the operation.
S.3.4.4 Natural Gas Technology
The area in which RDS has the most developed technology is on the Gas side. The noteworthy 
factor of natural gas is that the recent development & utilization of the technologies to synthesize 
high-quality liquid fuels from gas offers the potential for creation of new business fields. A good 
example is the liquid-fuel synthesis technologies, which are so-called gas-to-liquid (GTL) 
technology. A key focus is on maintaining our competitive position in LNG technology, 
particularly in the area of LNG processing, safety, +environmental impact, transport and storage 
(Shell Annual Report; 2009). Interview 5, 6 and 9 inform us that Natural gas is considered as an
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environmentally friendly clean fuel, offering important environmental benefits -when compared to 
other fossil fuels. However an amnesty international report on RDS in Nigeria clearly shows that 
gas flaring from the organisations activities is endemic. This leads to destruction of neighbouring 
communities and their means of livelihood. According to interviewee 9, ‘even though it is 
technically feasible to reduce and even eliminate flaring, the costs of technology to facilitate 
gathering, processing and distribution of recovered gas could be considerable’.
5.3.5 Summary
IOC’s can cover one or more activities along the value chain, implying a degree of vertical 
integration), (interviewee 4 and 5) and/or can seek to expand within a given activity, implying 
horizontal consolidation. Interviewee 2 was of the opinion that strategic possibilities are generated 
by linking of a value chain extending from suppliers in the upstream all the way to the downstream, 
and to the final consumer. Interviewee 6 and 17 in particular felt it is necessary to re-evaluate and 
rebuild the value chain when changes occur in the business environment and competitive conditions 
due to factors such as deregulation. Interviewee 5 states that ‘from this efficient and effective usage 
of the value-creating activities, RDS stays competitive in the oil industry.’
As RDS holds geographically diverse assets across all parts of the value chain, they are less 
vulnerable to specific events than companies that hold assets in one part of the value chain in one 
geographic region. As interviewee 13 ‘states breadth of operations allows us to reduce the volatility 
of our return on investment and reduce our cost of capital’. IOC’s tend to have lower volatility of 
their return on investment than independent companies. The world’s nations need energy to power 
growth, but the world’s nations are realizing that the energy may not always come from fossil fuels, 
especially oil. Most respondents were of the opinion that no one can tell for certain when fossil fuel 
will be exhausted, but respondents note that renewable energies provide an opportunity to bypass 
this problem. It was frirther gathered from the interviews that RDS invests heavily in R&D with a 
prime focus on the near-term reward of increased shareholder value while maintaining long-term 
sustainability through reserves replacement.
Respondents also note RDS’s investments in training new scientists through university grants helps 
basic research. This investment is not always categorized as R&D, yet respondent 4 believes it is 
immensely important in creating the next generation of petroleum scientists, engineers, and 
geologists Respondents were generally of the opinion that growth requires a combination of
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acquisitions, exploration activities, and further technology and downstream market developments. 
Hence high oil prices putting a premium on acquisitions and increasing the value of an exploration 
upside, majors need to think about “recreating” their dedicated venture teams to find and secure 
new exploration opportunities and complement their work by taking a stakes in, or even partnering 
with smaller but more focused exploration companies.
5.4 Projection Strategy through Scenario Planning At RDS:
5.4.1 Background
In light of all the strategic challenges highlighted above, breadth of vision and emphasis on the 
generation and application of ideas rather than a narrow focus on financial performance was seen as 
the appropriate solution in RDS. As a consequence, RDS pioneered many new management 
techniques, including multiple scenario analysis, business portfolio planning, cognitive mapping, 
and the application of organizational learning concepts to planning processes (Schoemaker; 1993). 
This is in line with (Bindeman: 1999) who notes that strategy situations present many opportunities 
for the exercise of intuition and the generation of novel actions. Foresight and vision, not just 
rationality, are crucial drivers of strategy at RDS. Besides feedback learning, feed forward learning 
(foresights about RDS’s external environment and core competencies) influences decisions and 
actions within RDS and through them its overall strategy. The dotted lines in figure 5.5 represent 
these learning loops.
Learning Learning
D ecisions A ctions
Strategy
Firm
Perform anceExternal
Environment
Core
C om p etencies
BUSINESS
CONTEXT
CORE ELEMENTS OF THE 
STRATEGY PROCESS
Figure 5.5: Core Elements o f the S trategy Process 
Source: Bindeman: 1999
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5.4.2 Attraction of Scenario Planning at RDS
Shells planning system lay at the heart of its management system (interviewee 12). It is viewed as 
one of the most sophisticated and effective of any large multinational (interviewee 16). According 
to interviewee 9, ‘it is a breadth of vision, and emphasis on the generation and application of ideas 
rather than a narrow focus on financial performance.’ The company develops global scenarios as 
part of its strategic planning for the whole organisation, and focused scenarios for the appraisal of 
more specific strategic issues at various levels in the organisation (interviewee 5). Global scenarios 
are developed for the long term, usually 30 years into the future. Its use by RDS in the 1970s arose 
from a growing dissatisfaction with more deterministic approaches to long-term planning, which 
tended to rely upon single-point forecasts and on the non-explicit assumption that the future will be 
much like today - only a little better (Wack; 1985).
RDS’s planning horizon of 30 years into the future -  was much further than the four- or five-year 
planning that most companies engage in. Unlike most other companies, the basis for these strategic 
plans was not traditional forecasts but scenarios -  alternative views of the future which allowed 
RDS managers to consider strategic responses to the different ways in which the future might 
unfold (interviewee 11 and 14). They constructed scenarios around the issue of the price of oil 
which made sense as this was the key determinant in their business at that time. Interviewee 7 notes 
‘we operate within an atypical business environment where a small number of key variables such as 
oil reserves and price have a disproportionate effect on the dynamics of the businesses’.
RDS planners also asked questions like, ‘what would have to be true for the Soviet Union to begin 
increasingly to sell its oil in Europe’. One answer was that such an event could occur if a political 
unknown named Mikhail Gorbachov became premier (interviewee 10 and 13). RDS managers 
noticed the rise of Gorbachov and began to see possibilities much further down the road than 
anyone else (interviewee 6). This activated their double-loop learning gate which enabled them to 
solve problems of how to make extracting expensive oil from the North Sea remain good business 
even if oil prices were to drop (interviewee 8). When asked why scenario planning has become so 
popular in the RDS? Respondents noted that the world had become more complex and at the same 
time it presents ever larger elements of change.
As the world becomes more global, RDS is put in the position of dealing with customers, suppliers, 
regulators, cultural, social, governmental, and economic factors different from the those that they
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were most familiar and comfortable with (interviewee 8 and 9). Scenarios help RDS navigate 
through these turbulent times (interviewee 8). Interviewee 7 states ‘scenarios help us focus on 
critical uncertainties and things we are not aware of which may alter our business, as well as the 
things we do know about in which there might be unexpected discontinuities’. Interviewee 9 also 
states ‘they help us understand the limitations of our ‘mental maps’ of the world -  to think the 
unthinkable, anticipate the unknowable and utilise both to make better strategic decisions’.
5.4.3 Classification
The first step in the process is to agree on the strategic issue they want to address, typically in the 
form of a “focal” question (interviewee 8 and 9). There are an infinite number of stories about the 
future with the challenge being to focus on those stories that are important. The focal question 
ensures that the scenarios are relevant to the strategic issue at hand or to the strategic decision under 
consideration (interviewee 7). Often, the focal question is informed by interviews at the onset of a 
project. The focal question might be open and broad such as “What is the future of the coal 
industry?” or more closed and specific such as “Should RDS invest in coaT (interviewee 14). Other 
respondents identify learning as a major objective and believe a more open focal question will allow 
broader discussions e.g gas technology initiatives. New scenarios at RDS are classified into two, 
‘The Dynamics as Usual’ and ‘The Spirit of the Coming Age’. The main questions explored by the 
new scenarios revolve around these factors:
• How long will oil and gas resources be able to meet rising demand and what will replace oil 
in transport?
• What will drive market growth and cost reduction of renewable?
• How will a hydrogen infrastructure develop?
• What will social and personal priorities be, and how will they affect energy choices?
‘Dynamics as Usual’ draws attention to the key drivers of resource scarcity, environment and 
security concerns, competitive responses by incumbent technologies and competing societal 
priorities (interviewee 6). In this scenario, the energy transition looks to be a continuation of past 
dynamics. Societal demands for cleaner, more convenient energy drive a gradual shift from high- to 
low-carbon fuels, and towards electricity as the energy carrier (interviewee 6 and8). But 
fundamental to this transition is a process of intense competition, maturing new technologies and
110
shifting social priorities, which slows down the transition process thereby making it anything but 
smooth -  that is to say dynamics as usual (interviewee 4). In ‘The Spirit of the Coming Age’ 
superior ways of meeting energy needs are developed to meet customer preferences. This is a world 
of experimentation and many failures. It is the story of a solution that results in a technology 
revolution and a reminder that discontinuities can arise from seemingly mundane parts of the energy 
system (Shell Annual Reports; 2008).
5.4.4 Strategic Implication
Wack (1985) explains how scenarios were used within RDS to explore potential futures that were 
not merely an extrapolation of the past, which may be a highly untrustworthy guide, but 
incorporated the inherent uncertainty, unpredictability and ambiguity of the future into this mix. 
This resulted in RDS having considered and rehearsed its response to the 1973 oil crisis and oil 
price collapse of 1981 before these events happened. Respondents felt their experience suggested 
that; although the future cannot be accurately predicted, neither should it be ignored. In their 
opinion, the scenarios provide a basis for defining signposts for each scenario. Scenario signposts 
serve as early warning system that signals that a particular scenario is emerging (interviewee 7, 8 
and 11). Watching for these signals allows RDS to make sense of change on an ongoing basis and 
to react more quickly than competitors to significant changes in the business environment 
(interviewee 5).
Another function of scenarios beyond the planning aspect is improving communication. Interviewee 
11 states ‘scenarios can lead to the creation of a common language for dealing with strategic issues 
by opening a strategic conversation within our organisation’ (interviewee 11). Respondents also talk 
about the co - coordinating function; during the scenario process the aims, opportunities, risks, and 
strategies are shared between the participants which supports the coordination and implementation 
of action (interviewee 12 and 14). In fact respondents believe the organisational learning and 
decision making process is improved. If effectively done, they integrate what would otherwise be 
bulleted or enumerated points (interviewee 9). Respondents see integration as a great step forward 
in understanding. The scenarios illustrate the interrelationships among the variables under 
consideration (interviewee 3). Projection strategy through scenarios helps RDS focus on critical 
uncertainties, things they don't know about which might transform their business, and on the things 
they do know about in which there might be unexpected discontinuities.
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They help RDS understand the limitations of their ‘mental maps’ of the world -  to think the 
unthinkable, anticipate the unknowable and utilise both to make better strategic decisions (Shell 
Reports; 2008). They are not standard predictions -  but reliable, pertinent and challenging 
alternative stories that help RDS investigate ‘what i f  and ‘how’. Their purpose is not to pinpoint 
future events -  but to consider the forces which may push the future along different paths 
(interviewee 15 and 18). The scenarios themselves are not the desired end; rather they are a 
management tool to improve the quality of strategic decisions (interviewee 3). Respondents note 
that strategic decisions might involve a specific investment decision, such as whether to build an up 
grader and whether it should be located in Alberta or in the United States, whether to focus 
exploration efforts on oil or on natural gas etc.
Projection strategy through scenarios serve both to generate strategic options (e.g.. If scenario X 
occurs, what strategies should we pursue?) and to evaluate their risks and rewards. For example, 
RDS suggests that successful implementation of carbon capture and sequestration technology would 
have huge benefits in leveraging heavy oil and coal resources. One strategy would be to invest in 
the technology (interviewee 8). Investing in heavy oil and coal resources which would benefit from 
CCS is seen as another strategic option (interviewee 10). In evaluating those strategies, if  the 
technology is not successful and there is an emergence of alternative scenarios, investing in CCS or 
carbon-intensive resources is regarded as a disaster (interviewee 17).
Different strategies will have different risk-reward profiles across the scenarios. In this way, both 
risky strategies and robust strategies (strategies that work in all scenarios) can be identified for 
further in-depth analysis, including developing more creative and flexible ways of implementing a 
given strategy (interviewee 12). Finally respondents felt it is the best suited way to use available 
information about the future as it generates new ideas and can help in identifying the underlying 
patterns. On the other hand intuitive logic is firmly connected with the experts who work on the 
scenario, the techniques are assembled together in the most varied manner and as a result it is hard 
to ascertain the validity of the particular approach adopted from a scientific viewpoint.
5.4.5 Issues with Projection Strategy through Scenarios at RDS
He states that the scenario strategy is not able to deal with complex developments and trends, which 
can be characterized as inconsistent, because they tend to be excluded as logically impossible or 
inconsistent during the scenario-building process. Other respondents indicate that scenarios do not
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prevent management from being surprised. Interviewee 9 states ‘we are regularly confronted with 
entirely unanticipated situations’. Thus, in this respondent’s opinion, it is remarkable how often 
scenarios occur that were just not included or were excluded as ‘logically improbable’ or 
‘inconsistent’ during the process of scenario building.
While some respondents stress the significance of consistency testing in scenario building 
Interviewee 9 and 13 points to this compounding in the key issue of projection strategies being 
unable to deal with inconsistency, especially when the future does not lie in consistent forecasts but 
rather lies beyond it and reveals different dimensions in surprising combinations. If scenarios, 
based on the conventional projections ignore unconventional trends, they are not helpful in 
exploring the future but rather tend to produce misleading results (interviewee 13).
In 1980 Managing Director Andre Benard (1980) of the Royal Dutch Shell Group notes in the 
Harvard Business Review “experience has taught us that the scenario technique is much more 
conducive to forcing people to think about the future than the forecasting techniques we formerly 
used”. Since the mid 60’s RDS has invested heavily in promoting the scenario technique in the 
company (interviewee 1 and 6). Interviewee 13 states ‘throughout the three decades that we have 
been using scenarios it has proven difficult, except in a few notable cases, to come up with clear 
evidence of confirmable links with superior strategic performance.’
This has not diminished the company’s enthusiasm for the approach. The above quotation is typical 
for the company’s belief in the value of upgrading strategic conversation quality through the use of 
scenario planning, even if the direct link with performance is difficult to trace. In consistently 
taking this stance, respondents demonstrate their perspective on the company as a community with 
a common purpose which exists in a strategic conversation. Such a conversation creates learning 
loops which RDS continuously goes through, consisting of new experiences and perceptions, 
leading to conceptualisation and adjusted mental models, leading to new plans and actions, leading 
to new experience etc.
5.4.6 Summary
Shells scenario strategy can be summarised by an overarching question: "What energy needs, 
choices and possibilities will shape a global energy system which halts the rise in human induced 
carbon dioxide emissions within the next 50 year without jeopardising economic development?"
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(Shell Annual Report; 2008). The RDS experience also demonstrates that an important role of 
projection strategy through scenarios is to bring together information from a variety of seemingly 
unrelated economic, technological, competitive, political, and societal information and translate it 
into a framework for judgement- in a way that no model could do. This crucially provides the 
opportunity to spot such trends emerging, prepare to encounter them, and potentially influence 
them. Finally, the basic strategy that an IOC adopts, and the factors that drive the selection, 
provides information on the way oil companies do business and view the outlook of their industry.
The diversity and depth of strategies that exist in the oil industry is significant, and no 
categorization is sufficiently descriptive to encompass all possible cases. Categories may change as 
internal (staffing, assets, successes, failure, etc.) and external (oil price, markets, interest rates, etc.) 
circumstances are played out. Authors who criticize the third generation model, as Miller (2001), 
Christensen and Overdorf (2000), point out the immediate requirement of new tools in order to help 
managers in technological development planning for horizons beyond those demarcated by the 
business plans. In light of this, scenarios provide a tool for IOC managers to take a long view in a 
world of great uncertainty.
5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In summary, the interviews established that value is created in the oil industry by the various links 
in the oil industry value chain, which starts from the resource base and moves through production, 
processing, transportation, and, finally, to the market. While the resource base is a gift of nature, 
translating this into reserves and production requires investment and effort. The production link in 
the value chain relates to field recovery factors as well as production costs which both have 
managerial and technical dimensions. The same is true of the processing and transport stages of the 
chain. The market value of oil and gas can be assumed to be outside the control of IOC’s in most 
cases around the world. RDS like other IOC’s face significant competition in each of their 
businesses for access to raw materials, including oil and gas reserves and refinery feedstock.
They also face competition in the sale of their products to customers, in the development of 
innovative products and solutions, including the development of new technologies and in their 
search for employees with the skills and experience they need (interviewee 3, 7 and 14). With the 
rise in oil and gas prices, producing countries have become aware of the value of their untapped 
reserves (interviewee 3) and just how necessary it is to optimize management of those reserves if
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they are to achieve long-term economic development (Interviewee 7). They are making sufficient 
money with what they produce and prudently do not want to develop their remaining energy 
resources too fast; rather they have the feeling that it is good for their citizens to keep such 
resources for the future (McNulty; 2008, Wheatley and Crooks; 2008).
RDS has accepted this reality with their strategy now being how to persuade resource rich countries 
to give them access by pursuing an array of commercial arrangements that vary from full equity 
interest to partial equity sharing and fee for- services. This contrasts their traditional roles of being 
full equity developers of oil and gas fields. This means contribution to technology and maximizing 
local involvement. As the industry changes, most respondents were unanimous in their opinion that 
technology remains crucial as IOC’s seek breaks through technological innovations or risk losing 
out to rivals. As noted earlier in this chapter, RDS is looking for newer types of energy with 
projects such as mining Canadian oil shale and investments in bio fuels.
Finally, an examination of RDS’s projection strategy through scenarios revealed that some of the 
main long term strategic issues facing RDS are; 1) when will oil and gas resources cease to meet 
rising demand 2) what will replace oil in transport 3) which technology will win the race to improve 
the environmental standards of vehicles 4) where will social and personal priorities lie and 5) how 
will these affect energy choices etc. The interviews established that scenario planning process is 
used by RDS to identify the forces driving future change. This opens the conversation to a wide 
range of creative ideas which can be recorded and grouped into common themes (Van der Heijden; 
1996). These themes identify the underlying forces that implicitly drive the future (Figure 5.6).
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This paper studies the “management control systems-strategy-performance” relationship from a 
contingency theory point of view, considering the way in which multiple aspects of control systems 
and dimensions of context combine in a variety of ways to enhance performance (Chenhall & 
Langfield-Smith; 1998 Otley; 1980, 1999, Dess et al; 1997). The basic argument underlying the 
contingency theory is that the organisation neither functions in isolation of the external environment 
(i.e. level of uncertainty may change) nor does it remain static or constant with respect to its internal 
environment, as for example, size or technology may change (Dess et al; 1997, Otley; 1980). 
Managers need measures that capture and reflect their firms’ strategies in order to effectively 
manage their organisation. Chenhall (2003) argues that the strategy literature might suffer from 
outdated strategy constructs and the investigation of only single facets of a multi-faceted concept. 
To counter this criticism, I measure multiple dimensions of strategy (Positioning, RBV, Scenario 
Planning).
116
6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AT RDS
6.1 Chapter Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate and clarify how International Oil Companies 
measure performance through the use of a diverse set of measures. In order to reach this objective, 
several obstacles that contribute to the complexity of the research area will be examined. Two 
industry specific measures will be presented as well as some of the more well-known conceptual 
performance measurement frameworks. Furthermore, the analysis aims to reveal different 
advantages and shortcomings of each individual performance measure and conceptual framework. 
An initial round of interviews helped to confirm from industry insiders the most appropriate 
methods for the oil industry. This was essential to ensure the researcher conducted a reliable 
analysis as there are numerous measures used by oil companies. The final focus based on the 
financial /subjective non-financial conceptual divide created for this thesis is listed below
• Financial Performance Measures:
Return on Average Capital Employed 
Economic Value Added
Reserves Replacement Ratio (Industry Specific)
• Subjective Non-Financial Measures:
Balanced Scorecard
Corporate Social Responsibility
Health Safety Environment (Industry Specific)
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6.2 Financial Measures of Performance
6.2.1 Return on Average Capital Employed at RDS
6.2.1.1 Background
Respondents were all of the opinion that the predominant performance indicator at RDS is Return 
on Average Capital Employed (ROACE). Their rationale for using this indicator is an assumed 
correlation between rent ability and valuation metrics. Respondents 4, 13,16, 17 and 18 all stipulate 
that RDS is often under pressure to provide consistent profitable investment from exacting 
shareholders with no concerns but how to maximise their returns and earn superior profits. This is 
one of the main reasons respondents at RDS felt it was essential to relate to some simplified 
indicators that can help them in developing relative valuation. Ideally, valuation should be 
undertaken by means of net present value analyses were the value of a firm is determined by the 
cash flow, growth and risk characteristics (interviewee 7). Most respondents were of the opinion 
that relative valuation is simpler to understand and easier to present to clients, thus much more 
likely to reflect the current situation in the market, since it is an attempt to measure relative and not 
intrinsic value.
In line with the conceptual model, ROACE is seen as providing RDS managers with information on 
historical performance as well as given senior and middle level managers a tool to effectively assess 
performance. While the conceptual model notes that financial measures are too aggregate and short­
term in nature, and are not focused enough to capture elements of strategy that are critical to the 
firm’s success, some clear advantages of ROACE compared to other “softer” measures s that it 
provides strategic level and middle level managers with, reasonably objective, verifiable, and hard 
information (Ijiri, 1975).
Osmundsen (2001) suggests that increasing pressures for improved financial performance have 
tilted the balance of management attention from long-term reserves and production growth, to short­
term earnings. Respondents were of the view that there is a need to strike a balance between short­
term goals of return on capital and long-term goals of production growth and reserve replacement. 
Interviewee 7 notes that the focus on short term return on capital may have caused a shift in Shells 
attention to cost-cutting and value-maximisation of existing reserves’, ie RDS managers focused on 
production enhancement and total oil recovery from available fields in their portfolio.
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6.2.1.2 ROACE and Investments at RDS
In deciding on its investment levels, during the interviews, RDS managers spoke about facing the 
issue of making the decision between the short-term gain of high investments in periods of high 
prices or obtaining higher long-term profits if they were to abstain from additional capacity 
expansion. Interviewees 6, 7 and 9 noted that the high IRR would often indicate that they would 
take the option for the short-term strategy of capacity expansion. However the system of relative 
valuation - and emphasis on ROACE - introduces a countervailing incentive, as high investments 
would generate a temporary decline in ROACE due to the features of the accounting system 
(Osmusdeen et al ; 2004).
Thus, focus on short-term financial indicators may have the interesting effect of supporting an 
equilibrium of low investments, which otherwise typically is characteristic for companies having 
low discount rates (Chua and Woodward; 1994). When asked questions about long term reserves, 
respondents agreed that increasing pressures for improved financial performance have tilted the 
balance of management attention at RDS from long-term reserves and production growth, to short­
term earnings. Respondents were of the opinion that cash-flow variables dominate capital-cost 
variables in the explanation of investment behaviour.
Respondents were of the opinion that increased focus on shareholder returns, capital discipline and 
return on capital employed (ROACE) caused a temporary slowdown in investment and production 
growth at RDS. One of the main issues with using ROACE as the main measure of performance 
results from the fact that value is created by making as many investments, including acquisitions, as 
possible that return more than the cost of capital thus overestimating the cost of capital will result in 
the company making fewer value adding investments than it should (interviewee 7 and 9). 
Respondents from the accounting department at RDS Dubai inform us that ‘the main issue stems 
from the fact that accounting returns on capital employed are not the same as economic internal 
rates of return.’ When queried further about the reason, interviewee 8 and 9 indicate that it stems 
from depreciation being charged on a straight-line basis, or unit of production for upstream assets, 
which does not accurately reflect the rate of impairment of economic value during the life of the 
asset. This is in line with Osmunsdeen’s assertions.
This is more prevalent for long-lived assets like LNG terminals and gas pipelines which operating 
cash flow is likely to rise over the asset life (interviewee 6 and 9). Respondents note the opposite is
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the case for oil fields that often have a fairly short expected life. In the last 15 years, RDS has 
realised that reserve growth is required to sustain long-term production and activity growth and thus 
they have reduced the pressure for short-term financial returns (interviewee 15). In light of the 
advancing depletion of legacy fields of the past and limited access to new exploration acreage, 
management focus at RDS has gone back to exploration for the intention of accessing new oil and 
gas reserves (interviewee 8).
6.2.1.3 ROACE and Reserves at RDS
During the 1990s, NOC’s were privatised all over the world, and embarked on new strategies of 
aggressive international business development. Consequently, the competition among lOCs for 
increasingly scarce oil and gas resources became fiercer than ever (interviewee 4, 8 and 9). From 
the mid nineties the size of oil and gas reserves became significantly more important in explaining 
valuation (interviewee 6). In respondents 5, 6 and 9’s opinions, oil and gas reserve disclosures are 
an important feature of oil company’s 10-K reports, as this information is essential in the equity 
valuation process. There is a risk that reserves may be exposed to errors in measurement in light of the fact 
that they fail to reflect real option as well as not being noted in the mid cycle oil price (Interviewee 5 and
7).
McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1999) also go on to claim there is a bias in the reported figures, as 
companies like RDS are more conservative in their reserve estimates. This in interviewee 18’s 
opinion is a factor that can explain the importance that is now placed by RDS managers on 
company reputation. However, this assumption has perhaps also become contentious after the recent 
reserve write-down in RDS. One of the respondent points out that ‘initial depreciations are too high 
with the successful efforts method used at RDS (This method is covered in more detail under the 
RRR section of this thesis). This respondent also felt that assets were depreciated too quickly in the 
unit production method resulting in the reward of passive management and the punishment of new 
activity.
6.2.1.4 Issues with ROACE at RDS
Respondents agree with Osmondseen (2004’s) view that due to conservative procedures inherent in 
ROACE, it temporarily improves when investment rates decline, providing an additional argument 
for RDS to curb their investments. This clearly dampens the propensity to invest, and eventually
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also production growth. This focus on ROACE would have a negative effect on long-term 
production among IOC’s.
Respondents cited Economic Value Added (EVA) as an alternative and effective solution being 
used in RDS. Interviewee 5 states ‘it has in its favour a blending of traditional accounting with the 
concept of a cost of capital’. However Boone (2002) identifies certain issues with the application of 
this approach to assets w ith  very different lives. In line with (Boone: 2002) respondents felt that 
certain factors must be embedded in this process of capital allocation such as the relationship 
between growth, ROACE and value creation, along with the relationship between the duration of 
an asset’s life and its accounting ROACE.
6.2.1.5 Summary and Conclusions
The results firom empirical studies do not support the general perception of ROACE as an important 
performance metric in the oil and gas industry. Variation in company performance is mainly 
explained by the oil price, oil and gas production, and to some extent reserve replacement. 
Respondents argue that a shift of attention among IOC managers has increased the focus on 
operational efficiency and short-term earnings, at the expense of long-term reserve and production 
growth. Interviewee 4 states that ‘our attention has shifted back to long-term reserve and 
production growth.” Most respondents at RDS agree that short term return on capital is 
unsustainable, and therefore would prefer a more balanced trade-off between short-term indicators 
such as return on capital and long-term indicators as e.g. reserve replacement.
Respondents agreed that there are currently problems with the valuation system at RDS, since the 
accounting information in the upstream sector gathered and reported did a distressingly poor job of 
conveying the true economic results (interviewee 14 and 18). Interviewee 10 and 11 also believe 
that there are measurement errors in petroleum reserve while interviewee 3 stated that there is an 
asymmetric response to new information whereby bad news is quickly reflected in the reserve 
figures and good news takes more time to be accounted for.
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6.2.2 Economic Value Added At RDS
6.2.2.1 Background
Respondents note that although accounting profit measures such as earnings per share, return on 
equity, return on assets and return on investment are reasonably effective, they don’t take into 
consideration the total cost of capital and are unduly influenced by accrual-based accounting 
conventions. In the case of some key indicators, respondents identify a difficulty with gathering 
data of sufficient quality. All though not all respondents would admit it, interviewee 2 and 6 agree 
that RDS still struggles with how best to communicate, for example, the quality of their 
management.
Traditional, predominantly financial, indicators used to measure corporate performance no longer 
effectively meet the needs of RDS and that of the capital markets (interviewee 6). These indicators 
fail to relay the full story of RDS and don’t adequately deliver true insight into their capacity to 
grow, adapt and change. Most respondents agree that the markets continue to focus on short-term 
earnings. This is further confirmed by interviewee 6 who goes on to indicate that ‘this is one of the 
major reasons for the use of more robust measures as EVA’. This respondent stressed the superior 
information given by the EVA figure when compared to normal accounting figure. This is in line 
with the assertions of authors such as Biddle et al; 1997 as well as Chen and Dodd (1997).
Due to its ability to predict future share prices and its links to traditional financial returns, EVA is 
seen in this study as tool to both document historical performance as well as predict future 
performance. One of its key advantages is its ability to make the drivers of wealth creation much 
more transparent to managers at the strategic, middle and operational level. At RDS, Strategic unit 
managers utilise EVA for compensation, middle level manager’s use EVA for translating financial 
goals into operational goals and the reserve adjusted EVA at RDS provides information on wealth 
creation at the reservoir and operational level.
6.2.2.2 Attraction of EVA AT Royal Dutch Shell
As stated in chapter 2, in contrast to other commonly used metrics such as EBITDA (earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization), cash flow and ROE (return on equity), an 
improvement in EVA always represents an improvement in performance for the shareholders
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(O’Byrne; 1999). Furthermore, McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1999) argue that EVA explains 
more of changes in shareholder wealth than accounting based measures. Interviewee 8 and 9 
stipulate that a main advantage of EVA is that it can be directly connected to the company share 
price through market value added (MVA). But other respondents such as interviewee 12 and 15 
specify that in consideration of the unique conditions characterizing RDS and the oil industry in 
general the EVA should be adjusted in order for management to gain accurate views on 
performance. EVA in interviewee 7s opinion may give a hint of how well the capital provider’s 
cash is spent.
McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1999) stress the use of an EVA metric which includes changes in 
the value of reserves, and inform oil firms that by making this adjustment the market would give 
credit now for value that will be delivered in the future. The authors also stress the importance of 
real options when valuing the reserves of oil companies. Respondents had read about Stem 
Stewart’s adaptation of Economic Value Added (EVA) for upstream oil and gas companies and 
believed that the measure was superior to traditional metrics. Stem Stewart had developed a 
measure of EVA for E&P companies that included an adjustment for the value of reserves in the 
ground net of the capital invested to secure those reserves.
Unlike traditional financial metrics such as eamings, annual cash flow, and retum on capital, for 
interviewees 7, 10 and 12 this reserve-adjusted EVA measure exhibits a strong statistical correlation 
with changes in shareholder wealth. According to (Lehn et al; 1996), if EVA is positive, a 
declining EVA suggests that financial performance is deteriorating over time, and if  this trend 
continues EVA will become negative and financial performance unacceptable. Interviewee 4 and 7 
believe that a negative EVA allows management to know if RDS is not compensating its capital 
resources adequately, and puts them in a position to ensure corrective action is considered if this 
negative EVA persists over time.
Respondents emphasize the superiority of EVA as it allows management to combine factors such as 
economy, accounting and market information in its assessment. Interviewee 1, 2 and 7 believe that 
it incorporates much more information as compared to traditional tools i.e. EPS, Net Operating 
Profit After Tax (NOPAT) etc. Respondent 6 notes that EVA can eliminate the confusion and 
conflicts which arise when a firm uses multiple measures and can eliminate economic distortions of 
General Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP); thus focusing on decisions of real economic
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results. Respondents were of the view that it provides for better assessment of decisions that affect 
the balance sheet and income statement and covers all aspects of the managerial cycle.
6.2.2.3 EVA Adjustments at RDS
Respondents note that another indication of the ready applicability of EVA to the downstream 
businesses is the observable link between the EVA and Market Value Added for refining 
companies. Interviewees 7, 8 and 9 inform us that the EVA measure at RDS is based on making a 
series of adjustments which include eliminating the non-cash amortization of goodwill, capitalizing 
off-balance sheet lease financing, adding back restructuring charges and asset write-offs, converting 
LIFO to FIFO inventory valuations, and so forth. EVA is said to have a value-based performance 
measurement system which have further practical advantages (Stem et al; 1998). Respondent 5 
identifies another of the benefits of EVA to be its simplicity and its easiness to adjust for risk
Another point that respondents note is that goodwill is automatically written off in the EVA system 
at RDS by reversing any amortisation of goodwill that has already taken place and restoring it to 
invested capital. The counter-argument is that whatever the treatment of goodwill, the “present 
value of charges to the future results from the acquisition of goodwill will be the same” 
(Interviewee 6 and 8). Thus there may be no obvious need for this adjustment under conventional 
GAAP as R&D costs are expensed. But as R&D is an investment, RDS act in line with (Stem and 
Stewart et al) who propose its capitalisation. The argument made by respondent 3 ,4  and 7 is that ‘if 
RDS does not capitalise R&D, there will be a temptation to under-invest because short-term profits 
will be adversely affected by R&D expenditures whereas the benefits will not be realised until 
future periods.’
To capitalise R&D, the adjustment is to add back R&D costs to NOPAT and shareholder’s equity. 
The capitalised costs are then written off gradually, with an amortisation period based on the 
number of future periods expected to benefit from products and services developed from the R&D 
(Young; 1999). However respondent 8 believes that adjustments such as this may be of no real 
benefit as management has qualitative targets to achieve, rather than a just financial objective. 
Interviewees 7, 9 and 10 further stipulate that RDS experienced particularly dramatic reversals of its 
fortunes, and those sharp changes subjected financial performance measures to the kind of stress 
tests that most clearly reveal their inherent limitations.
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Eamings before subtracting interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (i.e. EBITDA) according 
to interviewees 6 ,9 and 11 is a measure of the gross cash flow from operations used at RDS as 
measure of performance and value but it fails to be superior to other financial measures. The Rate of 
Retum like all the other measures in interviewee 13’s opinion used at RDS was backward-looking. 
IRR in a few respondents’ opinions is seen as fundamentally flawed measure for many other 
reasons as it does not adjust for accounting distortions, with interviewee 7 and 9 pointing out that it 
does not take into account the cost of capital, and it completely ignores the importance of the size of 
an investment or rate of growth in a company. Interviewee 8 furthers by noting that it is impossible 
to pinpoint exactly why, but for whatever reason, the financial measures at RDS failed to explain 
what was happening to the firm.
According to respondents, EVA at RDS included an adjustment for the value of reserves in the 
ground net of the capital invested to secure those reserves. Unlike traditional financial metrics such 
as eamings, annual cash flow, and retum on capital, interviewees 8, 9 and 10 indicate that this 
reserve-adjusted EVA measure exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder 
wealth in the E&P business. EVA makes the drivers of wealth creation much more transparent to 
managers at all levels of the firm. RDS measured EVA as far down as the reservoir level says 
respondents 10 and 11. Interviewee 8 furthers by stating that ‘this provided insights into wealth 
creation that would have been missed at the consolidated level’. Changes in shareholder wealth 
could be broken down into field-level operating efficiencies such as lease operating expenses per 
barrel (interviewee 11).
6.2.2.4 Improving Reserve Values through EVA
McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1998) research find the relations between valuation and financial 
indicators to be very weak or non-existent while finding stronger relations between EVA and 
reserves. Antill and Amott (2002) find the problem with financial measures such as ROACE is that 
capital employed will always reflect a mixture of legacy and new assets. The implication is that 
ROACE does not adequately reflect incremental profitability (Odell; 1998, Shaw and Weir; 1993). 
Thus, it falls short of being a good measure for current performance (Cormier and Magnan; 2002, 
Koester; 1990). Some respondents argue that RDS should accept investment projects with lower 
intemal rate of retum (IRR) as the growth potential would add value to the companies.
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Perhaps the greatest benefit respondents expect to achieve is the capital discipline that is so hard to 
bring about. Without question, RDS has sophisticated capital budgeting and planning systems. That 
should not be surprising since RDS prides itself in being one of the first to develop and apply the 
NPV method over 50 years ago. Still, respondents state that they are dissatisfied with their 
management of capital. The paradox is due to the fact that while employing forward-looking NPV 
calculations for decision-making, RDS does not in interviewee 6 and 7s opinion have a systematic 
way to instil accountability for capital after this is done. Interviewees 7 and 9 further point out that 
once a project is approved as a positive-NPV undertaking, the subsequent performance measures 
and incentives simply do not hold operators and engineers truly accountable for achieving the 
projections underlying the NPV calculations.
Interviewee 6 and 10 believe that the EVA framework succeeds because it closes the loop between 
decision-making, performance measurement, and compensation. Engineers and operators are 
trained to know that if they fail to cover the cost of capital, or to create a value that exceeds the 
amount of capital that they invest. When EVA is in for a tumble down the road, managers have 
every incentive to discipline themselves, and to propose only those projects that they truly believe 
are likely to produce a positive net present value according to interviewee 9 and 10. Once that 
happens, interviewee 10 believes that top management no longer feels compelled to ration capital, 
but can instead feel freer to make capital widely available and to decentralize decision-making into 
the field. Interviewee 1, 7 and 11 believe that when EVA is defined to include the change in the 
option value of reserves, more subtle but nevertheless important changes in behaviour can 
materialize.
Managers at RDS begin an earnest effort to understand how they can exploit the option value latent 
in so many physical assets according to interviewee 9. Interviewee 10 furthers by noting that option 
value is often a very significant portion of the actual market value of reserves, and yet most 
managers have no appreciation for this or ability to manage it. For one thing, measuring and 
managing reservoir options require valuation methods that are very different from simple, single­
point, discounted cash flow techniques. To better understand option values, respondents state that 
they start to examine and experiment with more sophisticated, Monte Carlo simulation methods. 
For another thing, the mindset of the respondents is powerfully reoriented towards the strategic 
value of flexibility rather than gross oil and gas volumes developed.
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Since management needs an internal performance measure McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1999) 
recommend the period-to-period increase in the NPV of the company’s reserves should be added 
both to its NOPAT and to its capital, in effect marking the reserves to market value. Respondents 
inform us that RDS adjusts its NOPAT and capital each year by adding an approximation of the 
increase in the net present value of their reserves to their earnings, and also to the capital base that 
was carried into the next year. Respondents 6 and 8 note that the NPV change is estimated at RDS 
by taking the year-to-year change in the “PV-SEC-10” reserve value and subtracting the year-to- 
year change in “Net Capitalized Costs” (i.e. the capital, net of depletion, invested to create 
reserves). By adding the estimated increase in NPV to the assets as well as to the earnings, 
respondents were of the belief that they both preserve the integrity of double-entry bookkeeping and 
maintain the equivalence between EVA and cash flow valuations.
Instead of focusing on growth, size, and raw market value, respondents were truly concerned with 
adding value to the capital they have employed, which is the impetus of building shareholder 
wealth. Related to this is the benefit that traditional metrics at RDS will be put into their proper 
perspective, viewed not as goals in and of themselves, but merely as supplemental indicators. For 
example, interviewees 10 and 11 point out that achieving a relatively “low” finding cost may 
actually destroy shareholder wealth if it occurs in politically unstable regions as those countries are 
often subject to high development costs, slow production rates, high taxes and other operating costs. 
Interviewee 8 states that ‘reserve replacement may also seriously mislead because it does not 
account for the amount of capital that must be invested to find and prove the reserves’ Simply put, 
any other measure besides EVA is only a piece of the puzzle since only EVA ties directly to the 
wealth of the shareholders via MVA (McCormack and Ian Drummond Gow; 2001).
6.2.2.S Issues with Economic Value Added at RDS
Interviewee 9 and 14 believe that EVA may not outperform the current realizations of other 
performance measures, such as earnings. Based on statistical evidence, Knight revealed that EVA 
is not as accurate as cash flow returns on investment. Respondents 6 and 7 believed ROI or IRR are 
good performance measures compared to EVA. Interviewee 1,10 and 15 believe that all accounting 
information gathered and reported by oil and gas concerns does a distressingly poor job of 
conveying the true economic results of RDS in a meaningful manner. As a result these respondents 
felt that all accounting-based measures, including a measure such as EVA that is derived from
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accounting information, have been ineffectual as meaningful goals (interviewee 1), as decision tools 
(interviewee 10), and as compensation benchmarks (interviewee 15).
Some respondents also spoke about the challenge of making EVA operational. Many questions 
surrounded implementation. Even given a conceptually superior metric such as EVA, respondents 7 
and 9 still questioned how RDS could provide operating managers with “line of sight” between 
changes in shareholder wealth and day-to-day decisions regarding costs, volumes, and production? 
For example, respondents Hand 12 were concerned about how an EVA financial management 
system deals with commodity price volatility? Crude oil prices can fluctuate wildly and, though 
managers have no control over prices, the effects on performance measures of commodity price 
swings often swamp the effects of most cost or production improvement efforts.
Although it is important to ensure it is pointed out that EVA is regarded as reliable indicator of the 
wealth RDS creates for its shareholders by most respondents, certain respondents like interviewee 4 
and 12 felt that EVA proves ineffective when used in the upstream side of the oil and gas industry. 
A crucial issue relates to the successful and full cost method which RDS uses to treat exploratory 
drilling expenses. Limitations of the successful methods approach relating to expensing the cost of 
unsuccessful exploratory wells have lead to IOC’s focusing more on the full cost method. 
Distortions arising from the use of SCA are elaborated on in the RRR section of this thesis.
6.2.2.6 Summary
This section examined respondent’s opinions on the Economic Value Added performance measure 
at RDS. Most respondents stressed the superior information given by the EVA figure when 
compared to normal accounting figure noting that it provides RDS with a logically coherent 
foundation for business planning, performance. According to respondents, EVA at RDS included an 
adjustment for the value of reserves in the ground net of the capital invested to secure those 
reserves. Unlike traditional financial metrics such as ROACE, respondents indicate that this 
reserve-adjusted EVA measure relays a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder 
wealth in the oil industry. Finally, while certain respondents were of the opinion that EVA is 
generally superior to traditional measures other respondents believe that EVA may not outperform 
the current realisations of other performance measures, such as earnings, in proxying for future 
equity. Other notable concerns raised were about how an EVA financial management system deals 
with commodity price volatility.
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6.2.3 Reserves Replacement Ratio
6.2.3.1 Background
While the level of existing reserves in an IOC’s portfolio will show its current and historical 
performance, its ability to replace those reserves are essential for managers to predict future 
performance. Chua and Woodward (1998) note that the success of an oil company’s exploration and 
development programme as well as its ability to generate future projects is measured by the rate at 
which IOC’s can replace depleted reserves. Due to its strategic importance and capital intensive 
nature, RRR is specifically used by senior level managers at the strategic apex for decisions related 
to measuring reserves as well as benchmarking replacement levels against bonuses and managerial 
performance.
Respondents generally felt that the reserves disclosures, including the standardized measure of cash 
flows and changes in the standardized measure, do have information value to investors. But 
interviewees 5, 6 and 8 also suggest that investors’ reliance on reserves disclosures varies widely 
with several other factors, including the size of the company and the accounting methods used for 
exploration costs. The stock price of RDS according to interviewee 5 and 9 is intimately tied to the 
amount of oil or gas reserves. When RDS took off 20% of its declared oil and gas reserves, 
investors and analysts were alarmed. Estimates are that over a period of years, RDS managers 
overstated more than $100 billion of future cash flows, based on billions of barrels of oil that were 
not in reality held in its reserves (Quirin et al, 2000; Magnan and Cormier, 2002).
The problem began in the late 1990’s. RDS was struggling to find energy in a world increasingly 
picked over or closed off to exploration. The low prices of the 90’s led to cut backs on exploration 
spending because IOC managers believed it wouldn't bring returns sufficient to satisfy investors. 
That contributed to the high oil prices of today. According to interviewee 7, ‘our RRR was one of 
the poorest in the industry and we were not finding new sources of oil fast enough’. Managers 
assumed that the policy for ‘booking’ new reserves was too restrictive. Respondents note that 
successful efforts (SE) method allows RDS managers to capitalize only those expenses related to 
successfully locating new oil and natural gas reserves, while the full cost (FC) method, lets 
managers capitalize operating expenses relating to locating new oil and gas reserves irrespective of 
the outcome.
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6.2.S.2 Importance of Reserve Disclosure
If reserves estimates are created in a biased manner for example, due to the fact that they are 
directly linked to bonuses, this clearly compromises the financial statements of IOC’s as this does 
not portray the true state of affairs to potential investors. Managers are more likely to revise to 
reserves upwards in expectation of increased bonuses. This thus lead to a situation whereby some 
managers were booking reserves but then failing to increase production or carry out further 
development on the pronounced ‘discoveries’ (interviewee 7 and 9). In addition to Shells 
ambitious plans to discover new oil and gas cheaply, interviewee 5 states that ‘we were redefining 
how we counted existing reserves’. These according to the respondent are defined as oil and gas in 
the ground that a company expects to pump and sell.
Oil companies have long had to report reserves to the SEC but have wide discretion over 
assumptions behind the calculations. Respondents 11, 14 and 17 point out that there was 
management fashion at the time for using problem solving teams to come up with radical and 
creative solutions. RDS established four such teams to improve the exploration and production 
function (interviewee 11 and 14). New guidelines for booking reserves were implemented; 
interviewee 16 points out that the company’s proven oil reserves increased by 40% and directors 
were rewarded for improving the efficiency of their directorates. According to interviewee 13, ‘we 
had adopted the system of determining senior managers’ rewards and bonuses according to their 
performance against critical performance indicators like RRR’ Interviewee 12 furthers this by 
stating that. ‘Rewards were triggered by numbers and targets and not by the rounded judgements of 
appraisers’. Interviewees 1, 3 and 9 felt that ‘they were spurred on in some occasions by a new 
culture that rewarded what was seen as unconventional thinking and risk taking’. Sound estimation 
of reserves often went out the window in favour of accounting manoeuvres.
Respondents point out that at the time, RDS was considering partially removing a Russian affiliate 
from its books for unrelated business reasons. By holding off on the move, management suggested, 
RDS could maximize its reserve bookings from the affiliate in years to come (interviewee 6). 
Interviewee 9 says, in some cases, we had letters of intent from customers to buy the output when 
we booked the project; he goes on to say there is a long way between these and commitment. The 
respondent talks about a specific case where after spending about $125 million drilling, engineers 
didn't find new gas. Interviewee 9 calls the whole process an example of how the new management 
culture undermined the checks and balances that underlay traditional planning. Respondents also
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identify issues relating to structure. Interviewee 5 and 8 note that the old set-up created regional 
scenarios were budgets were built from the centre, and had an incentive to bump up reserves, and to 
talk up their own province at the expense of others. According to interviewees 8 and 9, Australia 
and Nigeria were traditionally key "baronies".
Respondents 3 and 4 on the other hand point out that the RDS structure is unique, and while it may 
be involved in some of the company’s problems; it is not the only catalyst. “Good governance boils 
down to the ethics and competence of IOC managers.” Lawyers in the USA are clamouring to start 
class actions against the company on behalf of various pension funds who believe that 
misinformation caused them financial losses. In its agreement with the SEC RDS did not admit any 
illegality but it did agree to spend early £3m on developing better internal compliance systems 
(interviewee 4). RDS may be the first case to feel the weight of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was 
passed in the USA following the Enron and WorldCom cases. Under this act’s provisions the senior 
managers of the company signed a declaration that annual reports do not contain any false 
information.
6.2.33 Accounting for Oil and Gas Reserves
The recent reserves restatements by various organisations in the oil and gas industry have once 
again placed more scrutiny on the calculation and determination of oil and gas reserves information 
as well as leading to the consideration of existing accounting rules for oil companies. Below is a 
discussion on successful methods versus full cost methods of accounting reserves and whether they 
are accurate and dependable.
6.2.3.3.1 Successful Cost Accounting (SCA)
Under SCA an asset is only recognised in the balance sheet when there is a probability that the 
future economic benefits associated with it will flow to the organisation and the asset has a cost or 
value that can be reliably measured (interviewee 12 and 14). Respondents favouring successful 
efforts accounting argue that this method reflects the inherent risks and volatility that exist in the 
extractive industries due to the fact that costs of unsuccessful efforts are charged to expense as they 
occur. If costs associated with unsuccessful ventures are not charged to expense, there will clearly 
be distortions in both current and future financial statements because those costs must eventually be
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removed from the balance sheet and reported in the statement of profit and loss irrespective of the 
fact that they contribute nothing to future revenues.
Respondents felt that the capitalisation of costs from unsuccessful exploration and development as 
opposed to being expensed leads to an inability to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of 
management in profit and loss statements due to income smoothing. Under SCA, smoothing or 
normalising of earnings by deferring costs that do not meet the definition of an asset is greatly 
reduced or eliminated. Under the successful efforts method, the statement of profit and loss can 
provide an inaccurate reflection of performance in terms of success in finding new oil and gas 
reserves resultant from the effect of decisions to expand or curtail exploration expenditure 
(interviewee 3 and 5).
A reduction in exploration expense resultant from likely exploration curtailment would increase 
reported net profit in the years in which the exploration is reduced, even though few reserves will be 
added due to the curtailment of exploration. The cutback in reserve additions and the continuance of 
production results in a depletion of the reserves at the corporation (interviewee 9). Some 
respondents in favour of SCA argued that this shows if management curtails exploration, it will be 
reflected in the financial statements under successful efforts accounting. Bryant (2003) believes the 
solution might be that perhaps, supplemental information about reserve quantities and value is 
needed to indicate success or failure of exploration activity. Other respondents were of the view 
that the successful efforts method assesses success or failure too early in a project. Success or 
failure of exploration projects typically cannot be measured until the exploration activities are 
finished, which may take many years (interviewee 18).
6.2.3.3.2 Full Cost Accounting (FCA)
The full cost method reflects the way in which enterprises search for, acquire, and develop mineral 
resources (interviewee 12). These activities are carried out in varied locations, using various 
techniques and it is accepted that a number of projects will not result in the addition of reserves. In 
the full cost method, all costs incurred during prospecting, acquiring mineral interests, exploration, 
and development are gathered in large cost centres which normally aren’t smaller than a country 
(Bryant; 2003). Respondents note that they are interested primarily in earnings and changes in 
earnings from year to year. It is argued that SCA leads to distortions by expensing unsuccessful 
efforts to find and develop new reserves, which maybe widely varied from year to year. FCA
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eliminates these annual 'distortions' of income which are a result of expensing the charges for 
unsuccessful pre-production activities.
Other respondents felt that the full cost method delays loss recognition. Expenses should be 
reported on a timely basis as costs that do not result directly in future benefits are costs that are 
properly charged to expense (interviewee 4). Interviewee 13 felt that capitalising such costs results 
in deferring the effects of expenses. Interviewee 5 and 9 felt that the full cost method impedes 
measurement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the enterprise's exploration and development 
activities. Costs of unsuccessful activities are treated in the same manner as successful activities 
and are matched against future revenues from all of RDS’s successful exploration and development 
projects (interviewee 9). Interviewee 7 states ‘ there are certain situations which we may conduct 
completely unsuccessful exploration and development activities; yet the profit and loss statements 
fail to reveal this’.
6 2.3.4 Impact of Technology
Respondents went on to speak about the fact that in reality, a number of time-tested measures used 
for assessing reserves and their potential recovery dwindled as low oil and gas prices made it 
difficult to commercially afford the standard tests. The number of appraisal wells that always follow 
a new field discovery fell (interviewee 8). The use of coring (using core barrels and core catchers to 
deepen the wellbore by way of collecting a cylindrical sample) to test a new reservoir's rock 
properties was dismissed as outdated. Instead, according to interviewee 6 ‘we relied much more 
heavily on less costly geophysical data and computer modelling like seismic analyses’. Interviewee
7 furthers this view stating ‘ it wasn’t any sort of a methodical approach of overstating our reserves, 
the industry ended up being trapped into a system of not being able to afford to do the data 
collection that had in actual fact set the limits to what the reserves were’.
SEC also came under fire from certain respondents for disallowing the convention of ‘lowest known 
hydrocarbons’ and the use of 3D seismic to estimate reserves. Respondents felt SEC is being unduly 
conservative noting its rules (dating back to 1978) need to be updated. Respondents also criticized 
SEC for allowing certain technologies to be used for reserves estimations (e.g. 3D seismic) in the 
US Gulf of Mexico and disallowing the same technology when used elsewhere in the world. This 
implies that the same technology is somehow more believable in US territory than in non- US 
territory, which is clearly absurd. Interviewee 8 in particular notes that issues arise in the case of
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deepwater offshore deposits, where it would be very expensive (and physically and environmentally 
risky) to obtain flow data by the extensive pattern of drilling which is prescribed by the SEC, for 
onshore US fields; some relaxation has now been granted. The cost of proving continuity of 
pressure between two wells is $20 million a hole, and every hole has environmental risks associated 
with it (interviewee 8). Respondents felt it is essential that SEC take this into account.
Another issue respondents noted relates to oil produced in Canada from mining operations in tar 
sands which require specialized extraction techniques. For years SEC did not allow such oil to be 
booked as petroleum reserves on the grounds that it is a mining product (interviewee 7). When the 
Commission adopted the proved reserves definitions in the 70’s, the only effective means of 
extracting these compounds was through traditional mining techniques (interviewee 5). Since 1978, 
however, RDS have developed techniques to extract these compounds using oil and gas drilling 
techniques.
It is noteworthy that the new Canadian reserves disclosures appear to allow a great deal of 
flexibility, and in this respect the booking of oil from tar sands is not ruled out. It just has to be 
identified under a category of ‘unconventional’, thereby allowing investors to know what they are 
investing in, because unconventional oil and gas have their own risk and cost profile (interviewee 
7). In December 2008, (SEC) adopted revisions to the reporting rules governing oil and gas 
reserves. As a result of SEC rule changes these proven minable oil sands reserves are included in 
the proved oil and gas reserves from 2009.
6.2.3.S Price and Contractual Effects on Reserves Disclosure
While RRR provide important information needed to interpret the current and prospective 
performance of oil and gas exploration and production, there is evidence that current disclosures 
lack detailed asset data pertaining to ownership structures and their exposures to oil price volatility 
(interviewee 7 and 9). Rules for supplementary information on underlying reserves, SEC (SEC, 
1981) and FASB (FASB, 1982), are rooted in an era dominated by concessionary oilfield ownership 
structures. In contrast to concession ownership where reserves entitlement rests with the operator. 
Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) provides government regimes an entitlement to share oilfield 
production with producers (interviewee 15). The existence and price sensitivity of these contracts 
as they relate to underlying oilfields, are an alternative to concession ownership structures, and
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represent between 30 to 40 percent of emerging global reserve replacement opportunities 
(interviewee 1).
RDS recognises the existence of price sensitive contractual conditions and emphasises the need for 
the commodity price responsiveness of present values, reserves and production sharing to be 
disclosed (interviewee 3). The SEC disclosure presumption that entitlements are consistent across 
ownership structures has been shown to be incorrect for SEC measures (interviewee 1). The 
practice of reporting year end reserves as a homogenous asset class conceals value relevant 
information that would allow analysts to determine corporations with oil reserves most affected by 
price movements (Kretzschmar and Misung; 2006). Respondents were asked questions on the 
existence of undisclosed claims in oilfield ownership contracts; noting refs assertion that an oil and 
gas firm value can be decomposed into (1) the present value of future discretionary cash flows, (2) 
the present value of proven reserves (less contingencies) and (3) the present value of growth and 
development opportunities associated unproven reserves.
Interviewee 6 was of the opinion that the role of government contractual take is an important 
corporate value determinant in light of the rise in PSC’s and declining reserve opportunities. Each 
element is contractually dependent upon an assumed pattern of future oil prices, and as energy 
prices rise, fields producing through production sharing contracts are shown to have their 
‘bookable’ barrels reduced due to participation by the local government (interviewee 13). Although 
SEC disclosures are made net of contingent claims (at year end prices), the size of potential 
contractual claims is not disclosed and hence the effect of the PSC terms at year end prices, let 
alone their potential effect at future prices, is not readily understood by users of financial 
information. Interviewee 8 notes that another effect is on earnings disclosure - as the price of oil 
rises and a larger share of production comes from PSC regimes, oil companies will experience a 
larger effective tax take. It is thus recommend that supplementary information should reflect the 
disclosure response, resulting from contractual obligations, of SEC reserve disclosures to oil and 
gas price changes.
6.23.6 Issues and Reflection of Underlying Value
In respect of reserves reflecting the underlying value, respondents noted three main issues which 
will be examined below. These issues were field by field decline rates, managerial incentives and 
estimation issues.
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6.2.3.6.1 Field by Field Decline
Respondents indicate that reserves estimating will never be a precise science as it is a chain of 
complex estimates. Even if the reserves estimates could be found to be accurate, the data would 
still not provide analysts with any dependable tool to begin assessing field-by-field production 
declines. Interviewee 7 notes that it fails to provide information on the degree to which a reporting 
company possibly is being overly conservative or overly aggressive (interviewee 5). In 
interviewee 8’s opinion, the single best data reform is to require all major oil and gas companies to 
begin the timely reporting of field-by field daily oil production or production from key producing 
units. This new disclosure can be accompanied by the number of producing well bores from each 
production unit so analysts and public policy planners can begin assessing field-by-field production 
declines (interviewee 7).
6.2.3.6.2 Managerial Incentives
RDS had adopted the system of determining senior manager’s rewards and bonuses according to 
their performance against critical performance indicators like RRR. Rewards were triggered by 
numbers and targets and not by the rounded judgements of appraisers (Interviewee 15 and 18). 
Respondents spoke about the willingness of some of their managers to push the envelope of 
credibility in efforts to buoy investor confidence and thus increase stock value. The downside was 
that managers did not report downward or revisions of that number because of the impact that it will 
have on their own personal compensation schemes (interviewee 8). RRR consequently increased 
and the director was rewarded for improving the efficiency of his directorate (interviewee 11).
6.2.3.6.3 Estimates & Uncertainty
The amounts of oil and gas reserves that are disclosed in a company’s financial reports are 
determined by two factors, the definition of reserves and the reserves estimation process 
(interviewee 7). The process of estimating reserves requires important judgments and decisions 
based on available geological, geophysical, engineering, and economic data. These estimates may 
change significantly as further data from ongoing development activities and production 
performance becomes available and as economic conditions impacting oil and gas prices and costs 
change (interviewee 14). However respondents note that if the reserves estimates are known to 
change and an organisation fails to adjust reserves estimates to reflect these known changes in the
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underlying fact pattern, the disclosed reserves are seen as inaccurate because they clearly do not 
portray the best estimate of RDS’s reserves at the time they are reported.
Respondents were of the opinion that accounting rules also put up a hurdle that prevents recognition 
of a significant portion of the real value of undeveloped reserves. The regulations stipulate that the 
only reserves to be included in the SEC valuation are those that would have a positive NPV if 
developed at costs reflecting current technology and if future production was sold at the current spot 
price (interviewee 12). Since future oil prices are sometimes at a premium to current spot prices, 
and since technology advances are likely to reduce development costs over time, some truly 
positive NPV reserves are entirely excluded from SEC and those that are included are understated 
in value. Respondents talk about the advantage of relative valuation like real option which is more 
likely to reveal the current mood of the market, since it is an effort to measure relative and not 
intrinsic value.
6.23.6.4 Structure and Corporate Governance
RDS operates as a single organisation but legally it is two organisations, the Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company and the Shell Transport and Trading Company. RDS is managed on a day-to-day basis by 
an informal “ Committee of Managing Directors,”  and not by a chief executive officer. And 
although there is a chairman of the CMD, none of the executives reports formally to this person 
(interviewee 6 and 7). As of the today, the members of the Royal Dutch supervisory management 
boards hold or control 100 percent of what are known as priority shares which enables them 
nominate board representatives at Royal Dutch and to reject nominations by shareholders 
(interviewee 13 and 15).
This self perpetuating system is utterly conflicting with internationally accepted principles of good 
governance. Such a structure will obviously create tension as to who has the greatest authority 
and who carries oversight and responsibility for the corporation’s compliance with laws and 
conventions. The reserves revaluation has led to calls for changes in corporate governance of Royal 
Dutch Shell to prevent the reoccurrence of similar problems. The recommendations have included 
abolishing the priority shares and merging the two boards (interviewee 5 and 9).
137
6.23.6.5 Lack of External Auditors
RDS is currently required to provide unaudited estimates of proved reserve quantities to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), using definitions provided by the SEC (interviewee 
10). As investors discover more about how reserves are estimated and reported, it might come as a 
surprise to them that items on RDS’s balance sheet such as cash and receivables are subject to more 
extensive external audits and internal controls than proved reserves estimates (interviewee 6). It is 
clear that until independent external evaluators audit the reserves there will not be verifiable, 
audited information about IOC’s and investors and analysts will have to guess whether statements 
of oil reserves are accurate. Interviewee 8 notes that the first place to start is that IOC’s could 
publish a statement of reserves with verification from professionals signing and confirming that the 
information can be relied on.
6.2.3.7 Summary and Conclusions
What can be observed from the interviews and secondary data gathered that lOCs are able to make 
commercial assessments for developing reserves on the basis of seismological and other data which 
today are not fully taken into account in the SEC rules. Respondents were of the opinion that they 
require generally accepted accounting principles or another method that defines what oil industry 
managers are reporting—that is to say, define what a proven reserve barrel of oil is. Respondents 
found it ironic that at the very time the oil and gas industry is basing more and more of its 
investment decisions on the results of measurements from new technologies, the SEC has tightened 
up its definition which can or cannot be reported and by inference has ruled out measurements from 
new technologies. RDS also recognises the existence of price sensitive contractual conditions and 
emphasises the need for the commodity price responsiveness of present values, reserves and 
production sharing to be disclosed (interviewee 3).
If the RDS had been more transparent about what was being included in its reserves bookings (i.e. 
greater ‘granularity’) the problems would have come to light from the perspective of an outside 
investor sooner than they did. Respondents spoke about issues relating to field by field declines, 
managerial incentives, estimates and uncertainty to abolishing priority shares and merging the two 
boards in response to the reserves revaluation scandal at RDS. Finally other respondents spoke 
about the need for Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. There is evidently a need for some 
system whereby a third party comes in and verifies that a particular fact meets the definition.
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6.3 Subjective Measures of Performance at RDS
6.3.1 Balanced Scorecard at RDS
6.3.1.1 Background
The Balanced Scorecard model is presented as a business tool supporting implementation of 
corporate and business unit strategies (Maisel; 1992, Johnsen; 2001). Through establishment of 
goals for the drivers of business success, and with control systems to keep an eye on them, strategy 
accomplishment is enabled. BSC is also necessary in order to assess performance against 
organisational plans, and to have a means of assessing any changes in control necessary to correct 
any deviations from that plan (Kaplan and Norton; 1996). Kaplan and Norton propose the use of 
strategy maps to understand how the drivers of performance affect the top level objectives. It is a 
potentially powerful tool by which senior managers at RDS are encouraged to address the 
fundamental issue of effectively deploying the company’s strategic intent. It focuses on establishing 
links between strategic objectives and performance measures; it also pays some attention to 
measuring the achievement of the components of the strategic plan the organization has espoused 
_i.e. the means that it is believed will lead to the desired end.
Human Resources and strategy were the first divisions to pioneer the BSC within RDS. Due to 
events over the last decade, respondents felt that the rhetoric of the BSC was used to downplay the 
relevance of well-established accounting-driven practices within RDS, such as the budget and 
variance analysis. The following is the remark of a respondent from the strategy department “ 
although our crude oil and natural gas are invaluable assets, in today’s turbulent competitive 
environment, RDS must compete not only through its physical resources, but also through its 
intellectual and knowledge capital’. Interviewee 3 furthers this view by informing us that ‘employee 
motivation and capabilities, information technology, customer relationships and quality 
improvements characterize the main means to improve our contribution to the government and the 
community’. In this context, respondents felt that the annual budget exercise is not sufficient 
anymore to manage effectively such diverse resources at work. Financial metrics alone in their view 
are inadequate to drive the organization when so much of the value creation comes from things 
other than inventory, plant or equipment’.
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All respondents were familiar with the Balanced Scorecard, thus have a tool at their disposal to help 
them navigate the sometimes foggy worlds of strategy and CSR. Most respondents agree that the 
Balanced Scorecard helps RDS strategically manage the alignment of cause-and-effect relationships 
of external market forces and impacts with internal CSR drivers, values and behaviour. As 
management found that there was resistance to stand-alone CSR initiatives, they used the Balanced 
Scorecard to address CSR opportunities and challenges (interviewee 7). Respondents felt that the 
company’s early focus was on opportunities and challenges most commonly associated with 
environment, health and safety (EH&S). In order to bring more balance into how they measure their 
success and progress on the integration of the Triple Bottom Line, RDS launched a Sustainability 
Balanced Scorecard (interviewee 6 and 13). This section will examine the sustainability balanced 
scorecard currently being used in the oil firm.
6.3.1.2 Building and implementing a Balanced Scorecard
In spite of the fact that the conventional balanced scorecard considers nonfinancial and non- 
quantitative issues, which characterize many, ecological and sustainability aspects, respondents 
unanimously felt that it basically does not explicitly distinguish or balance different stakeholder 
interests, sustainability issues, and derived strategic goals. According to respondents 2, 4 and 5, 
RDS began to create a series of initiatives to address opportunities and challenges in the future. 
Interviewee 5 and 7 point out that these initiatives were created and refined after the RDS made a 
significant effort to consult with stakeholders to better understand internal and external 
expectations, with a specific emphasis on CSR. Interviewee 6 and 9 inform us that how to 
accomplish and measure their success was a major
RDS uses the combination of the Balanced Scorecard and CSR to help create a competitive 
advantage by making managers aware of whether they are truly entering into a CSR virtuous cycle. 
This is a cycle in which economic and environmental performance, together with social impacts, 
come together to enhance organizational performance exponentially (interviewee 6 and 7). 
Indicators that stand for environmental impacts at RDS are calculated through life -cycle analysis 
which is detailed in the CSR section of this thesis.
For strategic management it is not necessary to perform a comprehensive life-cycle assessment to 
estimate the environmental impact and to compute eco-efficiency indicators. The specification of 
the diffuse term environmental impact arises from strategic goals, mainly in the nonmarket
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perspective (Hahn and Wagner; 2001). For example, one target in the nonmarket perspective could 
be to reduce the contribution of the business to climate change. From this point of view eco- 
efficiency analysis (Figure 6.1) is an instrument for estimating and controlling the appropriate key 
performance indicators for two major aspects of sustainability, namely the environmental and 
economic issues (Figge et al; 2002).
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Figure 6.1: Eco Efficiency Indicators Embedded Into the Balanced Scorecard 
Source: Figge et al; 2002
According to respondents 7 and 9, RDS competes on cost leadership due to enhanced technology 
and effective and efficient processes. This in interviewee 7s opinion leads to improved ecological 
protection, which results in better risk management and a lower cost of capital. Interviewee 8, 9 and 
15 further this view by noting that RDS differentiates itself from its competitor’s values and 
performance through its community building activities, which can improve corporate reputation, 
result in improved brand equity and create customer satisfaction, which subsequently results in 
increased sales (interviewee 7 and 11). The traditional perspectives of the BSC are examined below 
as well as the new stakeholder perspective in the sustainability balanced scorecard used at RDS.
6.3.1.3 Financial Perspective
In the ‘Finaneial Perspective’, the overall strategy is reflected in the two seetions of ‘produetivity’ 
and ‘growth’. In respect to productivity, interviewee 6, 7 and 9 note that RDS aims to slash
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operating expenses per gallon sold to the lowest level in the industry and extracts more from 
existing assets by reducing the downtime at its oil refineries and thus increasing their yields. This 
particular respondent lists the metrics used as a) RDS’s cost per gallon in comparison to the rest of 
the industry b) RDS’s cash flow compared to the rest of the business plan. As one manager put it, 
“if we want to grow...we need to be investing enough to find more and we need to sustain that 
investment.. .from the cash flow generated from existing production.
The revenue growth strategy according to respondent 8, calls for RDS to expand sales outside of 
gasoline. Some examples used to measure this strategy are identified by respondents as: a) Revenue 
firom non-gasoline products b) Profit margin c) Sales volume compared to the rest of the industry 
d). As the prices of the products that Shell Resources sells are controlled by the marketplace, the 
measure in place of dollar growth amounts is growth in production volume. Interviewees 6 notes 
that oil and gas prices are so volatile that price cannot be considered an effective measure of the 
business.
This respondent points to production growth as the best measure of lOCs in such a volatile pricing 
environment. As the exploration and production business is in constant decline with respect to 
reserves of natural resources, it is important for the organization to reinvest in exploration and 
development. While the financial perspective ensures that an adequate, i.e. justifiable profit is 
achieved; one must point out the fact that economic concerns of the shareholders (e.g. market 
position, turnover, cost targets) are definitely above the interests of further groups of stakeholders of 
the company. The requirements of the stakeholders are to be considered extensively and in cases, 
where this may not be possible, adequate compromises should be granted.
6.3.1.4 Learning and Growth
The ‘Learning and Growth’ perspective asks the question of “to achieve our vision through our 
internal processes, how must our people learn, communicate and work together?” This perspective 
is divided into three main areas, strategic competencies, information technology and a climate for 
change. While strategic competencies must be developed in order to fulfil the objectives in the 
internal process perspective, information technology is required to provide information that allows 
employees to fulfil these objectives. This finally leads into climate for change which is a cultural 
shift needed to motivate, empower, and align the workforce behind the strategy.
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Interviewee 6 states that ‘we knew we had to nurture the leadership skills that were necessary for 
our managers to articulate the company's vision and develop employees’. Respondents identified 
key technologies that RDS had to develop, including automated equipment for monitoring the 
refining processes and extensive databases and tools to analyze consumer buying experiences. 
IOC’s are recommended to focus the intra-organisational processes on enhance its credibility in the 
field of eco-related products.
RDS managers can use leading indicators such as the amount of days for training per capita and 
year and internal forum discussions. Internal forum discussions can provide the employees of the 
organisation with the opportunity to reflect critically social or ecological concerns. As a lagging 
indicator, suggestions for improvement could prove the effectiveness of training. Technical and 
operational skills continue to be very important for an organization such as RDS as they are a very 
technology intensive company with a focus on cost reduction. However, interpersonal and 
commercial skills are increasingly becoming important in the face of the changing operating 
environment
6.3.1.5 Internal process perspectives
As to the process perspective environmental management systems are being integrated with health 
and safety and quality systems. Respondents let us know that RDS is aiming for “efficiency”, as 
they implement objectives and measures for the purpose of enhancing process efficiency from a 
financial viewpoint as well as form an environmental and social perspective. Typical lagging 
indicators identified are the material, energy and water use and waste production in ratio to the 
product output. Reducing the time-to-market and cost management in the research and development 
department may be of major importance (criteria of efficiency). Lagging indicators that 
demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of R&D can be the time period of a R&D-process, or 
the ratio of inventions coming up in final products. Leading indicators pointed out by respondents 
are the number of resource intense processes, the reducing measures and the product innovations 
leading to pollution prevention (the total of training in the field of sustainability-related products 
and services or the amount of working days dedicated at examining customers‘ needs in that area).
The development of sustainable products and services, technologies or production processes may be 
examined within this perspective, it has to be emphasised that a mere improvement of efficiency 
(e.g. ecological and/or social efficiency) of the internal production process is not sufficient in the
143
framework of sustainability demands: efficiency figures put ecological or social aspects in relation 
to economic value-added and primarily intend to improve competition or at least reduce costs. 
Hence, from an ethical point of view they appear rather reductive and strategy-oriented. Extensive 
aspects that do not only aim at the relative improvement of efficiency are generally in a position to 
contribute to the reduction of environmental pollution and social problems on a global level. The 
company itself being politically co-responsible may contribute to the effective solution of social or 
ecological problems.
6.3.1.6 Customer Perspective
The core of RDS business strategy is customer value proposition which describes the unique mix of 
product and service attributes, customer relations, and corporate image that the company offers. In 
the market perspective the main objectives are to develop existing markets or new markets in the 
context of sustainability. According to respondents, it defined how we differentiated our self from 
competitors to attract, retain, and deepen relationships with targeted customers. Leading indicators 
are the number of competitors in the relevant segment, customers willing to purchase the item in 
question or total of potential outlets acquired in the distribution channel (e.g. retailers). Lagging 
indicators are number of introduced sustainable products compared to conventional products or the 
ratio of sustainable products launched as a pioneer. Sound marketing practices should be used in 
order to emphasise the company’s unique selling proposition. As a result, first-mover-advantages 
can be realised, barriers of market-entry for potential competitors can be built and premium prices 
can be achieved.
Also as the company's immediate customers were the independent owners of gasoline stations and 
they were such a critical part of the new strategy, interviewee 9 talks about how dealer profitability 
and dealer satisfaction are crucial measures of performance. Because of the uncertainty of success 
IOC’s should carefully analyse the relevant market segment (e.g. competitors, existence of 
substitutes, customer needs) and choose an appropriate way of timing when bringing eco- 
innovations to the market. Considering the fact that ecologically related aspects are frequently not 
perceived after purchase and subsequently suffer from credibility issues regarding the social 
qualities, RDS have to emphasize a potential customer’s supplementary benefit and have to 
introduce them carefully into the relevant market segments. The use of eco-labels can calm 
customer suspicions. Not to underestimate is the fact that also the supply chains used by the RDS 
will be tracked when they advertise themselves as sustainable. Is oil produced in Nigeria with
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endemic oil spills really sustainable? Methods and tools like Life Cycle or Product Line Analysis 
can help to check the supply chains and be included in the measures mentioned in the SB SC (Pichel 
1995).
6.3.1.7 External Stakeholder Perspective
Because the growth of RDS is based around production and the ability to explore and discover new 
natural resources, the likely scenario is that communities living in or near environmentally sensitive 
areas like the Nigerian Niger Delta will increase their antagonism to oil and gas development, 
normally through political protests or by sabotage. In April 2003, Human Rights Watch wrote to 
RDS and other IOC’s conveying their concern regarding recent violent clashes in Nigeria's Niger 
delta. In conventional extractive sector analyses used at RDS, violent conflict is reduced to a risk 
factor that can be computed into financial risk ratings in relation to investment decisions 
(interviewee 5 and 9). The main problem in this method is the impact that conflict may have on the 
corporation, by enforcing increased transaction, security, reputation and other costs (interviewee 8). 
Conflict-prone zones warrant special attention, and this was not factored into the company’s 
rationale.
The issue of stakeholders is a complex one as there so many stakeholders that IOC’s deal with e.g 
land owners, communities/neighbours, media, elected representatives, government and regulators, 
industry, non-governmental organizations and customers, amongst others (Rowley, 2002). 
Respondents 5 and 8 note that the question becomes how to understand which stakeholders are 
relevant to the strategy Under the Government stakeholder, the key objective is to obtain regulatory 
approval as not gaining regulatory approval means that RDS does not receive licenses or permits to 
operate. Requirements for granting of permits include emissions discharge limits that the operation 
must comply with.
According to interviewees 7, 10, and 15, RDS has introduced general measures intended to trigger 
GHG-reducing investments at company production facilities, including internal emissions trading 
schemes. In addition respondents inform us that RDS has adopted energy-saving programs, and has 
made investments in reduction of faring and venting as well as investments in R&D on carbon 
capture and storage which are in line with the proactive formulations of their climate strategies. 
However, unlike BP, RDS has not undertaken investments in full scale carbon storage on 
production facilities where the company is an operator. In comparison to oil companies like BP,
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RDS therefore seems less committed to actual implementation of this measure in the period studied. 
In fact the figure 6.2 relays a different view of respondent’s claims. It summarises the carbon 
intensity of the top international oil companies. Its revelations are a far cry from respondents claim 
as it shows that the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per barrel of oil equivalent produced at 
RDS will outstrip those of its nearest competitors. The data shows that in the age of carbon 
reduction, RDS is fast heading in the opposite direction, particularly increasing the carbon intensity 
of its production of oil and gas. This presents real risks for RDS, for investors, and for the elimate 
(Stockman et al; 2009).
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Figure 6.2: Carbon Intensity of Oil and Gas by Company 
Source: Stockman et al 2000
Units in Figure 6.2 above and Table 6.1 below are average intensity of kilograms of carbon dioxide 
equivalent emitted per barrel of oil equivalent produced
Shell 33.8 62.6 85
Chevron 38.8 52.8 36
ExxonMobil 40.6 44.7 10
BP 31.0 36.9 19
Table 6.1 IOC Intensity Level 
Source: Stockman et al; 2009
The figures in table 6.2 illustrate that RDS holds more carbon in its resources, per barrel o f  future oil 
equivalent, than any other IOCS. While respondents at RDS consistently stressed the environmental and 
competitive advantages o f their move into tar sands, their reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG), other 
respondents note that RDS is more vulnerable to carbon pricing and subject to greater carbon risk than
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other IOC’s because of these initiatives. In the 2005 scenario ‘Open Doors,’ environmental effects 
were internalized in energy prices, with Kyoto-like mechanisms making carbon management an 
essential part of energy development and use (Steger and Killing; 1997, Weyant; 1999, lEA; 2002). 
Respondents note that their strong presence in markets with stringent climate regimes mean they 
will have to raise company-wide greenhouse gas emission standards of our products to reap 
production economies of scale’. Respondent 8 furthers this by stating that ‘RDS may conclude 
covenants or engage in partnerships with supranational governmental bodies and NGO’.
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6.3.1.8 Barriers to Implementation of the Balanced Scorecard at RDS
The massive introduction and usage of the BSC did not please everybody at RDS. This is the case 
for several members of the finance department where the scorecard was generally perceived as an 
‘operational tool’ which was potentially disrupting for the existing (accounting-driven) working
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practices. Talking to finance managers at RDS, their scepticism came to the surface as the 
impression was that there were more important and valuable things to care about. Interviewee 8 
states ‘ultimately, what is the linkage between the scorecard and the budget’? The BSC helps 
companies to cope with many well-known problems (e.g. focus on intangible assets, improvement 
of processes from strategy to action “or market-oriented strategies). But interviewees 1, 3 and 6 
point out that this is often linked to the fact that managers can put strategies into action without 
reviews within the organisation.
To overcome this potential side-effect, Weber et al (2000), suggest a BSC for the setting-up of 
strategies as well and a strategic feedback-process afterwards. Issues with the Niger Delta crisis and 
increased carbon intensity clearly show that environmental and social sustainability are still not 
central to business strategy and management systems of RDS. Accordingly, sound management 
tools are needed that help to overcome this gap between EMS and business management systems, to 
integrate the financial, environmental and social management systems and to improve the 
environmental performance of IOC’s.
6.3.1.9 Summary and Conclusions
In summarising this section, most respondents agree that the Balanced Scorecard helps RDS 
strategically manage the alignment of cause-and-effect relationships of external market forces and 
impacts with internal CSR drivers, values and behaviour. The interviews established that the BSC 
approach at RDS is a very business-like approach to a sustainability scorecard, which focuses on 
metrics that can be captured by the information and accounting systems of the organisation. 
Finally, interviews also brought to light the fact that the introduction and usage of the BSC did not 
please everybody at RDS. Members of the finance department where especially noted as perceiving 
the scorecard as an ‘operational tool’ and indicating that there were more important and valuable 
things to care about. Irrespective of such scepticism, the BSC was generally seen by most 
respondents as an effective measure of performance.
148
6.3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility at RDS
6.3.2.1 The Business Case for CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) projects, to promote oil and gas companies as ‘responsible 
local citizens’ or ‘good neighbours’ to their local communities is another major strategic tool to 
tackle the traditionally bad reputation of the industry (Frynas; 2005). RDS has taken an increasingly 
proactive stance on issues of corporate governance and social responsibility, primarily in response 
to the extreme negative publicity generated around the execution of Nigerian civil rights activist 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, as well as the attempted dumping of the Brent Spar platform. An examination of 
the Group’s corporate culture showed mistrust in anything but hard facts, as well as arrogance 
towards and lack of ability to dialog properly with customers, stakeholders and adversaries. 
Respondents admit that it was time to alter the company’s culture. Thus, what came to be the 
transformation of the Shell Group was originally launched due to a commercial need, but eventually 
involved much more as the company learned the hard way that it had to listen, engage and respond 
to stakeholder groups (Frynas 2003).
Strategic CSR provides managers at RDS with a tool to indicate current position with respect to 
strategy as well as predicting future performance. (Ittner and Darker; 1998) note that effective CSR 
and stakeholder management has the potential to affect future performance in a positive or negative 
way (e.g negative media, goodwill, delayed production). Senior leadership must make clear and 
authentic public commitment to social responsibility initiatives. Often CSR will evolve more 
organically among lower levels of staff. But, at some stage, senior managers have to be brought on 
board, commit, and engage. This clear vision of CSR needs to be entrenched within the core values 
of RDS as well as linked to the mission, vision and values of the company. Measures of corporate 
social performance help top RDS managers, boards of directors, and other stakeholders understand 
if operational managers are building valuable long-term relationships and assets. This can be 
particularly effective in demonstrating the value of environmental and social efforts to management.
6.3.2.2 Strategic CSR at RDS
The first clause for strategic CSR is that CSR needs to be integrated with the corporation’s strategic 
disposition (Porter; 1996). Strategy denotes the deliberate choice of activities that enables IOC’s to 
meet their objectives. The second condition required for strategic CSR relates to having a way to
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measure and monitor these new or additional values. The guidelines at RDS serve as an important -  
although admittedly still somewhat precarious - reference, to demonstrate how the commitment to 
CSR may be integrated into day-to-day business activity, together with assessment and monitoring 
of its progress. Respondents felt that the complexity inherent in such a strategy begins with the need 
to find a new perspective for a firm’s cognitive framework, traditionally formed strictly by an 
engineering outlook.
According to interviewee 1, ‘A factor militating against a uniform CSR approach arises from the 
enormous diversity our Group products, technologies and local production conditions’. For these 
reasons, the guideline at RDS (Figure 6.4) considers what it terms “potential contribution areas” for 
undertaking Sustainable Development (SD) actions, as shown below, offering a checklist of SD 
components and respective indicators in order to allow definition of policies based upon the 
experience of each operating company. Interviewee 7 and 8 point out that the practical implications 
of SD for the Exploration and Production business are examined to provide a basis for self- 
assessment and to build a profile of strengths and weaknesses, as gauged against the triple bottom 
line (Environmental, Social and Economic Performance).
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Figure 6.4 Sustainable Development Challenges And Issues For The Exploration & Production Business 
Source: SIEP: 1997
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6.S.2.3 Classification of Measures
Methods can have different approaches to measuring social impact. Respondents identify process 
methods, impact methods and monétarisation methods. Process methods monitor the efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of ongoing operational processes. RDS works to create measurable results at the 
community level — lives changed, communities strengthened and community problems that 
diminish in magnitude over time (interviewee 7 and 9). This takes into account program outputs, 
such as numbers of people served by programs or units of service delivered, and goes beyond that to 
look at long-term macro-level results that are far beyond what anyone organization or program can 
do on its own (interviewee 4 and 8). It is essential that corporate contributions are shown to provide 
benefits to strategic business objectives and society. Interviewee 6 states Tf we are not able to show 
contributions and our impact CSR is not only a drain to funds, but it might even damage our 
reputation’.
Impact methods measure operational outputs and their impact by linking Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) (interviewee 2 and 14). CSR helps 
RDS measure indirect business impact by measuring impact on reputation and stakeholder 
satisfaction (interviewee 12 and 15). This includes, among others, increased trust, public image, and 
name recognition. RDS also measure direct business impact; what is the added value of corporate 
philanthropy for the firm (interviewee 5). Next to this, monétarisation methods like the ‘Social 
Return on Investment’ quantify social and environmental indicators and translate those indicators 
into a monetary value to be comparable with traditional financial data (Lamberton, 2005; Pearce et 
al., 2006). Like Return on Investment (ROI) it is also a way to measure the magnitude or quantity of 
the value created in comparison to the initial investment.
Respondents also point out that RDS often present CSR performance data in terms of absolute 
quantities that can be expressed in a physical unit of measurement related to weight, volume, energy 
or financial value and normalized quantities which measure sustainability performance per unit of 
production. Normalization enables comparability over time, but can also introduce anomalies. For 
example, a well-performing company might wish to acquire a high-volume business with relatively 
poor sustainability performance; this will skew the company’s overall performance results. Similar 
to this is the NPV of projects (Lamberton; 2005).
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Another approach is based on using time-based relative measures, i.e., measures which compute the 
change in a particular quantitative measure over a given time period; e.g “the percent reduction of 
total hazardous waste from 2009 - 2010. Respondents state that becoming a good corporate citizen 
by establishing effective relationship with external stakeholders is one of the critical organizational 
activities, which should be captured into the internal business process perspective of BSC.
For management it is important to understand the causal relationships between sustainability and 
financial performances, herein the balance scorecard can be a helpful tool to link CSR objectives 
with appropriate corporate actions and performance outcomes (Epstein and Wisner 2001, 1). 
Respondents mention three fundamental principles which help RDS address the challenges 
associated with measuring and reporting sustainability. These are:
1. Address the dual perspectives of resource consumption and value creation.
2. Include economic, environmental, and societal aspects.
3. Systematically consider each stage in the product life cycle.
4. Develop leading and Lagging Indicators (Covered in HSE chapter)
6.3.2.4 Resource and Value at RDS
The first principle of sustainability measurement is that evaluations should address the dual 
perspectives of resource consumption and value creation. RDS strives to minimize resource 
consumption while maximizing value creation. Examples of value creation pointed out by 
respondents include increased profitability, reduced pollution, improved nutrition, and liberation of 
time. Depending on the CSR activity undertaken by RDS -  value redistribution, value integration or 
new value creation - and the corresponding impact, a measurement approach should be selected. 
CSR as new value creation is a process of collaborative innovation. A characteristic of this process 
is that at the level of the firm a new balance is struck between economic, ecological, and social 
impact (interviewee 1 and 6).
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6.3.2.4.1 Value Creation
When new value creation takes the shape of efficiency improvements of processes and products, 
impact can be measured by comparing the old with the new situation e.g substituting a hazardous 
substance which results in less water pollution (interviewee 8 and 9). The difficulty of measuring 
the impact of new value creation is dependent on whether the innovation constitutes the departure 
fi*om the existing technological paradigm, i.e shifts in activities are often systematically too 
different to be compared with the old situation; as with scientific paradigms, the impacts are 
incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962). This is in light of the fact that greater economic freedom within a 
global commercial marketplace places greater importance upon innovation and product 
differentiation as a determinant of competitive advantage.
6.3.2.4.2 Value Integration
Value integration implies the effort of RDS to integrate values espoused by stakeholders into its 
activities and organizational routines that were previously disregarded. Measuring such impacts has 
to be a collective activity; RDS cannot measure impacts without taking the perspective of the 
stakeholder into account (interviewee 6). Indicators for value measurement can be selected directly 
through stakeholder consultation, as in the case of Shells’ Residential Advisory Board. They can 
also be selected through building leaming-action networks or indirectly by using indicators 
provided by different guidelines, frameworks, standards and rating schemes.
However, current developments in measurement instruments focus mainly on output measurement 
(interviewee 8). Emphasis is put on measuring the pay-back results of CSR initiatives for RDS 
instead of measuring impact along the different dimensions. Expressing environmental impacts in 
monetary terms clearly depends upon the interests and information need of the stakeholders and the 
firm. Interviewee 6 states ‘A shift is needed from output measurement to impact measurement’.
6.3.2.4.3 Value Distribution
Value redistribution includes the effort of RDS to change the distribution of impact over the system 
actors. In addition to measuring the distribution of impact, RDS assesses how much of the value is 
obtained by the producers and workers in the value chain. This can be done by looking at the prices 
paid or obtained in every step in the supply chain and make a comparison of the initial situation and
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the situation after the redistribution effort (interviewee 15). Again, this is problematic as changes in 
practices of actors, constituting social impact, are difficult to measure. Judging from the top level 
strategy formulations of RDS, there seems to be a credibility gap when it comes to having CSR and 
HSE filtering down in the strategic profiling of their supply chain.
One respondent states that ‘suppliers/contractors seem, on average, more concerned with 
strategically profiling their technology orientations.’ This contradicts interviewee 8 and 15’s views 
that RDS always puts HSE first, because subcontractors are included in the policy. Sadly, 
respondents 6 and 7 state that it is not the case with subcontractors operating in an economic reality 
where continued growth and low product prices are the only rationale for differentiation and 
competitive advantage, and where environmental pressure groups are largely nonexistent. This 
shows that the concept that a law is ineffective if it lacks local legitimacy is applicable to company 
regulations as well.
To always put HSE policy above possible gains may very well be RDS’s official policy and even 
its intention, but that does not mean that things work that way in practice. Traditional economic 
ideology and market positioning, reign as dominant orientations for most supplier organisations 
(interviewee 7). Furthermore, their CSR profiles vary extensively, with many suppliers not focusing 
on CSR at a strategic level at all (interviewee 5, 6 and 9). Given that as much as 80% of upstream 
petroleum activities may be outsourced to the supply industry, the CSR gap may threaten the 
credibility of the oil majors.
6.3.2.5 Triple Bottom Line at RDS
Sustainability measurement at RDS considers the complete triple bottom line of economic, 
environmental, and societal performance (interviewee 7). In most respondent’s opinions, this 
strategy reduces risk, assist in delivering better outcomes for employees, shareholders, customers 
and clients, and enhance reputation. In respect of environmental and social performance, 
respondents speak about issues ranging from GHG reductions to social development investments. 
To add to their environmentally friendly strategy, RDS marketed new innovative products as a 
result of the industries new reality, unfortunately the image was quickly turned around again with 
the recent continued oil spills and conflict in the Niger Delta and the recategorisation of reserves 
(corporate governance issue).
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Since unexploited oil fields are, by definition, located in underdeveloped areas, RDS is also more 
likely to operate in pristine environments and disrupt the lives of indigenous people. Interviewee 8 
states that ‘we have responded to these challenges by accepting social responsibility and 
demonstrating our commitment to CSR by increasing community development (CD) spending’. 
According to Moon (2001), such non-profit engagement offers business an opportunity to 
demonstrate the substance of its social responsibility. According to interviewee 13, ‘we had to 
change our community relations strategy from community assistance to community development’. 
Interviewee 10 furthers this point by stating that ‘the failure of Community Assistance (CA) 
projects was largely attributed to poor community participation in the design, monitoring and 
implementation of the projects. As a result, the respondents 10 and 15 confirmed that the CD 
approach was based on ensuring community participation and ensuring sustainability by building 
local capacity and expertise.
Marketplace polls report the public wants business to play a broader role in society than driving 
shareholder wealth, want to hear how business is doing this, and will reward more socially 
responsible organisations for doing so (e.g. Environics 1999). A future challenge for RDS managers 
will be how to meet this market-driven preference. On the other hand, it has been argued that RDS 
will never be seen as environmental friendly anyway. Nevertheless, there is clearly an opportunity 
here, a fact backed by analysts predicting that the demand for cleaner burning diesel fuel is believed 
to increase tenfold in the next decade. (FT, 18.03.2004). Finally, while RDS has been able to make 
real changes in the cultures of their organisation as well as achieve real improvements in terms of 
human-rights issues and emissions reductions, some respondents have noted how the inherent 
emptiness and vagueness of the TBL paradigm makes it as easy as possible for some of their 
branches and cynical partners to claim being committed to social responsibility and ecological 
sustainability when in truth they engage in activities that negatively affect host communities. On 
the other hand the TBL can play a critical role in an IOC’s strategy to improve its ethical social 
performance as well as integrating this goal into its corporate culture.
6.3 2.6 Life Cycle Consideration at RDS
The third principle of sustainability measurement is that evaluations should systematically consider 
each stage in the product life cycle. Resource consumption and value creation take place throughout 
the life cycle, including the supply, manufacturing, use, and disposition of a product. This approach 
comes in two steps: life-cycle inventory and life-cycle impact assessment. Life-cycle inventory
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addresses cause-and-effect chains in material and energy flow networks that correspond to the life 
of a product, process, resource, capability, or activity. These cause-and-effect chains in 
respondent’s opinions include material and energy flows and transformations outside the boundaries 
of RDS because major environmental impacts occur as external effects.
Figure 6.5 is a graphical representation of Shell Oil’s life-cycle impact analysis for petroleum 
products. According to interviewee 1, ‘it is an objective process that evaluates all the costs 
associated with the production, distribution, use, and disposal of a product’. Assessing and 
quantifying environmental threats is the beginning of the change process that culminates in the 
creation of sustainable corporations (interviewee 7). Historically IOC’s have focused almost 
exclusively on their internal operations and have not considered the implications associated with 
activities of their suppliers or customers. Yet an evaluation that focuses exclusively on one life 
cycle stage (e.g., manufacturing) may fail to capture significant product benefits or impacts that 
occur in either upstream or downstream stages (Fiksel, 1996).
Figure 6.5: Shell O il’s Petroleum Life Cycle Analysis 
Source: Shell Annual Report; 2007
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6 3 .2.1 Challenges of Measuring Strategic CSR Performance at RDS
Old customs and routines are partly being considered as slowing down the diffusion of CSR into 
management control systems (interviewee 6 and 12). One respondent mentioned compensation 
systems as an example. If compensation systems include cost-effectiveness measures but not 
measures evaluating management skills or motivation skills, this leads of course to those aspects not 
considered in the compensation are not paid attention to (interviewee 15). Still many people 
building up compensation systems consider that the last mentioned measures cannot be included in 
the systems because their measuring is somewhat subjective. The business case arguments for CSR 
has meant that RDS is more interested in measuring the business benefits, whether in terms of 
increased sales, customer satisfaction, enhanced brand and profile or improved employee 
engagement and morale.
Respondents note that the externally reported information on most CSR initiatives tends to 
emphasise the dollars spent or time dedicated by staff on a particular project rather than the social 
impact an initiative has had on the target community. Change resistance is also a factor to be 
considered when implementing CSR (interviewee 3 and 16). In a sense making CSR easily 
understandable and a natural part of operations is a common challenge. On the other hand, change 
resistance can also improve operations considerably. “Criticism can also be a very good thing. 
Interviewee 14 states ‘When discussing matters for and against in the preparatory stage, the actual 
core will be found as well’. Some respondents felt that the group’s decentralized structure often 
serves as an obstacle to the diffusion of CSR principles among all Shell companies. This is true, 
above all, because to operationalize CSR requires that strong commitment be translated into 
procedures and connected actions difficult to apply in an independent management structure.
Today virtually all of RDS are much more directly managed from The Hague as ‘global businesses’ 
have been created in all sectors. A centralized company is held to be better equipped for internal 
communication and coordination (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003), with greater capacity to make use 
of information generated through monitoring (Brammer and Pavelin: 2004 Erickson: 2007). Despite 
this reorganization, respondents were of the opinion that the overarching complicated organizational 
structure related to the ownership structure with two parent companies remained unchanged. While 
the researcher lacks sufficient data to be conclusive in our discussion, the most recent case of 
mismanagement by RDS in the time period studied here at least indicates that this structure has 
been the cause of accountability problems within the company leadership.
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Other respondents note that RDS tends to accentuate their positive contributions without referring 
to the negative implications. Interviewee 5 and 7 speak about how there still remains great variation 
in terms of the manner in which each IOC communicates the impact of their CSR initiatives. Under 
SROl money is used as the common unit of analysis in order to quantify and articulate social value 
creation, thus enabling the comparative assessment for social value. The core of SROl analysis is to 
arrive at the SROl ratio, which is expressed as:
SROl = Net present value of benefits 
Net present value of inputs
However the difficulty with SROl lies in the quality of the assumptions made. There are issues with 
respect to the outcomes generated and the time taken to generate them. Issues also come in the form 
of placing a financial proxy or monetary value on those outcomes. Interviewee 7 felt that the main 
challenge of CSR performance measurement at RDS seems to be that the measures need to be 
highly organization specific to reflect the strategy and thereby the measures cannot be copied from 
someone else but developed by RDS itself from the very beginning. Other respondents argue that 
firm-specific measuring is not adequate when measuring CSR actions because network of firms has 
a notable effect on the whole CSR effect. Although this is true, the firm specific target setting, 
measuring the achievements of the targets is a starting point for network wide target setting and 
measurement (interviewee 7 and 13).
6.3.2.S Conclusions
The existence of CSR focused MCS reinforces the fact that RDS is attempting to operate in a 
responsible manner rather than only doing image enhancement (interviewee 9). One respondent 
states that ‘we believe that incorporating economic, environmental and social considerations into 
every business decision sets us apart from competitors and helps us to grow profitably’. Interviewee 
2 furthers this by stating that ‘it allows us to attract additional resources: investors, customers and 
dedicated employees’. In the view of most of the respondents, the petroleum industry and its 
suppliers should develop a contractual arrangement to manage CSR issues and be ahead of 
governmental bodies. Particular emphasis was placed by respondents on the ability of the petroleum 
industry to take strategic CSR initiatives when operating in weak state contexts such as in Nigeria.
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Performance measurement, traditionally used to measure companies’ efficiency, profit and 
competitive advantage, builds upon output thinking. Measuring output does not enable RDS to 
assess their value added (or destroyed) across environmental, social and economic dimensions. 
This illustrates why new methods capable of measuring impact are needed. In order to effectively 
measure the impact of CSR on different dimensions, a change is required from output thinking 
focusing on a single dimensional firm outlook to impact thinking which also includes a societal 
perspective (interviewee 17). While outputs and outcomes are related to the provider of the product, 
activity or service, impacts are associated with the user and other stakeholders. Epstein and Roy 
(2001) create a framework where CSR actions are linked to CSR performance, stakeholders’ 
reactions and this way to long-term financial performance (EVA, ROI, ROCE). The framework 
(Figure; 6.6) is represented as a sustainability linkage map where everything ultimately leads to 
better long-term financial performance (Epstein and Roy; 2001, p.588).
: Corporate and Business Unit Strategy
CSR Performance
CSR Actions
Stakeholder Reactions
Long Term Financial Performance
Figure 6.6 : D rivers of sustainability and financial perform ance 
Soutce; Epstein and Roy, 2001
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6.3.3 Health Safety Environment Performance (HSE) at RDS
6.3.3.1 Background
Companies have moral and legal obligations to avoid harm to their employees, visitors and to the 
environment. There are also sound business reasons for avoiding accidents. A substantial return on 
investment can be realised by improvements to health, safety and environmental performance which 
may also result in enhanced organisational productivity and financial performance (Wiegmann et al 
; 2007, Pidgeon; 1991). As with any other company activity therefore HSE related activities need to 
be measured to find out if the management of health and safety is efficient and effective. The 
measurement and evaluation of an organization’s performance on health and safety conditions at 
work (H&S) mainly aims at the provision of information about the current situation and the 
progress of the strategies, processes and activities that are adopted by an organization with the view 
to keep H&S hazards under control.
Metrics are used at RDS to monitor performance of existing programmes or to measure the effect of 
change (for example, processes, procedure). Respondents note that HSE performance at RDS seeks 
to answer such questions as Ts RDS’s management of health and safety reliable and proportionate 
for their hazards and risks’ as well as Ts the culture supportive of health and safety, particularly in 
the face of competing demands’. The health and safety management system is an important 
influence on the safety culture, which in turn impacts on the effectiveness of the health and safety 
management system. Measuring aspects of the safety culture therefore forms part of the overall 
process of measuring health and safety performance.
In line with the conceptual model, HSE overarching objectives link directly to the strategy themes 
while the corresponding indicator data is a mix of outcome data and leading indicators. HSE also 
helps RDS manages effectively predict future performance as advanced and effective HSE systems 
are likely to mean that RDS will reduce the chances of any unforeseen cost from environmental 
disasters which could have an adverse effect on future performance. It can also provide data with 
which business units can design more efficient processes, decreasing material usage and 
environmental impacts while at the same time increasing yield and profitability. While HSE is more 
often used at the operating level by lower level staff, recent understanding of the impacts of 
negative HSE activities on long term performance has lead to both senior level and lower level 
manager’s focusing on the importance of safety measure.
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6.3.3.2 Measuring HSE Performance
RDS managers now realise that the indirect costs of accidents such as time devoted to investigating 
and reporting, lost production, introduction of corrective measures, additional training, increased 
insurance premiums, asset repair/replacement, fines, adverse impact on staff morale, etc can far 
exceed direct costs (interviewee 6 and 9). Interviewee 6 furthers this argument by stating ‘we 
recognize the necessity of a new accounting model leading toward advanced forms of decision and 
responsibility’. Investors have a significant level of interest in Health and Safety, and how it fits 
well with CSR. They are generally supportive of the idea that good health and safety performance is 
an indicator of good management.
Respondents note that the metrics can be divided into lagging indicators and leading indicators. 
Lagging indicators, which measure the direct effect of an activity on the environment, include 
indicators, which measure outputs such as pounds of pollutants emitted or discharged (interviewee 
2). These lagging indicators help in highlighting opportunities and priorities for improvement, 
determining trends, confirming effectiveness of interventions, and satisfying regulatory 
requirements (interviewee 7 and 11). Increased emphasis is now being placed on the need for IOC’s 
to use more useful proactive ‘leading’ indicators or in-process indicators that measure the 
implementation of practices or measures which are expected to lead to improved environmental 
performance rather than solely focusing on lagging indicators such as lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR), fatality frequency rate (FFR) and disabling injury frequency rate (DIFR) (interviewee 11).
Interviewee 16 talks about leading indicators which are used to improve safety performance by 
promoting action to correct potential weaknesses without waiting for demonstrated failures. For 
example, instead of the numbers of fines and violations, a leading indicator would be the number of 
internal environmental or health and safety compliance audits conducted during a year. When asked 
further about these indicators, interviewee 7 notes that unfortunately, leading indicators can be 
difficult to quantify (some may be qualitative rather than quantitative), and the results may not 
address the concerns of some stakeholders (such as the public), who may still want to know the 
quantities of chemicals released into the environment, or the number of health and safety violations.
Health, safety and environmental management tactics are entering an age with greater reliance on 
proactive measurement against targets. A common feature of the measures quoted would be that 
they are generally positive in nature - reflecting achievement - rather than negative, reflecting
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failure. While the general business performance of an organisation is subject to a range of positive 
measures, for health and safety it too often comes down to one negative measure, injury and ill 
health statistics - measures of failures. Consequently, the traditional safety performance evaluation 
methods, which are based on the collection of “after incident” data, such as the frequency indicators 
or incident gravity indicators, have been completed with evaluation methods based on the collection 
of “pre-incident” data, such as safety inspections, safe and unsafe behaviours, the employees’ 
attitude towards safety, etc (Pidgeon; 1991, Griffin et al; 2000).
It is unlikely that use of a single set of KPIs will be helpful; strategies should combine leading 
(measure what i being done) with lagging (measuring the effectiveness) indicators. 
Underperformance detected from several parameters is commonly indicative of other underlying 
weaknesses such as the management system, management commitment, management engagement 
with staff, employee motivation/empowerment, etc which may need addressing before 
improvements in HSE performance can be realised. Respondents note that metrics should drive an 
appropriate action in line with company objectives. They should be meaningful, relevant, 
repeatable, simple, well-defined, comparable, economical to collect, timely, and they should 
facilitate trend analysis for intra and inter department/site comparison. When expressed as absolute 
quantities, indicators such as spills, emissions, wastes and energy use, offer a sense of magnitude or 
scale. Normalization of these quantities facilitates comparisons among organizations of different 
sizes, and can help express environmental performance in economic terms. These quantities are 
relative figures representing ratios between two absolute quantities of the same or different kind 
(Griffin et al; 2000).
6.33.3 Lagging Indicators for HSE
The primary purpose of gathering HSE data is to manage HSE risks by monitoring performance. 
The data is used to inform management and stakeholders on how RDS is performing against our 
competitors and the extent to which we have met our public commitment (interviewee 3, 6 and 9). 
The most common HSE measures at RDS are workplace death and injury count based metrics. 
Regarded as safety “failure” measures, measures such as the number of fatalities, lost time injury 
rates and injury frequencies consistently form the cornerstone of HSSE disclosures by RDS. 
Respondents felt that fatalities were important, because of the potential implications in terms of 
liability and reputation. Interviewee 8 tells us that the Lost Time Injury Rate is most acceptable 
here as a general indicator, being most widely used by industry and most standardised.
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Nevertheless, management took the view that in order to maintain high HSE standards a programme 
of continuous improvement was to be introduced.
Interviewee 5 and 8 on the other hand stress the fact investors are implicitly aware of the criticism 
of this indicator, as a single measure that does not present a complete picture but, if a single 
measure of accident performanee is to be used, this is probably the most acceptable. The ISO 
14000 series standards are international standards that provide specific requirement that give 
managers a structure for establishing, improving and maintaining programmes for protection of the 
environment. RDS apply these concepts to an environmental management system (EMS) for health, 
safety, and the environment (interviewee 7, 8 and 10). This EMS has been translated in RDS into 
the HSE/Management Systems (MS) model shown in Fig. 6.7.
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The heart of the model is the hazard and effects management (HEMP) which is an in-depth 
assessment of critical operations or installations which requires documented demonstration that 
risks have been reduced to “as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). It reflects Quality 
Management principles, such as target setting, planning feedback and continuous improvement 
mechanisms and defines accountabilities for tasks which contribute to the management of HSE 
risks (www.shell.comV Interviewee 6 states, ‘while there is evidence of an increase in HSE 
awareness at RDS, the implementation of HEMP into the HSE-MS requires significant efforts and 
high calibre resources’ In this respondents opinion, ‘a concerted and proactive approach is needed
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to ensure that specified controls are actually implemented and working as intended’. A crucial 
challenge is including provision of resources, obtaining ownership, getting certified, ensuring staff 
competence, compliance with legislation, and having adequate documentation whilst minimising 
complexity (Shell Reports; 2009). The diagram below relays the process for setting up HEMP at 
RDS.
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Respondents from the accounting department in particular point out that the quest for reliable and 
relevant financial HSE measures presents a number of challenges for them as the current set-up of 
many financial and management accounting systems are not conducive to capturing and presenting
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Health and Safety cost information in a useful way. In their opinion, these measures typically fail to 
address the broad array of other indirect and often immeasurable costs e.g those associated with 
compensation premiums, litigation expenses, insurance losses, fines and other imposed penalties to 
the hidden costs associated with business disruption and decreased employee morale. Another 
issue with the sole reliance on lagging indicators is timing. Respondents felt there may be a 
considerable time lapse between exposure to health hazards and the development of health effects. 
For example, exposure to carcinogens (cancer-causing agents) at the workplace may cause effects 
which can only be observed many years after exposure.
Health and safety is different from most other areas measured by managers at RDS because success 
results in the absence of an outcome (injuries or ill health) as opposed to the presence. Interviewee 
5, 6 and 10 speak about how a low injury or ill-health rate, even over a period of years, is no 
assurance that risks are being controlled and will not lead to injuries or ill health in the future. This 
is particularly true in IOC’s where there is a low probability of accidents but where there is a 
presence of major hazards. Here the historical record could be a misleading indicator of safety 
performance. Another issue occurs when periods without an incident are connected with some 
kind of reward for staff, as this practice often discourages managers to effectively incidents.
The ability to monitor and improve workplace safety nevertheless “hinges on how well health and 
safety performance can be evaluated.” and an effective health and safety program must be “capable 
of measuring the indicators that unambiguously reflect its performance... (in terms of) delivering 
internal control and systematic management of H&S” (Else and Beaumont 2000, p38). The inherent 
difficulty in measuring workplace ‘safety’ however arises because safety is not an observable 
property, but rather an imprecise construct (interviewee 6).
6.33.4 Leading Indicators for H&S
More useful proactive ‘leading’ indicators can be obtained from such as near-miss investigations, 
site inspections, risk assessments, safety meetings, safety audits etc. These indicators measure the 
effectiveness of the Safety Management Process and target areas for continuous improvement. One 
of the three main lessons from the Niger Delta spills was for RDS to develop key performance 
indicators (KPIs) for major hazards to ensure process safety performance is monitored and reported 
against these parameters. Experience has shown that the greatest business and societal benefits of 
new projects come from effective identification and management of potential impacts during
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planning and design (interviewee 4, 7, 18). As a company, RDS require that an integrated 
environmental, social, and health IA is carried out before the implementation of any new project or 
significant facility modification (interviewee 18). As part of their operations in the Niger delta. 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC) undertakes approximately 30 
Environmental Impact Assessment (ElA) studies each year (interviewee 6). This Impact 
Assessment provides a structured way of looking ahead at the potential positive and negative 
impacts that could arise throughout the project’s lifecycle.
Interviewee 6 and 9 talk about how a full EIA is completed During the ‘Define’ phase for the 
selected concept, possibly as a single EIA for the full field development or a series of project El As 
underneath an integrated ‘umbrella’. This indicates the fact that the EIA should be completed to 
inform the investment decision, rather than during the execute phase, when construction has started. 
Furthermore it states that impacts should be reduced as low as reasonably practicable at this stage. 
Unfortunately the reality is that EIA’s are often done after the economic and technical feasibility 
studies have been completed and investment decisions made (interviewee 12). El As are typically 
produced by project proponents, who have the most stakes in acceptance of the project. This clearly 
leads to the possibility of biased and insufficient environmental impact statements (interviewee 13). 
While RDS claim to undertake 30 EIA studies each year in the Niger Delta. Reports show that Oil 
spills, waste dumping and gas flaring are endemic. Hundreds of thousands of people are affected, 
particularly the poorest and those who rely on traditional livelihoods such as fishing and agriculture.
Respondents felt it is necessary that they incorporate biodiversity issues into their management 
systems as these are the vehicles delivering their environmental policies and strategies. It is also the 
way for RDS to organize the operational aspects of their business and measure improvements in 
performance. Interviewee 5 notes that in the Sakalain II offshore oil and gas project (proposed US$ 
20 billion project on Russia’s Pacific Coast), some of our managers considered that significant 
impacts on a critically endangered species like the Western Gray Whale are acceptable’. 
Interviewee 18 states ‘if the ultimate conclusion is that the population disappears, it would destroy 
our reputation, and make a mockery of our Biodiversity standard’.
Finally, respondents speak about environmental audits which may be performed in-house or by an 
independent third party. While RDS claim to conduct an independent and impartial environmental 
audit of their facilities in the Niger Delta, the terms of reference of the audit, its lack of 
independence and the secrecy with which it was conducted have been severely criticised.
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Respondents felt that the issue with standards for environmental auditing (e.g. ISO 
14010,14011;1996) is that they do not mandate third-party audits or external disclosure of audit 
reports, and tend to focus on environmental management system audits as opposed to legal 
regulation compliance.
Greenpeace acknowledges RDS conducts audits for the sake of improving measurement systems 
and practice standards, but conclude that RDS’s claim that it operates under uniform standards 
worldwide as a complete joke. Prove of RDS polluting water in the Niger Delta came when a 
“team analyzed samples taken from the village stream and discovered that the total petroleum 
hydrocarbons tested eighteen parts per million (ppm), 360 times higher than levels deemed 
acceptable in the European Community.” These figures show that RDS and other IOC’s operating 
in the region have clearly not used effective measures to prevent oil spills from recurring. Failure of 
RDS to ensure rigorous monitoring of operations means that the probability of an increase in 
questionable practices and operational problems becoming more severe than would have been the 
case if they were identified earlier. In situations of oil spills and environmental impacts, the MMS 
recommend a calculation of Annual number of all oil spills greater than or equal to 1 barrel and less 
than 10 barrels for the calendar year)/[(Number of major platforms) + 0.5(Number of minor 
platforms) + (Number of wells spudded for drilling during the year).
63.3.5 Legal Implication of Standards
As well as their use in interpreting petroleum contracts and legislation, national courts may invoke 
international guidelines in prosecutions for environmental offences (interviewee 6, 10, 12). This is 
true with the case of the Niger Delta, where RDS has constantly made pay outs to indigenes as a 
result of court jurisdictions (interviewee 3 & 6). Particularly the ISO 14000 Series, or other industry 
standards for EMS based on the Series, possibly will become the legal standard of due care in 
negligence cases relating to the environment (interviewee 6). For example in june 2010, a jury 
found TAV Engineering Ltd guilty of failing to protect workers and members of the public 
following an investigation into the explosion and fire at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot in December 
2005 (Environmental Agency; 2010). Alternatively, depending on the jurisdiction, the 
implementation of effective and efficient management systems could grant the basis for "due 
diligence" defence prosecution cases for environmental offences. This could reduce the risk of 
regulators implementing a prosecution, or could mitigate the penalty imposed by the court 
(interviewee 6, 8 and 14).
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While workers on the BP oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico had already described it as a Nightmare well, 
BP is adamant that there was no evidence of comer-cutting to save money. However, the latest 
revelations will be seized upon by litigants in the courts (Environmental Agency; 2010). This same 
issue is evident in the Niger Delta where respondents admitted that their inffastmcture needed work 
and that corrosion was responsible for 50 per of oil spills. RDS established a programme to replace 
and upgrade ageing facilities and pipelines, and improve the way the company operated and 
maintained facilities and responded to spills (interviewee 16).
However, many pipelines were not in fact replaced. Instead RDS switched to a Pipeline Integrity 
Management System which involves checking the condition of Pipes and replacing them on the 
basis of condition rather than age (interviewee 6 and 10). While RDS appears to have taken some 
steps to improve performance, it is clear they have not taken effective measures to prevent oil spills 
from recurring, or to properly address the impacts of oil spills. Respondents also spoke about how 
many of their facilities in the Niger Delta have been certified as complying with ISO 14000 
standards. ISO 14000 is a standard on environmental management and does not assess 
environmental impact.
63.3.6 Summary and Overview of Issues
Given that safety management systems nowadays are about putting in place a system of risk 
controls, the real purpose of HSE performance measures must be to evaluate the effectiveness of 
those controls. RDS managers do this by monitoring failures of the controls in use, as well as 
monitoring the functioning of the components of the safety management system designed to 
guarantee that these controls are working effectively and efficiently. Interviewee 5 furthers this 
view by stating that ‘Safety indicators are only worth developing if they are used to steer 
improvement, that is, if our managers focus attention on them in such as manner as to make a 
difference’. The ultimate goal (lagging indicator) of zero occupational fatalities, injuries, illness, 
days lost and adverse environmental impacts requires an active programme of continuous 
improvement, individual accountability, and demonstrable leadership to provide measurable 
stepwise changes in the desired direction. Therefore regulators can treat the industry fatality rate as 
a measure of how well safety is being managed in that industry and try to drive it down by 
promoting various industry-wide safety initiatives.
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Respondents felt that this culture at RDS which spreads an over reliance on mitigation is dangerous 
as not all impacts can be mitigated, not all risks are acceptable, and implementation may not be 
satisfactory. The problems experienced by RDS during construction also indicate that they did have 
an accurate understanding of the environment when they started. Whilst most projects encounter 
some unexpected events during execution, the number and significance of the ongoing problems, 
which have not been addressed with construction continuing, is resulting in significant unnecessary 
impacts (interviewee 6).
In the Niger Delta, there is a growing problem of some of our managers trying to comply on paper 
once a project is half-built, rather than going through a legitimate, inclusive process of assessment 
prior to the project starting’. Finally, respondents identified legal implications of not complying 
with HSE standards and having effect management systems in place. While national courts may 
cite international guidelines in prosecutions for environmental offences the implementation of 
effective and efficient systems could also help mitigate court penalties.
Respondents also identify environmental audits which may be performed in-house or by an 
independent third party. Over time, it is expected that increased international attention will be given 
to requirements for third party environmental auditing and public disclosure of audit results 
(interviewee 5 and 9).
6.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
Assessing the relative importance of the individual factors that affect IOC performance in any 
scientific or objective way is impossible. But, collectively, it is possible to assess whether an IOC is 
performing well or not. However, effective frameworks of performance measures frameworks are 
based on the fact that management accounting information systems cannot rely on financial 
measures alone. A combination of financial and non-financial measures is essential to give a more 
balanced impression of the overall performance of the organization. Chapter 6 proves the 
integration of traditional financial as well as non-financial performance measures that also reflect 
the soft performance drivers of the company will give IOC managers a better understanding of the 
relations among various strategic objectives and to set priorities based on them (Ittner and Larcker; 
2003 ). This is in line with previous studies that have found significant evidence that measurement 
diversity is considered useful by managers and will enhance managerial effectiveness (Chenhall & 
Morris, 1986).
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This section examined financial (ROACE & EVA), subjective (BSC & SR) and industry specific 
measures of performance. Of the latter, the main one is “reserves,” which was assessed via the 
reserves replacement metric. As the large body of research in earlier parts of this thesis shows, the 
financial performance of a RDS is influenced not only by its strategy, but also by its business 
context. The premise of this analysis is that the business context of RDS includes both its external 
and internal environments. The former is defined by the economic, social, competitive and sectoral 
forces that it confronts (Pettigrew, 1992), and the latter by its core competencies (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994). The analysis made it clear that a focus on different strategic (RBV, Positioning and 
Scenario Strategy) priorities is associated with use of different types of performance measures. 
Therefore, I also examine complementarities between strategic priorities and how these influence 
PMS design. A final analysis relates to the implications of complementary emphasis on different 
strategies. The results show that organisations often lay emphasis on multiple strategies 
simultaneously. With an increasing focus on multiple strategies, companies also use performance 
measurement information more extensively and intensively, and, depending on the types of 
strategies pursued, emphasize different combinations of performance measures.
Both the external (Porter, 1980) and internal (Barney, 1991) environments of RDS have an 
influence on its financial performance. Strategy defines how effective the RDS has been in 
leveraging its business context. Its impact on performance cannot be seen in isolation from the 
firm’s business context. The double-headed arrow linking business context and strategy the diagram 
below conveys this relationship (Figure 6.9).
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Consequently, alignment between the objectives and strategy of the firm, and its performance 
measurement system should facilitate effective strategy implementation (e.g. Chenhall, 2005; Ittner, 
Larcker & Randall, 2003). Managers need a combination of multiple perspectives of strategy as 
well as a diverse perspective of performance to gain an accurate overview of company performance. 
While RBV, Positioning and Scenario planning address issues of the internal, external and future 
strategic uncertainty respectively, the 6 measures covered in this study complement each other with 
their focus on multiple goals and different organisational levels. It is thus the combination of a 
thorough examination of the different blends and different levels that leads to effective performance 
measurement.
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.1 Background
This chapter examines the outcomes from the doctoral thesis and dwells on the implications for 
management and aims to show how the problem has been addressed and redefined through 
challenging and adding to the practice of management. The implications for research and practice 
are considered in this section together with methodology. The implications for policy arise from the 
literature review. The implications for practice are viewed in a business context and are a 
derivative of the key findings and conclusions derived from the data analysis. The section rounds of 
with a look at the limitations faced by the researcher and makes suggestions on future research.
7.2 Outcomes
This research has looked at how to measure the performance of an International Oil Company. With 
the understanding that performance is a strategic issue, the research thesis was split into two main 
sections (Strategy in IOC’s and Performance Measurement in IOC’s).The strategy section of this 
thesis covered both positioning and resource based strategies. This thesis offered a new dynamic to 
the traditional emergent and prescriptive view of strategy by acknowledging the role of intuition 
and foresight in the strategic mix through the incorporation of scenario strategy. The performance 
measurement section of the thesis examined a diverse set of measure including financial (ROACE, 
EVA, RRR ‘industry specific’) and subjective (CSR, BSC,HSE ‘industry specific’) thus creating a 
unique blend which facilitates the effective strategic performance measures of IOC’s .
Case studies provided an excellent opportunity for this doctoral thesis to explore new areas such as 
measuring the performance of Royal Dutch Shell thus providing preliminary input into a variety of 
issues. Much of our understanding to date regarding enterprise systems implementations has been 
gleaned from case studies (qualitative research) that have been reported in the literature. Interviews 
at RDS provided in-depth understanding, insights on people’s experiences, and also helped to 
approach the research questions from different dimensions (Mason; 2002). Meanwhile, interviews 
also improved access to a wider variety of people for the doctoral thesis and enabled a greater 
breadth of coverage (Ryman; 2001).
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7.3 Contribution to Practice
7.3.1 Strategic Management Implications for IOC Managers
The five forces model in section 6 helped establish the fact that strategy seeks to reinforce Shells 
position as a leader in the industry and provide investors with competitive and sustained total 
shareholder returns. Chapter 6 showed that realising IOC strategy will increasingly be shaped by 
what can be seen as the four hard truths. (1) There has been a step-change in global energy demand 
as a result of a growing world population; (2) conventional supplies of oil and gas will struggle to 
keep pace with demand; (3) IOC’s face reduced access to reserves as a result of increased 
competitive rivalry with NOC’s and service companies, and (4) emissions of greenhouse gases, 
such as carbon dioxide (C02), will continue to rise with increased use of fossil fuels’.
The implication for IOC managers is that countries and “safe zones” that are open to IOC 
investment are those in which oil production has already peaked and production is costly (lower 
U.S. states. North Sea); where new production is possible only if oil prices remain at very high 
levels (Alberta); in areas where there are huge technical challenges and production is expensive 
(Siberia, Alberta, offshore West Africa); or in alternative energy sources (oil shale, natural gas). 
Many of these options are very risky, as they may become unprofitable if oil prices drop 
considerably in the future Respondents went on to note that high oil prices are also causing another 
noteworthy change in the industrial landscape (interviewee 3): the rise of oil services firms 
(interviewee 7). They interact more easily with NOC’s (interviewee 1) and offer a greater range of 
services without the sensitivity of booking reserves (interviewee 13). Therefore NOC’s have an 
easier relationship with service companies than RDS and other IOC’s (interviewee 11).
IOC managers have to respond to these various industry developments by turning to traditional key 
strengths: technology and learning, operational capabilities, value-chain integration and 
management skills. These skills allowed RDS to open up new frontiers. In the past RDS opened up 
the North Sea for exploration, now they are exploring and producing in even more difficult 
geography including the Arctic, Oil Sands and Deep Water. RDS also created markets for Liquefied 
Natural Gas and Gas to Liquids. This ability to open up new frontiers will remain a key 
differentiator for lOCs as it adds to their strategic value. Technology will therefore remain a key 
differentiator for IOC managers.
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The resource based viewed analysis of RDS established that their technological excellence is a key 
strength, allowing them to implement projects on time and on budget, but respondents went on to 
insist that technological excellence is not enough and that IOC’s have to act as a good corporate 
citizen, attuned to local needs, if they want their host countries to welcome them and accept their 
presence over the long term. As the rules of oil economics characteristically dictate; corporations 
are more willing to invest in new and potentially risky exploration, drilling, and production projects 
when prices rise, (interviewee 5 and 11) and, as a result, increase hiring of the appropriate workers 
(interviewee 9)
Conversely, when supply outpaces demand respondents noted that prices fall and layoffs follow. 
IOC managers should invest heavily in R&D with a prime focus on the near-term reward of 
increased shareholder value while maintaining long-term sustainability through reserves 
replacement. This will require some investment in unconventional resources that have the potential 
to add significantly to the resource base. Company investment in training new scientists through 
university grants and individual fellowships vdll enable basic research. Although this investment is 
not always categorized as R&D, IOC managers have to be aware that it is immensely important in 
creating the next generation of petroleum scientists, engineers, and geologists.
In order to avert a damaging workforce shortage IOC managers have to take proactive steps to 
ensure that their talent pipelines are replenished and vital institutional knowledge is not lost. 
Managers need to understand the unique values the new generation holds (Andersen; 1998), and 
then formulate and execute strategies to recruit, develop, and engage this new resource (Laherrere; 
2001, Davies and Weston; 2000). Moreover, by incorporating such tactics into their organizational 
fabrics, such leaders should be better able to connect all the workforce generations (Acha; 2002). 
The diagram below (How to Attract and Engage The New Generation) discusses the implications 
such workplace values can have on employers in the industry, as well as the strategies needed to 
develop, deploy, and connect these new entrants.
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Figure 7.1 Develop-Deploy-Connect Model 
Source: Deloitte Research: 2004
In summary, IOC managers should be aware that the world’s nations need energy to power growth, 
but the world’s nations are realizing that the energy may not always come from fossil fuels, 
especially oil. Managers cannot tell for certain when our oil and fossil fuel will be exhausted, 
alternative and renewable energies offers a means to bypass this problem. There are also numerous 
efforts to reduce dependence on fossil based and other un-renewable energies due to their harmful 
environmental effects. These annotations are where the energy paradigm is changing. IOC 
managers can position their organisations as the world’s foremost provider of alternative energies 
among the super-major oil producing firms by vigorously supporting and participating in the 
activities noted above (fig). This offers diversification from other IOC’s also participating in 
alternative energy production (Nixon; 2002). Shell Group's Principles of Sustainable Development
IOC managers could change the face of energy in certain areas of the world, but they must foresee 
the demand before it arrives through the use of effective strategic management tools such as 
scenario planning which can be regarded as a tool for improving decisions making against a 
background of possible future environments. While shareholders of IOC’s continue call on the 
companies to think more about future profitability by investing in renewable energy, some claim 
that this has not produced visible results as it is often argued that IOC’s do not have the skills or the 
will to invest and succeed in the renewable energy business. Shareholders, on the other hand, 
emphasize the need for evolution of these companies, due to concerns about climate change and 
sustainable long term returns. As long as IOC managers take full advantage of the oil based energy 
market while it lasts, they can continue to benefit from the high profitability that this market is
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providing. It is essential that IOC managers capitalise on renewable and alternative energies as a 
failure to be proactive to demand could lead to a loss of first mover advantage from being the oil 
industry pioneer in green energy.
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7.3.2 Implications of Performance Measurement Diversity for IOC Managers
In summary, the case study at RDS has shown that the combination of both financial and non- 
financial measures can capture a wide variety of IOC performance dimensions which managers try 
to achieve. It was established that a wide use of diverse measures (financial, subjective, industry 
specific) would provide RDS managers with an improved lens to understand and evaluate the 
diverse objectives of the company from various performance aspects. Also, IOC’s that operate in 
developing countries like RDS face especially high levels of uncertainty with regards to 
technologies, products or markets (Buchel and Thuy; 2001). This further reduces the meaning and 
validity of short-term quantitative indices of performance. These considerations make objective 
performance indicators appropriate for other forms of organisations but less suited to IOC 
effectiveness (Reuer; 1997).Evidence on the use of various performance at RDS in this doctoral 
thesis, makes it clear that there is more to defining the outcome of these oil giants than the criteria 
of stability survival or financial performance.
176
7.3.2.1 Implication of ROACE to IOC Managers
One view that was prevalent among all respondents was the fact that IOC’s are increasingly ranked, 
and probably priced, by investment analysts and investors on a basis that puts disproportionate 
emphasis on return on capital employed (ROACE). Although many studies have argued for the 
value relevance of accounting information, the predominant view among respondents was that 
historical cost accounting is inappropriate for accurately conveying the financial performance at 
RDS to the financial markets. Consequently, this view has resulted in RDS being required to 
disclose additional financial and operational data (cf. the EASE Statement No. 69).
One of the crucial points which IOC managers have to note from the research at RDS is that the 
main reasons for the lack of confidence in historical cost accounting in the oil and gas industry is 
the fact that IOC’s have distinctive operating features, such as the extensive lead-times in the 
investment process, the risk of drilling a dry well and the lack of a predictable correlation between 
exploration costs and reserve value ROACE and other financial indicators indicator’s were 
perceived as a simplified implicit incentive scheme presented to the companies by the financial 
market In responding to these incentives, IOC managers need to balance short-term goals of return 
on capital and long-term goals of production growth and reserve replacement.
13 .2.1 Implications of EVA to IOC Managers
Managers identified Economic Value Added as an alternative and effective solution being used in 
RDS, stipulating that it has in its favour a blending of traditional accounting with the concept of a 
cost of capital. The analysis contributed to the view that EVA is a superior measure of 
performance as it allows management to combine factors such as economy, accounting and market 
information in its assessment. Interviewee 1 believes that it incorporates much more information 
compared to traditional tools. The analysis established that RDS utilises a measure of EVA for E&P 
companies that included an adjustment for the value of reserves in the ground net of the capital 
invested to secure those reserves. Unlike traditional financial metrics the greater explanatory power 
of this new measure reflects the reality—well known to industry practitioners and analysts that 
changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or 
cash flows.
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RDS measured EVA as far down as the reservoir level. This provided insights into wealth creation 
that would have been missed at the consolidated level. Changes in shareholder wealth could be 
broken down into field-level operating efficiencies such as lease operating expenses per barrel. 
When it comes to exploration activities IOC managers have to be aware that ‘successful efforts’ 
accounting means that only the costs of successful investments (those with future economic 
significance) are capitalised and placed on the balance sheet. Unsuccessful investments are 
conventionally written off considering that it is usual for IOC’s to drill many exploration holes 
before one with viable quantities of oil is found. While certain respondents were of the opinion that 
EVA is generally superior to earnings another accounting-based performance measures in 
explaining security returns other respondents believe that EVA is not a superior measure of firm 
performance. Based on statistical evidence, Knight revealed that EVA is not as accurate as cash 
flow returns on investment.
7.3.23 Implications of RRR to IOC Managers (Industry Specific Measure)
One of the main implications of this thesis to IOC managers is that reserves data are extremely 
important to investors to value and assess the performance of energy companies. The magnitude of 
the Shell re-categorization scandal shows that there are problems which need to be addressed by 
both IOC’s concerned and SEC. It is clear that oil and gas reserves disclosure requirements have 
not kept pace vyith industry changes. For years respondents had questioned SEC’s decision not to 
include oil from oil sands in the estimation of proved reserves. However managers should be aware 
that SEC changed its rules to start including the oil it extracts fi'om oil sands in its estimation of 
proved reserves in December 2009. The interviews made it clear that IOC managers have to adjust 
reserves estimates to reflect known changes in the underlying fact pattern. If this is not done, the 
disclosed reserves will be problematic because they would not portray the best estimate of IOC 
reserves at the time they are reported.
Transparency is equally important and IOC managers should provide as much transparency as 
possible with regard to geographical breakdown and the booking of material projects. IOC 
managers need to look at the possibility of ensuring third party certification to prepare IOC reserves 
estimates, assess their estimates, and evaluate the proved reserves information in the filings that it 
makes with SEC. It is clear from the thesis that it is essential to go further than focusing on solely 
improving reserve accounting rules as improving the procedures surrounding the estimation of
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reserves could be the solution to the recent reserve restatement issues. IOC managers should thus 
focus on ensuring IOC’s have effective internal control systems for calculating and reporting 
reserves estimates, conducting an independent audit report; and finally limiting the amount of 
performance-based compensation that is tied to reserves balances. The key is to ensure all managers 
are ethical.
In respect of exploration activities, IOC managers have to pay further attention to issues 
surrounding ‘successful efforts vs full cost’ accounting which was covered briefly in this thesis. It is 
recommended that IOC managers address whether the disclosure for reserves should be 
supplemented with greater financial and value disclosure, as reserves have very different values 
depending on their location, maturity, and the fiscal regime. SEC initially required oil and gas 
companies to account for their oil and gas activities at historical cost using successful efforts 
method (SE) instead of the full cost method (PC). However, the SEC unhappy that neither the SE 
nor the PC methods were appropriate for communicating oil and gas firms’ underlying asset and 
reserve values issued Accounting Series Releases No. 253 (SEC, 1978) and No. 269 (SEC, 1979) 
which effectively suspended the historical cost accounting method requirement in SPAS 19 
(interviewee 16).
73.2.4 Implication of BSC to IOC Managers
In spite of the fact that the conventional balanced scorecard considers nonfinancial and non- 
quantitative issues, which characterize many ecological and sustainability aspects, other 
respondents in the analysis felt that the traditional BSC basically does not explicitly distinguish and 
balance different stakeholder interests, eco-efficiency and sustainability issues, and derived strategic 
goals Most respondents thus felt that the BSC could be seen as a tool at their disposal to help them 
navigate the sometimes foggy worlds of strategy and CSR. IOC managers can use the BSC to 
strategically manage the alignment of cause-and-effect relationships of external market forces and 
impacts with internal CSR drivers, values and behaviour.
As management found that there was resistance to stand-alone CSR initiatives, they used the 
Balanced Scorecard to address CSR opportunities and challenges. To bring more balance into how 
we measure our success and progress on the integration of the Triple Bottom Line, RDS will 
launched a Balanced Scorecard which is published for employees, is updated quarterly and is one of 
the basic internal measurement tools for our progress on the Triple Bottom Line. When working
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with the BSC, a more integrated approach which IOC managers may follow in the future could 
consist of a transversal SB SC (Appendix B) in which environmental and social indicators are 
installed at all four levels of the BSC. Such an approach would strongly increase integration of 
sustainability management. Conversely, RDS managers might also ask how economic and 
environmental sustainability can contribute to the ‘human case’ of social sustainability and how 
economic and social sustainability contribute to the ‘green case’. Here topics such as ‘eco 
effectiveness’ (rather than efficiency) and ‘sufficiency’ of needs would have to be discussed.
73.2.5 Implications of CSR to IOC Managers
If CSR is to become a strategic activity, the IOC managers will have to monitor the impact of its 
activities. RDS uses appropriate systems to control their CSR behaviour and achievements to be 
able to assess whether they are responding to stakeholder concerns and meeting their own internal 
CSR targets and goals (interviewee 8 and 9). IOC managers however have to be aware that goals 
are not easy to convert into numerical measures as they are a sum of many factors influencing the 
goals. In order to address the issues associated with measuring CSR, IOC managers should address 
the dual perspectives of resource consumption and value creation, include economic, 
environmental, and societal aspects, systematically consider each stage in the product life cycle and 
develop effective leading and lagging indicators.
Brand damage of an IOC through a problem with a single product or operation can be rather 
disruptive for the global activities of the company as a whole (Weiss; 1999). The Brent Spar and 
Niger Delta are good illustrations. The potential of an event to lead to large-scale disruptions of 
existing social arrangements is often recognised to late by IOC managers. The recent power of the 
media to globally broadcast information on a disruptive event, its causes and impacts, has created a 
situation in which local calamities have global impacts and are magnified many-fold’(Wijen and 
Zoeteman: 2004)
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IOC managers whose companies operate in developing countries must eease all harmful and 
wasteful practices immediately in addition to engaging in the immediate clean-up of affected areas. 
They must also compensate communities for the resources lost as a result of oil exploration and 
production activities. Since commercially available solutions are yet to come into existence for 
separating C02 from the flue gases, the only workable ‘upstream’ option for emissions abatement is 
a reduction in the level of flare gas. IOC managers have to be aware that this again depends on the 
availability and costs of technologies to make use of and/or safely deposit the recovered gas, as well 
as the potential demand for gaseous products at the domestic, regional and international level. 
Engaging in partnerships with governmental bodies and NOG could also be seen as a winning 
strategy for IOC’s. The diagram below shows a more systematic approach to stakeholder 
engagement than traditionally evidenced by oil majors, and raises several salient process points -  
such as the importance of including vulnerable groups; the possible value of using intermediary 
organisations; the importance of mapping stakeholder groups as well as a strategic and professional 
approach to their engagement
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They should be meaningful, relevant, repeatable, simple, well-defined, comparable, economical to 
collect, timely, and they should facilitate trend analysis for intra and inter department/site 
comparison. One main implication of the study is that that lag indicators are direct measures of 
harm, while lead indicators measure things that are in some ways precursors to harm. The above- 
mentioned examples from RDS all have in common the fact that they are failures of one sort or 
another. Perhaps the point is that lag indicators measure failures, regardless of whether they result 
in harm on any particular occasions. Lead indicators are then a residual category. The problem with 
this proposal is that there are many kinds of failures that are not normally regarded as lag indicators. 
For instance, the failure of a system to stay within safety critical parameters is not normally treated 
as a lag indicator, nor is the failure to comply with procedures.
When accessing the company’s mitigation measures the researcher found the approach taken to date 
has not always been suitably or consistently precautionary, nor has the ALARP (As Low as 
Reasonably Practicable) concept always been implemented in a manner that provides the least 
practicable risk to marine wildlife. The true nature of the Niger Delta situation is evidence of this. 
CSR policies on social responsibility, ethics and protection of the environment and human rights 
policies at RDS are clearly either inadequate or inadequately implemented (interviewee 6, 9 15). 
Certain respondents felt RDS will have no defence if its excessive risks result in the extinction of a 
species. It is essential that impacts are either avoided or are reduced at source, as the receptors of 
whales are so sensitive to that it would not be a matter that could be rectified by compensation.
While loss of containment spill is a critical HSE measure, it seemed not that mattered to RDS as 
spills consistently got worse in the Nigerian Delta. If such indicators are to drive improvement, 
ways need to be found to hold senior managers accountable for them. One clear way is to make 
them part of the remuneration packages (interviewee 6). For the higher level managers in RDS, it is 
however difficult to envision how safety bonuses can offer much in the way of financial motivation 
as the financial benefits they are entitled to far outweigh other sources of income. In these 
circumstances, the impact of safety bonuses must be emblematic with a direct effect on manager 
reputation and pride, rather than exercising any real financial leverage.
13 .2.1 Transferability of Findings
Considering that an organization will choose the particular features of an appropriate accounting 
system depending on the specific circumstances surrounding it, transferability of the findings from
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this thesis outside the context of the oil industry will be difficult. A PMS ought to consist of various 
types of performance measures covering all important aspects agreed as representing the success of 
a company. There must in turn be a balance between the various performance measures in the PMS. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to give an exact definition of the term “balance”, since it includes 
several types of “balance” and is highly dependent on each individual case. The thesis established 
the fact that no single approach is suitable for every organization as each company has its own 
particular products and services, organization, financial structure, legal and regulatory requirements, 
customer demands, data collection and management systems, and environmental impacts.
While generic measures like ROACE, EVA, BSC and are generic measures which most companies 
will find useful, other measures like RRR as well as context specific HSE and CSR examined in this 
thesis are more suited to the oil industry. The main contribution from the thesis however comes in 
the form that PMS should be appropriately focused on short- and long-term results, different types 
of performances (e.g. EVA, BSC, HSE), various strategic perspectives (e.g. Positioning, RBV and 
Scenarios), and various organisational levels (e.g. Corporate, Business and Functional).
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge
7.4.1 Contribution to Stratégie Management Knowledge
The main contribution to knowledge came in the form of extending the research that both the 
external (Porter; 1980) and internal (Barney; 1991) environments of an organisation have an 
influence on its financial performance. The strategy research commenced with the traditional 
emergent and prescriptive views of strategy. By analyzing the oil industry through the five 
forces(section above), this research was able to understand the current position of RDS, the positive 
influence of structure and strategy on performance and the company’s position which is 
predominantly based on technological competence where they can uniquely have a competitive 
advantage. In examining prescriptive strategy, I used the RBV theory which is an efficiency-based 
explanation of performance differences (Barney, 1991; Peteraf and Barney; 2003). The capabilities, 
competencies or resource-based approach emphasizes the firm’s resources as the fundamental 
determinants of competitive advantage and performance.
In the oil industry this is in line with Technological specialization which may take various forms 
and allow companies to capitalize on in-house technical strengths (Economides; 1995, Anon; 2006,
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Arent and Norland; 2006) or to specialize in specific areas such as onshore/offshore, shallow 
water/deepwater, oil/gas, geologic and working interest plays, and mature assets (Williams; 2003, 
Mahtani; 2007, Wintersteller; 1993). Low cost strategies allow companies to explore without large 
financial backing and to farm out acreage after adding value to the asset (Anon; 2006), or to 
purchase marginal (end-of-life) property for production and acreage opportunities (Davies; 2000).
The contribution to strategic management knowledge also came in the form of integrating scenario 
planning into the strategic management framework as opposed to just the traditional emergent and 
prescriptive views. The argument of uncertainties cited in the industrial organisation and resource 
based view lead this thesis into scenario planning strategy which map out the boundaries of 
managers uncertainties and provide a context of expectations for generating and evaluating strategic 
options (Davis; 1994). The necessity of scenarios in the strategy process cannot be overstated as 
IOC’s are faced with a constantly changing market, technology advancements, price fluctuations, 
uncertainty due to OPEC influence etc. Surviving in the oil sector is based on management’s ability 
to take a long view in a world of great uncertainty. The description of hypothetical processes and 
sequences of events - that could develop over a period of time - help IOC managers navigate 
through this highly unstable industry.
7.4.2 Contribution to Performance Measurement Knowledge
Without accurate assessment of what firms have achieved, managers can’t objectively evaluate the 
quality of their strategic decisions for company operations. It is, therefore, essential that researchers 
develop proper performance measures to correctly evaluate the health of the company and ensure 
that the maximum value can be obtained. The contribution of the thesis was in line with Hoque and 
James (2000) who find a positive relation between perceived organizational performance and the 
use of a diverse set of performance measures. The thesis built on the view that researchers believe 
that companies achieve superior performance when they utilise a varying set of financial and non­
financial performance measures (e.g., Chenhall and Morris; 1986, Langfield-Smith; 1997).
The thesis revealed different advantages and shortcomings of each individual performance measure 
and conceptual framework. Although some studies have concluded that accounting information is 
value relevant, the predominant contribution of the thesis was that historical cost accounting is 
inappropriate for accurately conveying the financial performance of IOC to the financial markets 
and shareholders. Some of the issues caused by using solely financial performance are that
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traditional financial performance measures are historical in nature (Langfield-Smith; 1997) provide 
little indication of future performance; (Dixon et al; 1990, Hayes and Abernathy; 1980) encourage 
short-termism (Kaplan; 1986) are internally rather than externally focused with little regard for 
competitors or customers (Chenhall and Morris; 1986, Neely et al; 1995); lack strategic focus 
(Skinner; 1974); and often inhibit innovation (Richardson and Gordon; 1980). It was established 
that the information provided by such cost based systems is inadequate for the effective and 
efficient management of businesses in continuously changing and highly competitive markets.
This research builds on Artley (2001: p. 11-12) discussed broadly the need for strategy focused 
performance measurement systems. He noted that performance measurement systems succeed when 
the organization’s strategy and performance measures are in alignment and when senior managers 
convey the organization’s mission, vision, values and strategic direction to employees and external 
stakeholders (Artley: 2001:11-12). While it is not feasible to recommend eradicating financial 
measure, the thesis established that it was necessary to use a mix of financial, non financial and 
industry specific measures. Contribution also came in the form of incorporating an industry 
specific angle to the traditional financial vs. subjective measures advocated by researchers.
While measures like ROACE, EVA, BSC and CSR covered a diverse spectrum of measures, the 
relevance of reserves and safety performance in the oil industry lead me to the view that it was 
essential to extend this current school of thought to include measures specific to performance of the 
industry. It is clear that my view of adding an industry specific angle to measurement models will 
be applicable to other industries in other forms. While a measure like RRR is obviously specific to 
IOC’s, each industry is guaranteed to have specific measures which are unique to its practice. The 
ability of researchers to identify this is essential as failing to understand the intricacies of each 
sector on an individual basis may not provide an accurate picture of performance thus reducing the 
validity of the research findings. Finally, performance measures give life to the mission, vision, and 
strategy by providing a focus that lets each employee know how they contribute to the success of 
the company and its stakeholders’ measurable expectations.
7.6 Theoretical and Methodological Contribution
This study contributes to the contingency theory of management accounting which suggests that 
there is no universally applicable system of management control but that the choice of appropriate 
control techniques will depend upon the circumstances surrounding a specific organization. It is
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based on the view that the effectiveness and efficiency of organization results from fitting 
management practices, i.e. PMS, to the contingencies/contexts within which the organization 
operates (Chenhall, 2006). In line with these studies, performance measurement systems at RDS 
are seen as supporting the effective implementation of intended strategies (Henri, 2006). This paper 
examines how firms structure and align their PMS in response to their strategic orientation.
Chenhall (2003) argues that the generation of propositions concerning novel relationships 
concerning MCS, processes and their contextual setting are often best identified and elaborated by 
using case study methods. This is also one of the reasons I decided to use an in-depth explanatory 
case study method to investigate the relationship among MCS, strategy and organisational 
performance that is grounded on the contingency theory framework of MCS. Yin notes that single 
case study is used to confirm or challenge a theory, or to represent a unique or extreme case (Yin, 
1994). This thesis utilises a single case study approach in an attempt to confirm the relationship 
between strategic management and performance measurement systems.
Case studies are an appropriate research strategy to adopt when the research questions are “how” 
and “why”; when control over behavioural events is not required; when the research is focused on 
contemporary events; and when the researcher wishes to understand an organizational phenomenon 
in its real-life context (Yin, 1994). The investigation conducted in this dissertation research falls 
into these categories. Perhaps because a case study focuses on a single unit, a single instance, the 
issue of generalizability looms larger here than with, other types of qualitative research. However, 
much can be learned from a particular case. Readers can learn vicariously from an encounter with 
the case through the researcher's narrative description. (Stake, 2005). Further, Erickson (1986) 
argues that since the general lies in the particular, what we learn in a particular case can be 
transferred to similar situations.
Considering a central contingent variable is the strategy and objectives that an organization decides 
to pursue, control system’s require objectives and goals against which its performance can be 
assessed (Otley and Berry, 1980). The conceptual framework is designed to explore and elucidate 
organizational aims and objectives, and the mechanisms that have been put in place to measure and 
monitor goal attainment. Achieving this is based on performance measurement systems being able 
to document historical performance, indicate current position with respect to strategy, predict future 
performance as well as motivate and control action. The conceptual model was therefore designed
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to explore and document the connections the organization has made between its strategic intent 
objectives, and the means by which it hopes to realize them.
With fast changes taking place in business and industry, the PM concepts of past are outdated today, 
as they need to be modified according to today’s requirements. This necessitated the development 
of the conceptual framework in this thesis which is effective for total business goal and thus 
facilitating the linkage of operational performance to corporate goals. Hence, there was a need in 
the thesis to identify and analyse various links to performance measures at different levels in the 
organisation ranging from operational, middle to top level performance. It is an essentially multi­
dimensional approach to performance measurement.
It suggests that as well as financial measures of performance, attention should be paid to the 
requirements of customers, business processes and longer-term sustainability. It can be seen that no 
single technique has developed answers to all 4 of goals as well as all levels of the organisation. It 
may therefore be beneficial for both practitioners and researchers to consider all of the aspects 
identified in evaluating and refining the above techniques. Although a particular technique does not 
address all of the issues identified, such matters are dealt with by a combination of a variety of 
techniques in the overall organizational control system created for this thesis.
7.5 Limitations and Future Research
7.5.1 Limitations
A number of limitations were identified in the course of the research process not evident when 
commencing the study. The number of course participants, were 18 from Royal Dutch Shell. This 
relatively small number may restrict to some extent the ability to generalise results. Also, 
considering the research was conducted with information from the years 2008 and 2009, responses 
may have differed prior to these dates and may also vary if the research was to be carried out in the 
future. Furthermore the amount of time available for data collection was also limited, as a result of 
other university deadline and commitments. The study attempted out the outset and was successful 
in understanding the subjeet-as-self, by interpreting the meaning of others' internal worlds through 
their actions and explicit accounts.
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I was also successful in understanding researcher-as-self, by acknowledge that our own perceptions 
are filtered through a layer of tacit knowledge, accrued from leaming-by-doing and inductive 
generalizations from un self-conscious observation (Schon; 1983). Unfortunately, as is often the 
case with case studies, my conclusions can be challenged for its lack of generalizability to other 
organizations and industries as research was based entirely on RDS and the oil industry. A possible 
alternative for the doctoral thesis could have been a positivism paradigm which is based on the 
ontology of the world that is external and objective, whereas the epistemology is based on the belief 
that the observers are independent. In taking this stance this study would have been more likely to 
study causal relationships between management activities and outcomes by using methods driven 
by a quantitative approach (Yin; 1988, Cheng; 2001).
7.5.2 Future Research
While this thesis utilised the five forces model, RBV and scenario planning to conduct the strategic 
management analysis, future research could look into other strategic models such as P.E.S.T 
analysis. Transaction Cost Economics etc in conducting future strategic analysis on the oil industry. 
Though most strategy typologies have limited the strategy space only to two dimensions, any 
numbers of dimensions are theoretically possible (SI, S2) in future research. In addition, the 
strategy frontier shown is hypothetical.
Using the framework shown in the figure below it is possible to identify four types of strategy 
dynamics or outcomes over time: improving/imitating, migrating, consolidating and innovating. It is 
important for managers to note here that an effective strategy must not only seek to exploit the 
companies external opportunities and internal competencies creatively, but it must also endeavour 
to strengthen its business context by exploring for new opportunities and renevring its 
competencies.
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Figure 7.5 Possible Strategic Dimensions 
Source: C hahravarthy  and W hite; 2001
Also, this thesis focused on 6 measures; it is arguable that a focus on fewer measures could have 
improved information value and focus so it is thus my opinion that future research could take just 
three measures while maintaining the objective/subjective/industry specific divide. Researchers 
could probably examine the advantage of using one of each e.g. (ROACE, EVA, RRR, HSE). 
Future research could also focus on the impact of environmental factors on the bottom line. While 
RDS has been forced to pay a number of fines resulting from inadequate HSE systems, the 
magnitude of pay-outs in the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill reinforces the danger of infective CSR 
metrics. BPs partner Anadarko which has a 25 per cent interest in the blown-out well has accused 
BP of either "gross negligence" or "will-full misconduct" and may take legal action. Analyst 
estimate cleanup costs may run from $20 billion to $140 billion spread over five to 20 years 
(Environmental Ageny; 2010).
Considering most respondents were of the opinion that a lot of Shells issues stem from corporate 
governance problems (i.e bonuses tied into big reserves estimates, lack of accountability due to 
unique corporate structure), future research could focus specifically on corporate governance, ethics 
and accountability in the oil industry. While the doctoral thesis focused on RRR as an industry 
specific measure, future research in this industry can extend the construct to include other oil 
industry measures like unit cost and production growth.
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Future research can look at the possibility of disclosure being augmented to disclose movements in 
the total company ‘proven plus probable’ (P50) reserves estimates (Quirin et al; 2000) in addition to 
the more detailed movements in ‘proven’ (P90) reserves that are already required (Magnan and 
Cormier; 2002). As many users want volume disclosure beyond proved reserves future research 
should consider such issues as when these disclosures should be presented in the financial report 
(Quirin et al; 2000, Rajgopal; 1999), what reserve/resource information should be in financial 
reporting disclosures (Odell; 1998,Chua and Woodward; 1994, Levine; 2006) and finally if reserve 
estimates be presented as “through the eyes of management” or reflecting standardised conditions 
(e.g. price) (Magliolo; 1992, Osmundsen et al; 2006).
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8. Reflective Diary
8.1 Learning the Basics
The DBA is designed to enable a significant contribution be made towards the enhancement of 
professional practice in the area of management. Thus, the research undertaken has to be rigorous 
to be worthy of a Doctorate and immediately relevant to the world of management through 
addressing real problems. It is a Practitioner Doctorate. The first year was based on supporting 
research design and application through examining current and topical methodological questions 
and debates. Module 1 was based on philosophical underpinnings which directly relates to the 
research design. Knowledge and understanding was gained for appropriate techniques and 
approaches for the creation of new knowledge. The next model focused on qualitative research 
methods. This gave me an understanding of the practical issues and problems which need to be 
focused on in the design stage.
The third model followed provides a detailed understanding of quantitative techniques which can be 
used in academic enquiry. I used quantitative methods for the collection of management data in 
Crystal Petroleum. The module on critical review gave me the ability to make informed judgements 
on the strengths and weaknesses of published texts and research. It is my opinion that this phase of 
the research was crucial for a critical literature review which in turn enhanced my ability to write 
critically. The final module ended with the writing of a research proposal which was based on 
gaining an appreciation of appropriate research design as well as gaining an ability to conceptualise 
management problems. Completing all modules was essential to my development as a critical 
researcher as I am now more equipped to read reports at a more advanced level. I now view most 
issues through an unbiased lens from various perspectives before making any conclusions.
8.2 Starting the DBA thesis
The DBA is designed to enable a significant contribution to be made towards the enhancement of 
professional practice in the area of management. It was essential for my thesis to be rigorous in 
order to be worthy of a Doctorate and immediately relevant to the world of management through 
addressing real problems. I initially spent a couple of months reading through and trying to gain a 
better understanding of the concept and research question. The proposal writing assignment was 
thus my guiding factor at this stage as it gave a brief insight into the research question, structure and
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design. The lack of this could have led to a lot of issues as new themes and ideas were established 
during this extensive process. This phase gave me the ability to distinguish the important topics 
from the unimportant ones.
The nature of the practitioner doctorate in itself means that there’s a constant risk of blurring the 
lines between consultancy and research. My focus on contribution to new management knowledge 
overall was essential as opposed to a focus on just contribution to a particular issue at RDS. 
International Oil Companies have made bold claims about their unique role as suppliers of 
technology, capital and access to markets that are hard to validate with reality, especially in the 
present high price environment where most oil producing countries have not allowed lOCs access to 
hydrocarbon reserves. It was thus challenging to study strategic performance measurement of these 
companies.
The main purpose is to study the interaction between performance measurement systems, strategy 
and its impact on organisational performance in International Oil Companies; considering the way 
in which multiple aspects of control systems and dimensions of context combine in a variety of 
ways to enhance performance. The contribution of this thesis is that it upgrades the existing theory 
from the stand point of not only establishing a relationship between strategy and management 
control systems, but also considers how this relationship impacts on organisational performance
8.3 Research and Writing
One thing clear from examining my final thesis is the fact that only about 30% was identified in the 
proposal. Learning and readjusting over the years was essential to the completion of my thesis. By 
using a qualitative approach for this thesis, the authors will initially conduct a strategic analysis of 
RDS and subsequently investigate how the Performance measurement of oil companies works and 
what measures should be applied. In order to gain knowledge on how to measure the performance 
of oil companies, the author will collect information from theory and through interviews. By 
applying the information gathered to Royal Dutch Shell, the author will reach an objective picture 
of measuring the performance of International Oil Companies.
The guidance of my supervisors was crucial to completing this thesis as there were numerous 
situations which their many years of expertise in the fields of strategy and finance were the crucial 
factors in progress. Certain scenario’s came about where they were able to foresee areas in which I
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might have problems in the long run, thus enabling early readjustment as appropriate. Their depth 
of knowledge became the protective shield of my doctoral program. In this respect I remain very 
grateful to both supervisors for constantly asking questions which enhanced my critical reasoning 
and learning process.
8.4 Final Phase and Outcome
The final phase was predominantly based on reading through and readjusting where necessary. This 
was quite time consuming and much more difficult than expected as it was essential to keep all 
points in while making it more concise. Through the DBA I have been able to develop the skills of 
reflecting upon, developing and applying appropriate solutions to business issues at an advanced 
level. I also developed confidence in my decision-making, ensuring it is evidence-based and 
appropriate in a complex and often fluid organisational context. I learnt more about the use of 
Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (SPMS) and how it influences organizational 
performance through its contribution to the formulation of a more comprehensive strategic agenda. 
While the study may have taking longer than expected, I must say that i thoroughly enjoyed it and 
am very proud of the outcome. Overall the length of the journey in the end was completely worth it.
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A OIL INDUSTRY RESERVES
The Middle East currently has almost two-thirds of the 1.15 trillion barrels of the world’s proven 
reserves which is why the region has disproportionate geopolitical importance. But it is important to 
note that distribution of proven reserves is only a rough approximation of how oil is distributed 
around the world. For example, the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico and offshore West Africa 
have only recently been added to the proven reserves list as advances in oil development technology 
have become more available.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
In the important states of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, decision makers 
have been conservative about committing resources to capacity expansion. Saudi Arabia has 
invested $10 billion to $15 billion in recent years designed to bring on new fields to maintain its 1 
million to 1.5 million barrels a day cushion of spare capacity in the face of declining output capacity 
at some of its mature fields, but the Saudis have resisted calls from the United States and elsewhere 
that it expand its output to meet the expected rise in oil demand. Production in the United Arab 
Emirates has been relatively static, while Kuwait has been expanding output only slowly. The 
diagram below shows proven oil reserves data split by countries with greatest remaining reserves.
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The reserves-to-production ratios are also shown in the figure providing information on the oil 
depletion time expressed in years.
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APPENDIX B CRUDE OIL PRICE
The fact that crude oil prices are established by the forces of supply and demand means that prices 
are highly influenced by producers, eonsumers and traders. Big macroeconomies changes events 
such as OPEC announcements, war etc can significantly influence crude supply levels which will 
thus result a huge change in the prices of erude. Uneertainty about the resolution and timing of the 
conflict has also increased volatility in oil prices. In the medium term, financial and political 
instability in Latin America is delaying investments in oil related infrastrueture. In particular, there 
are concern that i) the financial instability in Argentina may spread to Venezuela and Uruguay; ii) 
several nations have elected populist presidents who have imposed taxes on oil production and 
exploration. In the long term, most untapped deep sea oil reserves are located off the eoast of South 
America and Nigeria. Political instability in these countries will significantly impact upstream oil 
activities in the drilling industry.
A similar approach is followed by EIA with its International Energy Outlook 2006 for determining 
the prices. These are derived in an iterative way, starting from an oil priee base assumption: the
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starting value, which is based on the average price of imported low-sulphur, light crude oil to U.S. 
refiners, is revised either upward or downward depending on whether the price assumed is able to 
meet the future total world oil demand or not.
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I equd  to  "Total oil demand" 
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Figure: EIA model for oil production and price calculation 
Source; Casam assim a; 2007
APPENDIX C: ROYAL DUTCH SHELL STRUCTURE
The combined group is overseen by an executive board known as the committee of managing 
directors (CMD). The members of the CMD are appointed by the boards of the parent companies. 
The supervisory board of Royal Dutch controls a number of foundations that own ‘priority shares’ 
that confer voting rights but no economic benefit. These enable the supervisory board to control 
nominations to both parent company boards and thus to the CMD. The CMD is not formally 
covered by the joint venture agreement that defines the merged company and so it has no formal 
authority over the parent companies’ assets.
Under a decentralised organisational structure, the Shell Group has enabled the individual 
Operating Companies to develop strong national identities and considerable capacity to define 
operating decisions Cohesion and the formation of a group culture takes place through the 
continuous rotation of senior executives as well as through the creation of working committees 
incorporating personnel from several operating and service companies Shell literature explains that 
to achieve the use of common principles by Group operating companies, the company exercises
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tight controls on national subsidiaries through economic mechanisms and annual appraisals, as well 
as through involvement in the appointment of managing directors and board members.
APPENDIX D MAJOR CHALLENGES AT RDS
1995 was a traumatic year for Shell. As table 1 illustrates, within a period of a few months the 
company was for two reasons put in the public spotlight. In June 1995, Shell’s decision to dump the 
Brent Spar buoy was met with public opposition far stronger than anyone had expected. Also, 
peaking in November the same year, the public outrage against Shell in the wake of the death 
sentence of the Ken Saro Wiwa, was unexpected. This section of the appendix gives brief 
overviews of the two issues.
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Descriptive Overview of OGONI Crisis
Of the major spills from Shell operations in over 100 countries worldwide, 40% occurred in 
Nigeria. Shells twenty-four hour a day operation was not just affecting the atmosphere; it also 
included the “Unlined toxic waste pits which cause contaminants to percolate into drinking water 
and Acid rain which has destroyed much of the delta’s once fertile farmland.” With the continued 
pollution in the mid 1990s, Ken Saro-Wiwa mobilized his people to demand legal compensation 
from RDS through the government and the courts for oil spills in the Niger Delta. In what many 
claim was pressure from RDS, Saro-Wiwa was arrested and assassinated on made up charges 
(Greenpeace: 2010). In a landmark judgement 13 years later, shell was ordered to by the courts to 
pay $15 million to his family.
Descriptive Overview of Brent Spar Case
In February 1995 RDS made plans to dispose of a rusted and obsolete oil-storage platform, known 
as Brent Spar, by sinking it in the Atlantic Ocean, 150 miles off the coast of Scotland.” They had 
two choices one was to properly dismantle the platform through “land disposal of the Brent Spar 
would cost RDS US$70 million, while sinking it would cost a mere US$16 million.” Despite the 
plan to sink the Brent Spar, Greenpeace and public support protested in order to ethically dismantle 
the platform. “Four months after the protests began, on June 20, 1995,: RDS backed down. It would 
spend the extra millions to tow the platform to Norway, where it could be dismantled on land.” 
Although RDS seemed to do the right thing at the end, it took a public backlash to acquire the 
change of mind. The Brent Spar incident “resulted in a widespread boycott of Shell Oil in northern 
Europe that cost the company $10 million per day in Germany alone.” Without such public 
pressure; Shell would have without a doubt, disposed of the platform at sea.
APPEENDIX E SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
Reporting is also one important approach, among others, for developing constructive stakeholder 
dialogue and thereby fostering a better understanding of stakeholders’ concerns. Often, these types 
of indicators are used as proxies for the “triple bottom line” or the three legs (i.e., environment, 
social, economic) that form the basis of the concept known as sustainable development or 
sustainability
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